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- Amanuel Tesfaye<\/a> Doctoral Researcher, University of Helsinki<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Yared Debebe<\/a> Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Gondar<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
![\"A](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/656884\/original\/file-20250321-56-s1ng07.jpg?w=800&ssl=1\")
Ethiopians in the US protest against attacks by the Ethiopian government in the Amhara region. J. Countess\/Getty Images<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n Ethiopia is in the grip of a civil war<\/a> between federal government forces and the Fano, a loose alliance of ethnic-based militia in the Amhara region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This conflict in Ethiopia\u2019s north erupted less than a year after the devastating Tigray war<\/a>, which ended in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Amhara<\/a> are one of Ethiopia\u2019s largest ethnic groups and played a leading role in the making of the Ethiopian state. Amharic<\/a> serves as the country\u2019s working language.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The region shares a border with Tigray. During the Tigray war, which began in 2020, various Fano groups allied<\/a> with the federal government. A peace deal in 2022 to stop the war sidelined the Amhara militia groups, which strained relations with the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Amhara conflict began as minor sporadic clashes with government forces in April 2023. This rapidly escalated into a full-scale insurgency by August when Fano forces launched a full blown attack in an effort to control the region\u2019s major cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The violence since has displaced more than 100,000 people<\/a> and left 4.7 million children<\/a> out of school.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The death toll from the conflict is piling up<\/a>. In March 2025, the government claimed to have killed more than 300 Fano fighters<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We are researchers studying ethnic nationalism, social movements and insurgency in Ethiopia, with a focus on Amhara. Based on our studies into the Fano<\/a> and ongoing research<\/a> on Ethiopia\u2019s political reforms process, we see three factors behind the escalating armed struggle in Amhara:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- a mismanaged political transition from 2018 to 2020<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- fallout from the 2020-2022 Tigray war<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- a hollow pursuit of peace.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Mismanaged transition<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Between 1991 and 2018, Ethiopia was governed by the Ethiopian People\u2019s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a powerful coalition of four ethno-national parties representing Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, and Southern nations, nationalities and peoples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Faced with a political crisis and growing unrest in 2014<\/a> following opposition clampdowns and arbitrary arrests, the coalition needed a change. Two members \u2013 the Oromo People\u2019s Democratic Organisation and the Amhara National Democratic Movement \u2013 joined forces to oust the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front from its dominant position. They did this by leveraging youth-led protests<\/a>, which played out between 2015 and 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following the resignation of prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2018, the two parties orchestrated Abiy Ahmed\u2019s ascent to power<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For a moment, the relationship between the Oromo and Amhara wings of the coalition looked like one of equals. This didn\u2019t last. In December 2019<\/a>, Abiy merged the coalition into a single party, the Prosperity Party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Oromo wing positioned itself as the core of the Prosperity Party. It monopolised key political positions and economic opportunities. This included asserting control over the capital, Addis Ababa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nRead more: Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people \u2013 four years later he’s silencing them<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nAmhara\u2019s outspoken leaders who criticised this dominance faced removal, arrest<\/a> or exile<\/a>. The region\u2019s president, Ambachew Mekonnen, was assassinated<\/a> in June 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Harassment<\/a>, kidnappings<\/a> for ransom and arrests were daily experiences for Amhara region residents trying to enter Addis Ababa<\/a>. Members of the Amhara community also faced ethnic-based violence<\/a> in various parts of the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These incidents provoked anti-government protests<\/a> throughout Amhara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fallout from the Tigray war<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A peace agreement<\/a> signed in 2022 in South Africa ended a brutal two-year war in Tigray and neighbouring regions. However, it deepened the sense of marginalisation in Amhara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the agreement silenced the guns in Tigray, it sidelined Amhara constituencies by denying them representation in the talks despite the region being affected by the war. The agreement\u2019s ambiguity regarding the fate of territories disputed between Amhara and Tigray<\/a>, such as Welkait, further fuelled distrust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The last nail in the coffin came in April 2023. The government decided to dismantle<\/a> regional special forces. This was ostensibly aimed at consolidating the country\u2019s fighting forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, with unresolved territorial disputes and Oromo nationalist ambitions at the centre, disarming the Amhara Special Forces was interpreted as a move to weaken Amhara defences. Additionally, the more than 200,000-strong Tigray Defence Forces<\/a> were left intact. This contributed to a sense of vulnerability in neighbouring Amhara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Public protests<\/a> led to clashes with government forces. These protests morphed into an insurgency<\/a> by the Fano in the following months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The insurgency has expanded its reach and has public support<\/a> across the region and in the diaspora.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Fano insurgency is taking place in a territory three times the size of Tigray, stretching the federal army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Various Fano factions cite objectives that range from the protection of Amhara interests<\/a> to constitutional change and overthrowing the federal government<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the insurgency is still in its infancy. It lacks unified leadership, a cohesive structure or a chain of command. Factional divisions and competition persist, and there are no clear objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Hollow pursuit of peace<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The government seems determined to crush the Fano insurgency by force<\/a>. A state of emergency was declared in August 2023<\/a> for six months. It was later extended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the state of emergency in Amhara officially ended in June 2024, some restrictions remain in place. This includes de facto curfews<\/a> in major cities, including the capital Bahir Dar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The counterinsurgency relies on heavy Ethiopian National Defence Forces deployments and drone strikes<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, the government has indicated its openness to peace talks. However, it has avoided meaningful confidence-building measures, such as releasing Amhara political prisoners. A Peace Council<\/a> established to mediate between the Fano and the government has proven ineffective. Its spokesperson<\/a> has noted federal reluctance to negotiate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nRead more: Ethiopia’s war may have ended, but the Tigray crisis hasn’t<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe government\u2019s peace efforts have centred on repeated calls for insurgents to surrender. There are reports<\/a> that the government wants to talk to different Fano factions separately in the hope of fragmenting the insurgency further. Secret talks<\/a> with one faction of the Fano are an indication of this strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The path forward<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
- Yared Debebe<\/a> Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Gondar<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n