The Abiy Doctrine: Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy Under Abiy Ahmed
In Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed has de-institutionalized and personalized Ethiopia’s foreign policy for personal and political gain. Consequently, the Abiy Doctrine undermines the national interest, leading to diplomatic miscalculations and blunders, isolation, and declining foreign direct investment. The adverse effects of the Abiy Doctrine pose significant risks to Ethiopia’s stability, national security, and economic interests.
November 26, 2024
34 minutes
Research & Analysis, Ethiopia, Governance, Politics, Foreign Policy
1. Introduction
In the 6 years Abiy Ahmed has been in power in Ethiopia, much has been written about his zero-sum approach to governance, ineffective economic policies, over reliance on the military, and the humanitarian catastrophes induced by his military adventurism. Abiy’s approach to foreign affairs, however, has received much less exploration. Which begs the questions: What is Ethiopia’s foreign policy under Abiy? Is there an Abiy Doctrine? If so, what is it? What are its outcomes and their consequences?
A practitioner of a warped Machiavellianism, Abiy’s principal aim has proven to be the consolidation, retention, and wielding of power, at all costs. In his own words, his singular goal is “to become the 7th King of Ethiopia.” To this end, Abiy has utilized Ethiopian politics and public policy—both domestic and foreign—to advance that principal objective, as demonstrated by the ruinous two-year civil war with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and his ongoing war of aggression on the Amhara.
If power consolidation and retention has played such a pivotal, and perhaps singular, role in his approach to domestic affairs, it behooves scholars and analysts of Ethiopia to examine Abiy’s foreign affairs through this same lens—the consolidation, retention, and exercise of power—and how its application in foreign affairs impacts and reinforces Abiy’s position vis-à-vis Ethiopia’s domestic politics.
2. The Contours of an Abiy Doctrine
In international relations, a foreign policy doctrine provides general rules of how a leader conducts foreign policy through decisions on international affairs. These general rules, or approaches, indicate: 1) how political leaders think about and deal with international affairs; and 2) provide a policy framework that can help explain the actions of a country and its leader to other countries in terms of interests, values, and strategies for advancing foreign policy objectives.
In Ethiopia, the Abiy Doctrine can be succinctly summarized as: the de-institutionalization1 — deliberate weakening and hollowing-out of government institutions — and personalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy to advance Abiy’s political objectives, namely the consolidation, retention, and wielding of power, at all costs. Put differently, the Abiy Doctrine has shifted Ethiopia’s foreign policy bureaucracy into Abiy’s hands—and away from Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—and in doing so, serving to advance his personal and political agendas rather than the national security and economic interests of Ethiopia.
2.1. De-institutionalization and Institutional Decay of Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy
The first feature of the Abiy Doctrine is the de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Five examples illustrate this ongoing de-institutionalization and institutional decay of foreign policy planning and decision making in Abiy’s Ethiopia.
First, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its most competent diplomats are being sidelined. Rather than the Foreign Ministry, much of the decisive foreign policy apparatus is now within the confines of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Through a series of advisors operating within the OPM, Abiy has complete control of Ethiopia’s foreign affairs. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry—which has a long, rich, and decorated history—is largely relegated to the back-burner.
Second, the de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy is reflected in the significant cuts made to the Foreign Ministry, the diplomatic corps, and the shuttering of Ethiopian embassies and consulates around the world. For years, Abiy has significantly cut the funding and personnel of the Foreign Ministry—50% of embassies have been shuttered; while simultaneously, scaling-up the foreign policy portfolio within his own office. Rather than strengthen the quality and efficacy of Ethiopia’s missions abroad, Abiy has scaled them back, while contending that “members of the Ethiopian diaspora—in their personal capacity—can serve as Ethiopia’s diplomats in their respective countries.” A truly absurd proposition.
Third, his personnel appointments within the MFA are indicative of both his intentions to de-institutionalize Ethiopia’s foreign policy and how little he values the MFA as an institution. For instance, his latest appointment as Foreign Minister, Gedion Timothewos, is by all accounts a bright individual with an academic and professional background in the law. However, Gedion has absolutely zero academic or professional experience in international relations.
Gedion replaced Taye Atske Selassie as Foreign Minister. Unlike Gedion, however, Taye has an immense background and formidable expertise in international relations, both academic and professional. Taye is the quintessential career diplomat. However, after serving a mere eight months as Foreign Minister (February–October 2024), Taye was abruptly and unceremoniously moved to the position of President—a ceremonial role with no real power. In one move, Abiy suddenly shifted a knowledgeable, capable, and highly respected career diplomat from the MFA to the ceremonial office of the Presidency, while appointing an inexperienced sycophant as Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister.
Why would Abiy appoint an individual with zero qualifications to be Ethiopia’s chief diplomat, while relegating one of Ethiopia’s most experienced and respected diplomats to a ceremonial role that has nothing to do with foreign policy—his area of expertise? The answer is straightforward: de-institutionalize Ethiopia’s foreign policy. In so doing, pivot Ethiopia’s foreign policy process and decision making from the most knowledgeable and qualified within the Foreign Ministry into his own hands by appointing a loyalist as figurehead of one of the most important and respected institutions in Ethiopia—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Fourth, and more broadly, during his 6 years in power, all major foreign policy agenda setting, formulation, decision making, and implementation have occurred secretly in the Office of the Prime Minister, including his relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the short-lived rapprochement with Eritrea; the Tripartite Agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia; the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, among others. The manner in which all of these foreign policies were formulated and implemented exemplify a common theme: Abiy and his de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy bureaucracy.
Fifth, Abiy’s dealings with regional organizations, specifically the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) further reflect the de-institutionalization of foreign policy in Ethiopia. Abiy has used the AU to advance his political objectives; while at the same time, undermining the principles enshrined in the AU Charter. This is best illustrated in how he attempted to use the AU to shield himself from scrutiny during the war in northern Ethiopia, spanning from 2020-2022.
During the war in northern Ethiopia, using the AU Charter and IGAD as political cover, Abiy railed against what he decried as “western meddling” in Ethiopia’s and Africa’s internal affairs. To this end, he deployed weaponized political rhetoric of “neo-colonialism” and “neo-imperialism” against the U.S. and E.U. in what became known as the “No More” movement—a political ploy to serve his immediate domestic political agenda. Shortly thereafter, Abiy would change his tone from “No More” to accepting IMF and World Bank bailout loans, neoliberal economic policies, and conditionalities—and in so doing, compromising Ethiopia’s economic sovereignty.
While Abiy used the AU as political cover during the conflict in northern Ethiopia, he quickly displayed his unmitigated contempt and disregard for the AU Charter when he signed an MoU with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland—in clear violation of the AU Charter. Specifically, the key principles of the AU Charter, as delineated in Article III: 1) “The sovereign equality of all Member States; 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of States; and 3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.” Abiy had no qualms about trampling upon these central pillars of the AU Charter; and indeed, foundational principles of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ushered-in the sovereignty and territorial integrity based international system.
Likewise, he has dealt in the same manner with IGAD. First, by appointing a loyalist, Workneh Gebeyehu, as its Executive Secretary. And second, by selectively utilizing IGAD to get political cover, particularly during the MoU fiasco, and throughout the civil wars that are devastating Ethiopia.
In sum, the combination of: 1) marginalizing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through downsizing; 2) the selection of unqualified personnel to key positions within the Foreign Ministry; and 3) Abiy’s erratic, destabilizing, and unprincipled engagement with countries in the Horn of Africa and regional organizations encapsulate the first pillar of the Abiy Doctrine—the de-institutionalization and institutional decay of Ethiopia’s foreign policy.
2.2. Personalization of Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy
The second feature of the Abiy Doctrine is the personalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy—spanning agenda setting, framing, policy formulation, decision making, and implementation. All of which have become personalized to the whims of Abiy. Additionally, since Abiy assumed power, seemingly every foreign policy is conducted in secrecy, the decisions are made by Abiy, and the details are always kept secret—from citizens, Parliament, and Ethiopia’s foreign policy bureaucracy. This lack of transparency and oversight are key elements of how Abiy has personalized Ethiopia’s foreign policy.
First, the details of his relations with the UAE and his patron, Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), is entirely a secret. Similarly, the short-lived rapprochement with Eritrea, and its leader Isaias Afwerki, was entirely a secret. The details of the controversial MoU with Somaliland are a secret. The negotiations with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), facilitated by Donald Trump and the U.S. Treasury, was handled by Abiy’s office in secret. The funding streams that Abiy receives from oversees, principally from the UAE, for various vanity projects, including what Le Monde characterized as “Abiy’s $15 billion pharaonic palace seized with delusions of grandeur” are all a secret. And the list goes on.
Second, another important illustration of Abiy’s personalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy is the manner in which illicit financial flows are entering Ethiopia. As Abiy has stated during an address to the Ethiopian Parliament, no individual—including members of Parliament—should ever ask him about financial flows into Ethiopia—in the billions of dollars—for the vanity projects that he is constructing, without oversight, throughout the country. In addition to Abiy’s exorbitant $15 billion pharaonic palace, there is the $4 billion palace for the President of the Oromia region, and numerous resorts and lodges (Halala Kella, Gorgora, Wonchi, and Chebera Churchura) that are being built with illicit funds and without Parliamentary oversight.
The financial sources for these multi-billion-dollar projects are unaccounted for—these are personal agreements, without the constitutionally authorized oversight of Parliament, that Abiy has reached with his patrons in the UAE. In addition to questions about corruption and illicit financial flows, these transactions raise serious questions regarding Ethiopia’s economic and national security interests.
To whom is Abiy increasingly beholden? To whom is he a potential client? In what ways are those providing financing influencing his domestic and foreign policy agenda and decision making? These questions, have ramifications for Ethiopia’s national security and economic interests, which now rest solely in the hands of Abiy Ahmed. This personalization of Ethiopia’s foreign affairs is deeply problematic.
Third, when specific foreign policies no longer suit his domestic political agenda, Abiy abruptly, and unilaterally, changes policy direction and resets the agenda. There are numerous examples of this personalized and zero-sum approach to governance, including the rapprochement with Eritrea, the Tripartite Agreement with Eritrea and Somalia, and the MoU with Somaliland. In all three cases, Abiy used a foreign policy agreement to derive some, real or perceived, domestic political benefit. And when it no longer suited his political agenda, he abruptly and unilaterally changed policy direction.
For instance, the rapprochement with Eritrea led to an improvement in Abiy’s standing in domestic politics, which was further bolstered by the Nobel Peace Prize award. He utilized that political capital in his war with the TPLF. Similarly, the Tripartite Agreement with Eritrea and Somalia initially strengthened Abiy’s position in domestic politics, and that political capital was spent in the northern Ethiopia conflict, as Eritrea and Somalia made contributions to Abiy’s war efforts. And more recently, there was the failed attempt to use the MoU with Somaliland to divert attention away from the devastating war of aggression being waged on the Amhara.
The rapprochement with Eritrea and the Tripartite Agreement ended abruptly—as soon as Abiy had largely achieved his domestic political objectives. Put differently, when they were no longer personally and politically useful to him. In this case, through the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) that ostensibly ended the conflict between the Abiy regime and the TPLF, temporarily solidifying Abiy’s preeminent position in Ethiopian politics; while at the same time, enabling him to open a new theater of conflict on the Amhara.
In short, through the personalization and de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign affairs, Abiy has used Ethiopia’s foreign policy to advance his personal and domestic political interests—the consolidation, retention, and unilateral wielding of power, at all costs—both by sidelining key figures and institutions within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and by selectively and unilaterally setting the foreign policy agenda to further his domestic political objectives.
At this juncture, Abiy is the principal actor in Ethiopia’s foreign policy—not career diplomats and foreign policy experts. In addition to the problematic nature of such centralization, in his personalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy, the priority is his own power and political survival not the national interests of Ethiopia. This is precisely what is illustrated by his illicit financial and military dealings with the UAE, the short-lived rapprochement with Eritrea, the short-lived Tripartite Agreement with Eritrea and Somalia, and the MoU with Somaliland.
3. Strategies and Tactics of the Abiy Doctrine
In advancing the Abiy Doctrine, what is Abiy’s modus operandi? What are the strategies and tactics he employs? And how effective are these strategies and tactics? In Abiy’s approach to foreign policy, three strategies and tactics are consistently present: 1) destabilization; 2) deception and secrecy; and 3) bluster and bravado.
3.1. Destabilization of the Horn of Africa
First, the Abiy Doctrine increasingly destabilizes Ethiopia’s neighbors—even if efforts at sabotage and subterfuge are often futile and backfire. Consequently, Abiy is widely perceived as the proverbial bull in the china shop—earning the distinct and unpleasant monikers: “regional destabilizer” and “regional spoiler.”
The latest example of his destabilizing approach is Abiy’s foreign policy towards Somalia. Rather than deal directly, in good faith, and in accordance with international law vis-à-vis the federal government of Somalia regarding questions of, and needs for, maritime access—whether for commercial or military purposes—Abiy recklessly and clandestinely signed an MoU with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Of course, this strategy went against both the AU Charter and the UN Charter, both of which call for respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States. True to form, however, Abiy had no qualms about driving a wedge through Somalia’s political cleavages, in an attempt to destabilize its government and advance his political agenda—alleviating domestic pressure in the face of rising unpopularity, discontent, instability, and resistance to his rule at home.
Facing significant opposition at home, Abiy assumed, if he pivoted to the issue of “Red Sea access”, he could create a rally around the flag effect, and the Ethiopian public would back his jingoism and Machiavellian maneuver. At the announcement ceremony of the MoU, he deceivingly declared: “congratulation to Ethiopians for owning a port”—and state media would amplify this erroneous message ad nauseam. None of it came to pass, however, and the political ploy has largely backfired.
The Ethiopian public, shell-shocked from the devastating civil wars, economic hardships, and domestic chaos and instability, elected not to back Abiy’s destabilizing adventurism and saber-rattling. Similarly, the diaspora, fed-up with Abiy’s antics, demurred. At the same time, the international community has largely backed Somalia’s position and claims of infringement on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Perhaps most significantly, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt have solidified their security cooperation through a Tripartite Agreement of their own backed by Turkey and Saudi Arabia—certainly as a bulwark against Abiy, the erratic and non-credible “regional spoiler.”
In Eritrea, Abiy employed a similar playbook. Having initially reached a personalized and secret “peace agreement” with Isaias, they have fallen out since the signing of the CoHA. The upshot of their agreement has been a civil war that destabilized the Horn of Africa and devastated northern Ethiopia to the tune of: 1) an estimated 600 thousand to 1 million deaths; 2) a reconstruction bill estimated at $28 billion; 3) the ongoing war in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, which will significantly add to the aforementioned human and economic toll; and 4) the occupation of Ethiopian territory by Eritrean forces in Tigray, including Irob and Gulomahda.
Furthermore, Abiy has used the same playbook of destabilization and shifting alliances in Sudan—backing the belligerent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the ongoing Sudanese civil war, including facilitating arms shipments and serving as a conduit between the RSF and its patron, the UAE. In doing so, Abiy has culpability in the destabilization of Sudan as he further brandishes his reputation as a “regional spoiler.”
For its part, Sudan has quickly moved away from Addis’ orbit and moved closer to Cairo. For years, Ethiopia worked tirelessly to have Sudan on its side vis-à-vis GERD negotiations. Since Abiy assumed power, however, Sudan has increasingly drifted towards Egypt. Additionally, Sudan has deployed its military to forcefully take the disputed area known as al-Fashaga from Ethiopian control.
Unsurprisingly, relations with Egypt have continued to deteriorate, as GERD negotiations have ground to a halt. Moreover, by destabilizing the Horn of Africa and antagonizing Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan, Abiy has opened the door for Egypt to enter the Horn region. In addition to the Tripartite Agreement, Egypt is now deploying droves of soldiers and armaments to Somalia, both as a component of a bilateral security agreement and as part of the AU Support Mission in Somalia. At the same time, Somalia has announced that Ethiopian troops can no longer be a component of the AU Support Mission in Somalia.
Lastly, even within Ethiopia, Abiy’s affinity for his patron, the UAE and MbZ, has resulted in destabilization. Unfortunately, the most pernicious effects of Abiy’s relations with the UAE have been felt most at home—as Ethiopia finds itself mired in domestic turmoil due to UAE arms and drones that Abiy has used to stoke and wage civil war throughout Ethiopia.
3.2. Deception and Secrecy
In addition to destabilization, the second tactic that Abiy employs is deception and secrecy. Deception and secrecy are key pillars of his approach to international law and human rights institutions, as well as Abiy’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa writ large.
One of the most consequential areas where Abiy employs deception and secrecy is human rights and towards human rights organizations. His objective being to flout international laws and conventions, while claiming otherwise. For example, Abiy’s foreign policy continues to deceive the international community, including UN and AU human rights bodies, regarding his use of combat drones against his own people—a war crime and violation of International Humanitarian Law. Copious amounts of data, reporting, and eyewitness accounts illustrate that Abiy’s drones are targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ethiopia’s Amhara, Tigray, and Oromia regions.
The ongoing drone warfare in the Amhara region has been particularly devastating due to the duration and frequency of drone strikes. The drone strikes disproportionately target civilians in marketplaces, schools, civilian vehicles, clinics, and ambulances. Among the victims are young children, women, and the elderly. Combatants account for a mere 3.5% of the recorded casualties.
In disproportionately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, the Abiy regime’s drone strikes are in clear violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights law. IHL, which applies in armed conflicts and governs the use of armed drones, stipulates that drone warfare must adhere to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. In deploying combat drones against civilians, the Abiy regime is in clear and flagrant violation of IHL.
Notwithstanding this documented devastation, Abiy and his generals claim to abide by IHL, including human rights law and laws on the conduct of war. The Abiy regime also claims to be conducting a credible and transparent transitional justice and accountability process for the war crimes proliferating throughout Ethiopia. Of course, the evidence does not align with the political rhetoric. Abiy continues to obfuscate, deceive, co-opt, and disregard human rights organizations while conducting extrajudicial killings and drone attacks targeting civilians—under the cover of an internet and telecommunications shutdown—to devastating effects for the human rights, lives, and livelihoods of Ethiopians.
No doubt history will condemn Ethiopia’s current so-called “leadership”, which has unleashed unfathomable violence and brutality on its own citizens, but history will also judge poorly Ethiopia’s traditional allies and human rights organizations that have enabled such criminality, devastation, barbarism, and inhumanity of epic proportion to ensue and continue unabated.
In addition to human rights violations, another area of foreign policy where Abiy deploys deception and secrecy is in his dealings with countries of the Horn region. In this regard, a common theme that emerges is a zero-sum and expansionary foreign policy couched in the deceptive political rhetoric of “economic diplomacy”, “regional integration”, and “economic cooperation and collaboration.” Nonetheless, seemingly at every turn, Abiy is angling towards territorial expansion and the flouting of regional and international laws and conventions.
Perhaps the best example of Abiy’s naked aggression couched in the deceptive language of “cooperation and regional integration” is his evolving relations with Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Initially, as a component of the Tripartite Agreement, Abiy spoke incessantly about economic and regional integration in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, no tangible investments were made towards these ends. Rather than an agreement to facilitate economic integration, the Tripartite Agreement appears to have been a security agreement. A security agreement which would serve Abiy during the civil war with the TPLF that devastated northern Ethiopia.
Even more problematic has been Abiy’s signing of an MoU with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland and antagonizing his erstwhile ally Somalia. After a brief spell of leading with “economic diplomacy”, encapsulated by rhetoric of “economic cooperation and integration”, Abiy made his move against Somalia. He clandestinely signed an MoU to recognize Somaliland as an independent country in exchange for a 20km strip of coastal land. This development—considered a direct violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity—led to accusations of an attempt at land annexation.
Similar fears abound in Eritrea, where Abiy is now viewed as a direct threat to Eritrean national security due to his machinations regarding the Red Sea, in particular Assab port. The “peace agreement” turned war pact—that led to Abiy being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—is non-existent. The two countries have reverted to their no-war, no-peace standoff. All rhetoric and initial efforts aimed at facilitating diplomatic engagement and economic integration have ceased, including the twice daily flights of Ethiopian Airlines. More ominously, there are now increasing fears that Abiy may be working to destabilize Eritrea politically, including funding an Eritrean opposition group known as Brigade Nhamedu, while targeting the port at Assab. Conversely, Eritrea continues to occupy and expand control over the Ethiopian towns of Irob and Gulomahda in the Tigray region.
3.3. Bluster and Bravado
The third, and final, tactic of the Abiy Doctrine is bluster and bravado. Abiy’s trademark bluster and bravado are characterized by his grandiose pronouncements and implausible assertions. For example, in his dealings with Somaliland, Abiy went on record to falsely assert that “Ethiopia had secured a port.” When this was quickly proven not the case, he doubled down by making a presentation to loyalists in which he claimed, “we want to get a port by peaceful means. But if that fails, we will use force” and he added, “it’s a matter of time, we will fight.” Such jingoism and weaponized political rhetoric to secure what he had already claimed was in his possession.
Subsequent to an onslaught of diplomatic pressure from the region and beyond, however, Abiy has recently backtracked by claiming that force will not be used and “even if we do not secure the Red Sea, our children will.” Such weaponized rhetoric, sensationalism, and misdirection are emblematic of Abiy’s patented bluster and bravado. Nonetheless, as Abiy flip-flops, his unpredictability and propensity to destabilize the region has the Horn of Africa on edge.
Interestingly, similar to the public unveiling of the MoU, the Abiy regime portrayed and presented the recent bailout loan agreement with the IMF as a “massive success”—even going as far as saying “congratulations” to the Ethiopian public—in yet another clear demonstration of deceit, bluster, and bravado. Two short months later, Ethiopians are dealing with a 170% depreciation of the currency, grappling with exorbitant inflation and a cost-of-living crisis, dramatically increasing levels of abject poverty (72% of the populations or 86 million people), and generally expressing widespread economic despair and discontent.
Even in his domestic policy, bluster and bravado are central components of Abiy’s modus operandi. For instance, in the lead-up to the war with the TPLF, Abiy claimed to be undertaking a “two-week rule of law operation”—the conflict spanned two years with devastating ramifications. Similarly, Abiy claimed to prosecute a swift two-week operation to disarm the Amhara, a year and a half later, the conflict rages with no immediate end in sight. Again, fueled by Abiy’s bluster and bravado.
In sum, in an effort to advance the Abiy Doctrine, three strategies and tactics are consistently employed — destabilization; deception and secrecy; and bluster and bravado. Ultimately, more often than not, the net result tends to be diplomatic miscalculation and blunder. As the wildly inexperienced and unpredictable Abiy commits these blunders, the Horn of Africa region remains on edge—and risks of miscalculations leading to a region wide conflict remain high.
4. Foreign Policy Outcomes of the Abiy Doctrine
In addition to outlining the policy framework and tactics of an Abiy Doctrine, it’s critically important to evaluate its foreign policy outcomes and consequences. In this regard, more often than not, Abiy’s foreign policy tends to be replete with miscalculations and blunders, while lacking meaningful, measurable, and sustainable accomplishments.
4.1. Diplomatic Miscalculations and Blunders
The Abiy Doctrine’s diplomatic blunders are numerous and their detrimental effects consequential. The consequences of these blunders are two-fold: 1) undermining Ethiopia’s national security and economic interests; and 2) increasingly isolating Ethiopia, within the Horn of Africa region, but also from traditional and longstanding allies such as the United States.
First, the most significant miscalculation is proving to be the MoU that Abiy inked with Somaliland—and its accompanying saber-rattling. The MoU immediately put Abiy on the defensive vis-à-vis Somalia. For its part, upon learning of the MoU, Somalia quickly went on a diplomatic offensive and was able to secure the backing of all major countries and regional organizations and the UN for its position—respect sovereignty and territorial integrity.
More significantly, Abiy’s miscalculation facilitated the emergence of a new Tripartite Agreement in the Horn region—between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt backed by Turkey and Saudi Arabia—in an attempt to isolate and contain Abiy. At the same time, it provided Egypt with an opportunity to directly immerse itself within the Horn region. This miscalculation has undone years of diplomatic work that had brought Ethiopia and Somalia into alignment, including in their security cooperation. This miscalculation alone has severely undermined Ethiopia’s national security interests.
Second, the collapse of the Tripartite Agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia is a significant missed opportunity. Any hope of these countries working together and moving towards greater economic cooperation and regional integration has been dashed—at least for the foreseeable future. Abiy’s destabilization, deception, and bellicosity played no small part in this outcome.
Third, the deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and the United States (U.S.) is yet another significant blunder of Abiy’s foreign policy. Since the conflict in northern Ethiopia, the U.S. has kept Abiy at arm’s length due to the systemic human rights violations of his regime. Consequently, the U.S. removed Ethiopia from the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA)—a preferential trade agreement that provided Ethiopia with duty free access to the U.S. market. U.S.-Ethiopia relations deteriorated further when USAID discovered a massive food aid diversion scheme, or “industrial level theft”, in which food aid was being diverted from civilians towards the army and to be sold on the market.
The ramifications of AGOA suspension on the Ethiopian economy cannot be overstated. In short, as a consequence of removal from AGOA, Ethiopia’s nascent but promising manufacturing and industrial capacity has collapsed. For his part, Abiy has retaliated by spying on the U.S. Department of State and Department of Justice. As well as threatening to pivot Ethiopia towards China. Ironically, if not amusingly, while Abiy threatens to pivot towards China, Chinese businesses are moving out of Ethiopia to neighboring countries as a consequence of Ethiopia being removed from AGOA by the U.S.
Fourth, the lack of political stability, security, and policy certainty in Ethiopia has led to declining levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and the exodus of firms from Ethiopia. Since Abiy assumed power, FDI inflow into Ethiopia has drastically declined, both in absolute amount and as a % of GDP — driven by the precipitous decline in manufacturing FDI inflows. According to Ernst and Young’s Africa Attractiveness Report (2023), FDI inflow to Ethiopia dropped from $4.2 billion in 2016 to just $600 million in 2023, while FDI projects in Ethiopia dwindled from 34 in 2019 to a mere 6 in 2022.
These developments are a major economic challenge to an already shock-laden and foreign currency starved economy. The root causes remain: 1) economic mismanagement; 2) AGOA suspension due to the proliferation of armed conflicts and human rights violations; 3) a chronic foreign exchange shortage; 4) exorbitant inflation; and 5) the lack of soft power, including a nonexistent “economic diplomacy.”
Fifth, Abiy’s foreign policy has been marked by deteriorating relations with regional and international organizations. Perhaps the most glaring example is the debacle with the African Development Bank (AfDB) in which federal security personnel assaulted and kidnapped AfDB diplomats, in violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
In a truly stunning and peculiar incident, an Abiy regime official within the Ministry of Finance was questioned by AfDB staff about failing to make a $6 million payment due to AfDB. In response, the regime official sent security personnel to intimidate, physically assault, and kidnap two international staff members of AfDB. This led to a “serious diplomatic incident” and the withdrawal of AfDB’s international staff from Addis Ababa until an investigation was conducted. The issue was found to be a case of fraud in which the Abiy regime official embezzled the $6 million through a foreign bank. The public funds have yet to be accounted for. Unfortunately, such incidents have become emblematic of the Abiy regime’s foreign policy and its lawlessness, criminality, and unaccountability.
Lastly, incidents that undermine the founding charters and operational capacity of the AU, IGAD, AfDB have become increasingly common under the Abiy regime’s foreign policy. One such incident is the decision to completely discontinue the importation of non-electric vehicles into Ethiopia—known as the “EV or nothing policy.” The AU has decried this “troublesome policy” preventing its non-EV vehicles from entering Ethiopia—stating, “the situation is severely hampering the effective functioning of the Commission and affecting the work of its staff members.” A letter by AU Chairperson Moussa Faki to Abiy warns that, “any continued delay in [permitting the AU vehicles to enter Ethiopia] not only contravenes established legal instruments but also poses significant operational challenges to the Commission.”
In other words, an abrupt and impractical policy decree by Abiy—50% of Ethiopians do not have access to electricity and there are only 50 charging stations for EVs in the entire country—which also goes against Ethiopia’s legal obligations as a host country of the AU, is adversely impacting the work of the AU and other diplomatic missions in Ethiopia.
The AU’s letter concludes, “Despite ongoing communications with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for months, no definitive action has been taken to clear the vehicles in question.” The fact that Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry has been unresponsive and unable to act—to the AU’s urgent and legally legitimate request—is perhaps yet another sign of the de-institutionalization of the Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4.2. Diplomatic Accomplishments
In terms of the accomplishments of the Abiy Doctrine, the Abiy regime points to three. Specifically, 1) its rapprochement with Eritrea; 2) the Tripartite Agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia; and 3) Ethiopia joining the BRICS+ grouping.
As discussed above, the rapprochement with Eritrea and the Tripartite Agreement have not proven to be meaningful diplomatic accomplishments. The agreements have not truly aimed at attaining peace nor have the agreements proven to be tangible and enduring. If anything, relations with Eritrea, Somalia and the broader Horn region are severely strained, tensions are on the rise, and the prospect of a regional conflict looms large.
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s BRICS+ membership, at least on the surface, appears to be a meaningful diplomatic achievement. Nevertheless, when examined below the surface, there are questions that must be addressed, such as: What are the major contributing factors that led to Ethiopia gaining access to BRICS+? What are the the implications of BRICS+ membership for the much-needed socioeconomic development that Ethiopia requires? And ultimately, what are the specific and tangible benefits that Ethiopia derives from membership?
First, it’s not particularly surprising that an invitation was extended to Ethiopia to join the BRICS+ as a consequence of Ethiopia’s long, rich, and impactful diplomatic history. For example, Ethiopia has enjoyed a leadership role as founding member of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the African Union. At the same time, the stature and influence of Ethiopia on African continent is immense and thoroughly recognized—something that BRICS+ want to bring into their fold. Additionally, Ethiopia has immense potential in terms of its demography and economic prospects. From the BRICS+ perspective, these are all desirable reasons to grant Ethiopia an invitation to join their grouping.
Of course, on the other hand, the Abiy regime has not contributed to any of these fundamental reasons for Ethiopia being a desirable country to add to the BRICS+ grouping. In other words, all the underlying factors that make Ethiopia attractive to BRICS+ were established prior to Abiy’s rise to power; and thus, have nothing to do with Abiy and his foreign policy.
Second, BRICS+ is a geopolitical grouping whose leaders convene for a summit with much fanfare but without much in terms of tangible outcomes. At this point in time, it is difficult to quantify the benefit that members derive from their BRICS+ membership. For Ethiopia, there are no quantifiable economic benefits to be derived in terms of FDI, access to development financing through grants and loans, or access to preferential trade deals. At the same time, because BRICS+ is a geopolitical grouping, membership will likely have geopolitical ramifications. In other words, it risks putting Ethiopia in an antagonistic position vis-à-vis the U.S., the E.U., and their allies. A conspicuous foreign policy position that goes against Ethiopia’s diplomatic history.
Third, BRICS+ risks being disproportionality influenced by China and serving as a vehicle for spreading Chinese influence. The economic powerhouse of the grouping is China; and thus, to the extent that financial resources become available in the future, it will be from China. Consequently, rather than being a genuinely independent grouping, BRICS+ will evolve into a vehicle for advancing Chinese interests, positions, and influence abroad, including challenging U.S. hegemony. The extent to which Ethiopia will derive substantive political and economic benefits from this arrangement is highly questionable. However, Abiy will certainly utilize BRICS+ membership to bolster his own domestic political standing—through political rhetoric and the photo opportunities that BRICS+ will inevitably provide.
5. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the Abiy Doctrine is characterized as the personalization and de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy, and serves to advance Abiy’s principal objective of consolidating, retaining, and wielding power, at all costs. From the perspective of Ethiopia’s national interests, however, the Abiy Doctrine poses a significant threat to national security and economic interests.
Through the personalization and de-institutionalization of Ethiopia’s foreign policy, Abiy has used Ethiopia’s foreign policy to advance his personal and domestic political interests—the consolidation, retention, and unilateral wielding of power—by sidelining key figures and institutions within the foreign policy bureaucracy, by selectively setting the foreign policy agenda to further his domestic political objectives, and by utilizing a combination of tactics, including destabilization, deception and secrecy, and bluster and bravado.
In terms of outcomes, the Abiy Doctrine has been replete with miscalculations and blunders, and risks positioning Ethiopia—historically the stabilizing anchor state in the Horn of Africa—as an increasingly destabilizing and isolated power. Ethiopia’s isolation is not only in relation to countries in the Horn of Africa, but also traditional and longstanding allies such as the U.S., which has removed Ethiopia from the AGOA preferential trade agreement.
In recent months, Abiy regime officials have incessantly referred to Abiy—the wildly inexperienced, incompetent, and erratic “regional spoiler”—as “Ethiopia’s chief diplomat.” It is no wonder that Ethiopia finds itself in a multitude of quagmires in its foreign relations, regionally and internationally. For the national security and economic interests of Ethiopia and its people, and for the security and stability of the Horn of Africa region, it behooves all Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia to do all they can to expeditiously remove the erratic and unpredictable Abiy Ahmed from power.
- Note: the term “de-institutionalization” or “institutional decay” in governance refers to the weakening and hollowing-out of government institutions. De-institutionalization also refers to the processes of circumventing institutionalized, or bureaucratic, forms of decision-making. De-institutionalization is a common strategy of Authoritarian leaders. This article uses the terms “de-institutionalization” and “institutional decay” interchangeably. ↩︎