The Foundational Elements for an Optimal Ethiopian Nile Basin Treaty Covering Water Allocation and Basin Management 

February 24, 2026

Berhanu Abegaz (Prof.)

Ethiopia finds itself in a position where NBI fatigue, climate stress, and naked power politics are undermining an equitable settlement over Nile waters. I argue here that a legitimate, creative, and effective strategic option for ending hydro-hegemony over the Ethiopian Nile is for Ethiopia to: (i) craft a coherent national water strategy that controls the narrative by articulating its legitimate sovereign interests and development ambitions, (ii) recognize water quota allocation, not dam management per se, is the root cause of the incessant conflict; (iii) insist on a comprehensive Ethiopian Nile treaty (embracing responsible water utilization and joint basin management) that is negotiated under the principles and norms embedded in modern international water courses conventions and their tangible expressions in extant treaty practices, and (iv) invoke subsidiarity as a principle to unilaterally manage silt flows, water use, and basin health, pending a binding Nile treaty.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Nile River is the only major transboundary river in the world that remains ungoverned by a comprehensive treaty under the guidelines set by international water conventions and expressed tangibly in treaty practices. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI, 1999) has gone a long way toward advancing this goal but remains unfinished. Two lower riparians, Egypt and Sudan, withdrew from final negotiations hoping to preserve historically inequitable water use. In the meantime, Ethiopia remains a dominant contributor and yet a marginalized utilizer of its sovereign waters. 

This paradox is no longer tenable. Nor can it be resolved by dwelling on this or that dam. It is time to search for fresh and practicable ideas. I offer one here on approach that is worth a thoughtful consideration.

There is much consensus on the hydrology of the Nile Basin. The root causes of the disputes over Nile waters, therefore, lie in power play and legality. The upper riparian countries (especially Ethiopia and Uganda) reject inequitable colonial or bilateral treaties that institutionalize the colonialist monopoly enjoyed by the two lower riparians (Egypt and Sudan) till today. Given these legacy benefits and the absence of iron-clad and easily interpretable international water laws in the existing water conventions and the variance among treaty practices, Egypt has understandably shied away from binding treaties that would commit it to equitable water allocations and the cost sharing needed to arrest the deteriorating basin environment. 

When circumstances incentivize it, an ideal Nile Treaty would have key features that are consonant with contemporary principles and practices embodied in international water conventions and extant treaties: it must involve all stakeholder states of significance in the negotiations; it must cover equitable water allocation and sustainable utilization practices; it must provide for timely data-sharing and cost-sharing arrangements regarding major water projects and in the joint management of the entire basin to minimize negative spillover effects; and it must include effective dispute resolution mechanisms. More specifically, an implementable comprehensive treaty covering transboundary rivers and connected aquifers must be crafted by adopting and adapting the legal principles, guidelines, and actual practices that are informed by the UN Watercourses Convention (UN, 1997; Stoa, 2014; UN-Water, 2021), the Berlin Rules on Water Resources (ILA, 2004), an improved institutional design of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement that unpacks water misguided securitization (Mekonnen, 2010), and the peculiarities of the Nile Basin itself. 

This note explores the parameters of an imperative and optimal comprehensive Nile treaty. It focuses on Ethiopia’s case since it contributes 86 percent of Nile water and almost all of the silt and yet benefits the least from its sovereign water resources despite its glaring food insecurity and the lack of access to electricity for half of its households and its ambition to commercialize agriculture and industrialize. 

2. BASIC FACTS AND CONSEQUENTIAL MISCONCEPTIONS

The Ethiopian highlands, the water towers of Africa, give rise to three clusters of transboundary rivers which have been a curse of a blessing for Ethiopia. Until very recently, the country has not been able to tap its deeply gorged and erosion-prone rivers for transportation, irrigation, or electrification. Figure 1 depicts the geography and hydrology.

The Ethiopian (Eastern) Nile Basin (ENB), comprising the rivers Abay, Baro-Akobo, and Tekeze-Setit)  contributes 86% of the total Nile flow (76 billion cubic meters, bcm, of the total 88 bcm). Abay (aka Blue Nile) contributes some 65% of the Nile’s total flow at the Aswan Dam. Baro–Akobo contribute 14% of the flow as they join the White Nile in the wetlands (Sudd) of South Sudan. Tekeze-Setit (aka Atbara) contributes 7% as it joins the Nile north of Khartoum. Nearly all of the silt is generated by the ENB, which explains the white-blue segments of the world’s longest river connecting Lake Victoria and the Mediterranean Sea, (dis)serving over 400 million people and USD 800 billion of annual income. 

What we may call the Ethiopian Somali Basin (ESB) includes the Shebelle, Genale, and Dawa rivers. Two-thirds of the catchment area and 90 percent of the water is Ethiopian  in origin. The Shebelle is the lifeline of Somali agriculture as it crosses Somalia to dissipate into the Indian Ocean. Genale and Dawa (aka Juba) provide reliable perennial water flow for Somalia and northeast Kenya before reaching the Indian Ocean at Kismayo. Somalia is, therefore, almost entirely dependent on the water and silt of the ESB for its food security and future industrial use. On the Kenyan front, the Omo and Gibe rivers are the sole feeders of the desert Lake Turkana. That leaves Awash as the only semi-boundary river of great economic significance.

Figure 1:  The Geography and Hydrology of Ethiopia’s Transboundary Rivers

Source: Drawn with the help of ChatGPT 5.2. The map is good for the general location of the major basins.  It is, however, inaccurate in terms of basin boundaries.

So, the key question we address here is what a coherent transboundary water strategy should look like for Ethiopia, preferably tailored to each of its major transboundary basins, to ensure equitable and sustainable watersheds and livelihoods. More precisely, what should Ethiopia do to take the lead in crafting a comprehensive and binding treaty, especially with Sudan and Egypt, to avoid negative-sum water settlements and endless political destabilization at bay?

By focusing on the decisive political and legal dimensions of the deep-seated disputes over water  and silt, and anchoring the solution in a treaty guided by international conventions and actual practices, we aim to dispel the following four misconceptions: 

1. The conflict of interest among the Nile riparian states can be solved primarily by hydrological and technical mechanisms. In reality, there is a high level of agreement among water experts on the impacts of natural processes and human-caused basin interventions since these assessments are based on scientific modeling and tested using the best available data. What fuels the resistance against an implementable and equitable water treaty is political intransigence by historically privileged riparians and the inadequacies of international water laws themselves.
2. The upstream countries (mainly Ethiopia) and the downstream countries (mainly Egypt) can reconcile their conflictual interests through partial agreements such as shared management protocols governing projects such as the renaissance dam of Ethiopia, the Rosiere dam of Sudan, or the Aswan dam of Egypt. Nile basin countries do not have a tradition of systematic data sharing or prior consultation concerning the initiation and implementation of mega hydropower or irrigation projects. Furthermore, the sources of conflict go far beyond dam building and management. They involve irrigation and basin health in the face of rapid population growth, commercialization of agriculture, industrial use of water, and the relentless degradation of the highland ecosystem. In the absence of treaties and join programs, the two lower riparians have enjoyed exclusive de facto control of the Nile basin without any reciprocity—something unseen elsewhere in the world. 
3. The ultimate source of conflict is solely over water share because reducing silt outflow from upper riparians benefits downstream countries by reducing the silting of dams. As we argue below, the first part of this assertion is correct, but the second part is not. Given the topography, the huge annual silt loss is arguably more damaging to Ethiopian agriculture than water loss. Similarly, if Egypt were to receive the same volume of water that it does now without any silt from the Ethiopian Nile, the sandy soils of the Nile Valley and Delta would not support a rich agricultural base. Silt matters as much as water, if not more.
4. International water conventions and practices provide clearcut laws for straightforward treaty-based solutions. As we argue below, international water conventions and treaty practices that govern major world rivers (Colorado, Niger, Danube, Euphrates-Tigris, Ganges,  Indus, Mekong) provide useful principles and guidelines rather than iron-clad laws with  effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Crafting a mutually acceptable Nile treaty, therefore, entails goodwill and wisdom in adapting these guidelines to the specificities of the region.
5. THE OVERLOOKED SILT-WATER PARADOX

It is worth noting that Ethiopia’s surface water, the annual surface runoff from the river basins,  is estimated at 124 bcm and its sub-surface water at 16 bcm—enough to meet, at the international average, the annual water needs of 120 of its 130 million people (Zhang, et al., 2025). All but one of its nine major rivers are transboundary, and Ethiopia currently utilizes less than 5% of its potential water resources. These facts offer both opportunities and challenges for the low-income country.

Table 1 provides a structured profile of Ethiopia’s transboundary rivers, covering their geography, hydrology, and importance. Egypt originates only 1.8 bcm (or 3%) of its renewable surface water, thus deriving the rest from the Nile. Out of the 86 bcm of Ethiopian Nile water volume, Egypt currently utilizes 55.5 bcm (or 65%) and Sudan 18.5 bcm (22%)—leaving the rest to largely avoidable evaporation. 

The deep brown Ethiopian Nile, tumbling down from the steep and progressively denuded Ethiopian highlands, gouge hillsides to scoop up an astonishing millions of tons of fertile soil every year. Estimates suggest that 140 to 230 million tons of sediment flows annually from the Ethiopian Highlands into Sudan and Egypt (Garzanti, et al., 2006). This massive nutrient-rich sediment load historically fed the Nile Delta. Today, much of it is trapped by reservoirs. 

It is the silt, not just the water, which is the unrequited gift of the Ethiopian Nile. This fact goes a long way toward explaining Egyptian angst over dam building by lower riparians. Even non-water consumptive dams like the trailblazing, domestically financed, Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are a threat because they hold back much of the sediment that once flowed downstream. Ethiopia, for example, may have to build more upstream dams just to prevent GERD from fully silting up in two or three generations. 

While dam-focused hydrologists hail this as an unintended gift to Egypt and Sudan in extending the life of dams, they inadvertently divert attention from the potentially disastrous  economic impact of the vanishing soil. Onyango-Obbo (2025) artfully characterizes Egypt’s unspoken angst over Ethiopian dams and soil conservation projects: “For the first time in history, Egypt must face the desert without the brown gold that once floated faithfully down from the upstream highlands. Its natural subsidy has vanished.” 

Table 1: Data on Major Ethiopian Rivers

River	Catchment Area (km2)	Annual Volume, bcm	Terminus
Abay	199,812	54.5	Mediterranean, Egypt
Wabi Shebelle	202,697	3.4	Indian Ocean, Somalia
Genale-Dawa	171,042	6.0	Indian-Ocean, Somalia
Awash	114,123	4.9	Non-transboundary
Tekeze	87,733	8.2	Mediterranean, Egypt
Omo-Gibe	79,000	16.6	Lake Turkana, Kenya
Baro-Akobo	75,912	23.23	Mediterranean, Egypt
TOTAL	854,500 km2	116.83 bm2	Excluding Gash-Mereb

Sources: Compiled from various sources using ChatGPT 5.2.

4. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAWS AND PRACTICES

In crafting the best treaty to govern the Nile, one has to begin with the principles outlined in modern international water conventions and the practices embedded in notable treaties on transboundary rivers. While the tit-for-tat between upstream and downstream Nile stakeholders pays lip service to such lofty principles as equitable and responsible use of water, little attention has been paid to actual treaty practices. Extant treaties show the practical operationalization of broad principles but also reflect geopolitical power imbalances among contending signatories.

1. The Legacies of Colonial and Colonialist Agreements

Table 2 provides an overview  of existing treaties. It also provides useful clues about innovative approaches such as the basin-wide NBI process which strives to honor received principles and proven practices, deepens the quality of CFA institutions, and reconciles the development aspirations of upper riparians with the security concerns of lower riparians:  

• The 1929/1959 exclusionary agreements blatantly favor two downstream countries (Egypt, Sudan), and these “acquired rights” are categorically rejected by upstream postcolonial states.

• While neutral global legal frameworks exist with balanced principles, they provide only guidance and legitimacy. Nile-specific and inclusionary agreements have yet to be crafted.

• The CFA, a regional framework that embraces universal principles, remains politically fragile due to myopic downstream intransigence (AP, 2024; Matthews, 2023; Mekonnen, 2010). 

2. Lessons from Non-Nile Treaties

Existing treaties governing major world rivers provide useful lessons. As shown in Table 3, one striking observation is that upper riparians tend to  be hydrological hegemons. In the Nile Basin, however, lower riparians are the hegemons as evidenced by the monopoly over water by Egypt and Sudan. This sordid reality raises the high prospect of empowering upstream countries to obtain their fair share while incentivizing downstream countries to embrace equitable treaties.

At the level of principles, the ideal Nile treaty for sharing basin resources and responsibilities will have to combine:

(1) The legal principles of the UN Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses with  the Berlin Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, which interpret what “equitable and reasonable” means  by balancing several competing considerations–relevant uses, basin hydrology, population size, dependency, socio-economic needs, existing uses, and the like;

(2) The institutional design of the 2024 NBI Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), toward a post-colonial integrated and equitable basin-wide development. Among other things, CFA provides for an operational body (such as a permanent Nile River Basin Commission) to implement treaties through data-sharing, joint planning, and project implementation; and 

(3) Modern, concrete provisions on benefit-sharing, basin management, and climate resilience. 

Table 2: A Comparative Look at Nile Agreements

Dimension	UN Watercourses Convention (1997)	Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA, 2024)	1929 (UK–Egypt) & 1959 (Egypt–Sudan) Agrmnt.
Legal Nature	Multilateral UN treaty on non-navigational uses of international watercourses; global.	Regional treaty negotiated by Nile Basin states; not yet in force (needs ratifications).	Colonial-era treaties imposed by UK (1929) and between Egypt & Sudan (1959).
Parties	Open to all UN members; 39 ratifications as of 2024 (but Egypt & Ethiopia not parties).	Ratified by 6 upstream states (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, and S. Sudan.	1929: UK + Egypt. 1959: Egypt & Sudan only. No upstream participation (Ethiopia excluded).
Principles	– Equitable and reasonable use (Art. 5–6). – Obligation not to cause significant harm (Art. 7). – Duty to cooperate, prior notification.	– Same core principles: equitable use, no significant harm. – Explicitly rejects historical volumetric allocations. – Creates Nile Basin Commission.	– Allocations only: 1929 gave Egypt veto over upstream projects. 1959 allocated total Nile flow between Egypt (55.5 bcm) & Sudan (18.5 bcm). – Excludes upstream rights entirely.
Institutional Mechanism	No permanent basin institutions; relies on ad hoc state cooperation.	Nile Basin Commission (COM, Secretariat).	None — purely bilateral allocation agreements.
Allocations	No fixed quotas; instead, a balancing of factors (population, climate, dependence, alternatives, etc.).	No fixed quotas; promotes equitable shares, cooperative development.	Fixed volumetric allocations to Egypt & Sudan (74 bcm total).
Dispute Settlement	Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, ICJ (Arts. 33–35).	Stepwise: Commission mechanisms, AU/mediation, arbitration/ICJ.	No clear dispute resolution beyond bilateral political negotiation.
Political Status	Universally recognized as global customary framework but politically resisted by some (Egypt argues for “no significant harm”).	Regionally negotiated, reflects upstream demands for inclusion. Still politically contested.	Egypt & Sudan continue to cite these agreements as legally binding; upstream states reject them as colonial & exclusionary.
Strengths	Universally recognized legal principles; balances use & harm; flexible.	Region-specific, institutionalized, reflects modern water law; aims at inclusivity.	Clear allocations, downstream certainty (for Egypt/Sudan).
Weaknesses	Lacks basin-specific institutions; vague balancing of principles; Nile states not all parties.	Not ratified by Egypt & Sudan; remains politically divisive.	Outdated, exclusionary, ignores upstream states; entrenches zero-sum conflict.

Sources:  Compiled from various sources using ChatGPT 5.2.

The doctrine embedded in the most recent UN Water Convention (1997) and the Berlin Rules (2004) that would inform an optimal treaty blueprint embrace:

• Comprehensiveness: The rules cover all freshwater resources, including surface water (rivers and lakes) and groundwater (aquifers).
• Equitableness: They require riparian countries to manage transboundary rivers in an equitable and reasonable manner.
• Harm minimization: States are obligated not to cause significant harm to other states in the utilization of appropriately shared water resources.
• Human rights: The rules assert the right of every individual to water for sustaining life and endorse citizen participation in water management decisions.
• Environmental sustainability: The guidelines call on all states to promote sustainable use of water resources and act appropriately to prevent water pollution, protect ecosystems, and prudently manage floods and droughts.
• Conflict resolution: The rules also include provisions on the protection of water resources and water installations in the event of armed conflict, and procedural rules for cooperation through transparency and consultation in joint basin and reservoir management.

How closely do actual treaty practices adhere to the above principles and guidelines?

Table 3 reveals one striking fact:  There is a stark imbalance between a weak country’s  contribution to transboundary river flow and its de facto or treaty—based water allocation. Hegemonic upstream countries keep the contribution to align with allocation—as in the cases of Colorado, 1944: 91% US vs. 9% Mexico with 9% water contribution or Euphrates-Tigris, 1987/1990: 90% Türkiye vs. 10% for Syria and Iraq with 10% contribution. Similarly, hegemonic downstream countries almost completely shut out weak upper riparians—as in the cases of the Nile, 1959: 100% for Egypt and Sudan vs. 0% for Ethiopia despite its 86% water contribution or the Ganges, 1996: 65% for India, 35% for Bangladesh, 0% for Nepal despite its 40% water contribution. 

So, the core equity problem in many basins is that the biggest contributors of the flow are not always the biggest beneficiaries with or without treaties. Danube and Indus provide a useful template. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is a good example of a balanced and equitable sharing built around the partition of Indus tributaries for prespecified uses (irrigation, power, or navigation) rather than a rigidly fixed allocation of water volume. 

Table 3: Major International Transboundary River Treaties

River	Treaty/Year	Type of Allocation	Upper Riparian Share	Lower Riparian Share
Nile	1959 Egypt–Sudan	Fixed volumes	None (Ethiopia excluded)	Egypt 55.5 bcm, Sudan 18.5 bcm
Euphrates	1987 (Türkiye–Syria); 1990 (Syria–Iraq)	Min flow + %	Türkiye retains upstream use; Syria gets 500 m³/s, passes 58% to Iraq	Iraq ~58% of Syria’s share
Ganges	1996 India–Bangladesh	Seasonal/time-sharing	India priority some years	Bangladesh priority in alternate low-flow years
Colorado	1944 US–Mexico	Fixed volume	US retains majority	Mexico guaranteed 1.5 MAF (~9% of flow)
Danube	1994 Danube Convention	No allocations; cooperative	Shared governance	Shared governance

Source:  Compiled from various sources using ChatGPT 5.2.

The takeaway from treaty practices is that the foundational elements of a binding Nile agreement must embrace flexible water allocation and shared governance that embrace international water-sharing principles and their implementational interpretation in basin cooperation agreements. Distilled, they mean two things: (i) equitable and reasonable use with no significant harm, and (ii) an institutional mechanism for phased implementation,  joint scientific assessments, notification and consultation, dispute settlement mechanisms, and joint investments. 

Future Nile agreements must then strive to realign contributions with benefits. Ethiopia and upstream states, supplying nearly all of the water, need equitable legal entitlements. Egypt and Sudan must also secure their share of renewable Nile water as prescribed by international conventions and treaty practices. Their remaining water deficits are better addressed by reducing water-intensive agriculture and unsustainable virtual water exports, mitigating desert evaporation with upstream water storage schemes, tapping vast aquifers prudently, eliminating waste and pollution through market pricing and technology, and desalinating sea water.

5. ETHIOPIA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE 

Treaty or  not, it is incumbent upon Ethiopia to articulate the two dimensions of its sovereign water rights and responsibilities. The first task is to issue a comprehensive national water policy on transboundary rivers. The second task is to articulate the broad outline of its preferred Nile treaty. These are essential for framing the national debate and the international public opinion in a fruitful manner.

1. Need for a Comprehensive National Water Strategy

Until its transboundary rivers are subject to binding agreements, Ethiopia retains its sovereign right to utilize its valuable sovereign waters in any way it deems necessary (such as irrigation, fishing, and hydropower) and responsible (observing international norms of equitable and sustainable use in damming and diverting river flows). Furthermore, despite the high investment needed to tap its mainly non-navigable rivers, extensive water development reduces the volume of boundary crossing water subject to international law. What is transboundary is endogenous to the level of domestic water footprint. In other words, what water is transboundary, and subject to international law, is ultimately dependent on the level of domestic water use by the originator of the rivers. Decoupling actual transbounariness from what prevails in the state of nature is a rarely recognized fact which can go a long way to incentivize Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia to come to the negotiation table with reasonable postures. 

Given the circumstances, Ethiopia’s water strategy must embrace the following elements:

1. Ethiopia reserves the right to utilize its sovereign transboundary waters on the Colorado allocational principle. As a dominant upper riparian, its high contribution to the Nile flow would define the ceiling of its rightful share of the waters for any legitimate use—drinking, irrigation, industrial, households, or hydroelectric. 
2. Absent a binding treaty, Ethiopia does not recognize any responsibility to seek approvals from other riparians on the type of water utilization and management, other than the voluntary self-constraint of responsible use.
3. Ethiopia’s primary responsibility is to provide food security, water security, and electricity for its citizens. Above-quota water provision, pertinent ecoservices, and the sale of hydropower to riparian and non-riparian alike will be negotiated under prevailing market conditions.
4. The Seemingly Irreconcilable Postures of Nile Riparians

The de facto Nile water allocation and utilization borders on the absurd when viewed through the prism of international norms and practices. This power asymmetry has colonial origins but persists because of inertia, asymmetric balance of forces, and coordination failures among the nine upstream countries.

Egypt and Sudan claim that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian and 1959 Egypt-Sudan Nile Waters Agreements are binding upon all riparian states, including the very sources of the Nile who were deliberately excluded from being signatories. These illegitimate and unilateralist  agreements gave all of Nile waters to Egypt and Sudan. They also granted Egypt veto power over any projects on the Nile or its tributaries. 

Egypt may be a gift of the Nile, but the Nile is a gift of Ethiopia. The colonialist denigration of reciprocity has fostered contempt and impunity by entitled beneficiaries for enfeebled benefactors. Giving up these undeserved privileges is understandably hard to do for Egypt which relies on the Nile for over 95% of its water needs and for Sudan for about half. In defense of this untenable status quo, Egyptians, the government and water experts alike, advance the following arguments:

• Any reduction the current water supply of Egypt, through dam building or irrigation works by upstream countries, constitutes an existential threat because of the overdependence on Nile waters, especially of Egyptian agriculture which consumes 80% Nile waters. This is the basis of the audacious claim that no unapproved dam in upstream countries is legal unless it receives the imprimatur of Egypt (Bitew, 2026). Egypt’s proposal for joint GERD management,  for example, renders colonial allocations sacrosanct, redefines transboundary flows as dam inflows, and wishes to impose the full cost of drought mitigation on Ethiopia (Asrat Blog, 2026).

• Egypt interprets the no-harm principle as absolute protection of existing uses even in the absence of a binding treaty involving all riparians. In other words, it objects to any upstream projects that reduce downstream flow because they automatically violate acquired rights and impinge on its great need. Historic utilization and need are certainly two of the many elements that inform a treaty, but they are neither decisive nor relevant in its absence.
• Egypt, not having ratified the UNWC, claims that it is not subject to customary international laws governing transboundary water rights. Accordingly, Egypt and Sudan refused to ratify the CFA, which came into force in 2024. It is ironic, however, that Egypt invokes non-ratification for disobeying UNWC principles but insists that non-signatories are legally bound by the terms of the 1929 and 1959 treaties! 

Ethiopia, along with other upstream states, advance the following counterarguments: 

• The 1929 treaty was signed by Britain on behalf of its colonies, and the 1959 treaty binds the Sudan and Egypt. These treaties do not, and cannot, impose obligations on the other, marginalized and aggrieved, stakeholders which had not granted consent. 
• All riparians have the right to equitable and reasonable utilization under international water conventions and practices. Until a comprehensive agreement is signed on water allocation and joint basin management (balancing such factors as geography, climate, water contribution, needs, and historical use), each riparian has a right to utilize its sovereign waters as its sees fit, albeit in a responsible manner.
• The best way to achieve a mutually agreeable Nile treaty would be for Egypt and Sudan to return to the CFA mechanism to complete crafting a modern treaty that balances the principles of no significant harm and equitable utilization under a settlement modality that is inclusionary and fair to all. 

3. Toward an Equitable Ethiopian Nile Treaty Framework

The bottom line is that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would reject Egypt’s claim to exclusive volumetric rights against non-parties but would look favorably at  Egypt’s “historic use and great need” as a relevant but not absolute factors. The Court would likely apply  the customary law of equitable utilization which supports Ethiopia’s right to legally obtain its fair share of Nile waters. 

This judgment would recommend a basin-wide negotiated framework. Only by integrating UNWC principles for global legitimacy, CFA institutions for regional ownership and acquired uses for political safeguard  into a cooperative governance regime can Nile Basin states put an end to the incessant water conflicts. A tailored treaty would offer a pathway toward a positive-sum outcome of regional stability, water security for all, and sustainable regional economic development.

The four notable lessons for Ethiopia are now clear:

1. Issue a comprehensive and coherent water strategy. This should include a commitment to international principles, sustainable plans for hydropower, irrigation, and industrial use, schemes for exporting surplus electricity and unutilized water allocation, and a plan for water and silt health that includes reafforestation, tributary diversion, and extensive terracing. 
2. Express an unflinching determination to enter negotiations only on a comprehensive treaty on water allocation, joint basin management, and regional economic integration that embraces international customary water law and treaty practices.
3. Insist that any partial and interim agreements on technical and data-sharing matters concerning existing major projects such as GERD encompass similar projects in other riparian states and, more importantly, do not prejudice the terms of a future comprehensive Nile treaty. 
4. Invoke the subsidiarity principle to stem soil erosion in any manner it sees fit since the management of siltation  is only indirectly alluded to in international conventions.

There are lessons for Egypt and Sudan, too:

1. Egypt will do well to abandon its hegemonic endgame. The practical expression of this myopic posture is multifaceted: military threats, political destabilization, blocking the external financing of water projects in upstream countries, disregarding responsibility for basin management, cleverly sneaking clauses in proposed partial agreements that implicitly recognize the legally untenable de facto quota, and disseminating misinformation and disinformation about the Nile itself. Enlightened self-interest would instead favor rejoining the CFA process to craft a win-win comprehensive Nile treaty.
2. Egypt should accept the reality that its existing water entitlement by politicizing the issue or relying on the inertia of history (Tayia, et al., 2921) is woefully inadequate given the urgency of eradicating poverty and the improved capability of governments in upstream countries to advance their sovereign rights, and the availability of better models of water sharing in modern water conventions. Egypt will instead do well to prepare to make up for the shortfall through investment in efficient water use, desalination, judicious tapping of its huge underground water, paying for extra-quota water supply and ecosystem services, and participating in regional economic integration initiatives.
3. Sudan, being less dependent on the Nile than Egypt and often a beneficiary of Ethiopian dams to reduce flood risks, has vacillated in its policy stance. It should instead strive to advance its long-term interests by supporting a mutually beneficial treaty regime rather than holding Nile strategy hostage to fleeting political alliances.
4. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

According to a recent World Bank report (Zhang, et al., 2025), the Horn of Africa’s index of water stress is near the 50^th percentile for water supply stress (drying) and 60^th percentile for demand stress (efficiency of use). The report recommends a three-pronged approach to address the crisis that is especially severe in Egypt and Somalia: managing consumptive demand, augmenting water supply, and improving the efficiency of competing water uses. All three sets of action require institutionalized coordination and coordination by riparians.

Prolonged uncertainty over Nile treaty continues to impose a significant economic cost. What might ironically incentivize a speedier negotiated settlement, preferably through a reinvigorated NBI mechanism, is for the likes of Ethiopia and Uganda to imitate the impunity of Egypt despite the geopolitical pressure it would trigger. In the absence of a binding comprehensive treaty, an aggressive water retention by upper riparians and basin deterioration will certainly reduce the volume of transboundary water outflows. This is a compelling reason for entering into a mutually agreeable treaty as soon as practicable.

The final water allocations, the most contentious issue of all, will fall as a result of the interplay between negotiation skills and the influence of asymmetric power balance. If we use the 1996 Ganges Treaty as a realistic template (but rejecting the unfair exclusion of Nepal),  Ethiopia may retain as much as three-quarters of its sovereign Nile water contribution. To avoid the pitfalls of allocational rigidity, flexibility can be built into the treaty for contingency-dependent adjustments. Other important elements of such a treaty are equitable cost sharing of basin resilience investments, and timely sharing of data and hydrological knowledge. 

Professor Berhanu Abegaz can be reached at : bxabeg@wm.edu 

7. REFERENCES

1929 Treaty. Agreement between Great Britain and Egypt relating to the use of the waters of the River Nile and the control of Lake Tana, May 7, 1929. 

1959 Treaty. Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Egypt–Sudan), Cairo, November 8, 1959. 

Abtew, Wossenu (2026). Nile Water Conflict and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Springer.

Associated Press (2024, October 14). Nile basin nations say water-sharing accord has come into force without Egypt’s backing, AP News.

Berhanu, Asrat (2026, January 20and 24). “The Drought Trap: How Egypt Tried to Turn Weather into a Water Quota in the 2020 Washington Draft, without ever saying “Historic Rights,” The Asrat Blog.

FDRE, Ministry of Water Resources (2021). Ethiopia’s Water Strategy, Addis Ababa. 

FDRE, Ministry of Water and Energy (2023). National Blue Economy Strategy of Ethiopia 2023-2027, Addis Ababa.

Garzanti, Eduardo, et al. (2006). Petrology of Nile River sands (Ethiopia and Sudan): Sediment budgets and erosion patterns, Earth and Planetary Science Letters, 252 (3–4), 327-34.

International Law Association (ILA, 2004). The Berlin rules on water resources, International Law Association.

Matthews, Ron and Vilado Vivoda (2023). Strategic implications of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Water International, 48(6), 951–969.

Mekonnen, Dereje (2010). The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement negotiations and the adoption of a “water security” proposal: Flight into obscurity? European Journal of International Law, 21(2), 421–440.

Mwangi Kimenyi  and John Mbaku (2015). Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime, Brookings Institution Press.

Nile Basin Initiative (NBI, 1999). Draft Cooperative Framework Agreement, Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat.

Onyango-Obbo, Charles (October 8, 2025). Egypt, Ethiopia and the Dam: What If the Real Fight is over Soil, Not Water? X.

Stoa, Ryan (2014). The United Nations Watercourses Convention on the dawn of its entry into force, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 47(5), 1321–1352.

Tayia, Ahmad, Antonia Barrado, and Fernando Guinea (2021). The evolution of the Nile regulatory regime: a history of cooperation and conflict, Water History, 13:293–317.

UN-Water (2021). UN global water conventions and transboundary water cooperation: Fostering sustainable development and peace (Policy brief). 

United Nations (1997). Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, United Nations Treaty Collection.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNEC,1992). Convention on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes. 

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