Interview Tall governance, conflict, regional politics hurdles stifle rehabilitation in post-war Tigray
December 28, 2024
Daniel Berhane, a legal expert and political science student, has been a keen observer of Ethiopian and regional politics for over a decade, building a considerable following online during this time.
Daniel used to manage his own media platform—widely recognized as the first blog pertaining to Ethiopian politics—complementing his activism on social media since 2010.
The war in Tigray marked a new chapter in Daniel’s career as he ventured into authorship. After the conflict concluded with a peace agreement, Daniel published a book in English titled ‘War on Tigray: Genocidal Axis in the Horn of Africa.’
Reflecting on the political tension in the Tigray region two years following the end of the conflict, Daniel observes the post-war era comes with its own challenges and hurdles. At present, Tigray is dealing with a sluggish reconstruction process, a full-blown feud at the top of the ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an ineffective interim administration, the proliferation of illicit mining and contraband, deepening human trafficking, and a pressing IDP problem.
The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle caught up with Daniel for his opinion on Tigray’s political affairs, concerns over rising tensions with neighboring Eritrea, and the federal government’s Transitional Justice and National Dialogue initiatives, among other topics. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: Much has taken place in Tigray since the war ended with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. Can you share your general perspective on developments in the region following the peace accord?
Daniel Berhane: The Pretoria Agreement is recognized as a framework for addressing the Tigray war, officially termed a ‘Permanent Cessation of Hostilities.’ However, this designation is unusual. Typically, a conflict ends with a cessation of hostilities, followed by a comprehensive peace agreement after thorough negotiations to resolve outstanding differences. The phrase ‘Permanent Cessation of Hostilities’ is rarely seen in written literature, adding to its unconventional nature.
Despite this, the agreement serves as a framework for implementing specific measures. These include the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), ensuring territorial integrity, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process, forming a governmental administration, conducting elections, and other related tasks outlined in the agreement. The framework acts as a skeleton, with these detailed elements serving as the flesh to build a complete resolution. However, the process appears stunted, with progress halting prematurely along the way.
Some processes have been initiated as part of the agreement. For example, there has been some progress in restoring basic services in the region, though many damaged properties remain unrepaired. While certain organizational operations have resumed, reconstruction—particularly of educational institutions deliberately targeted during the war—remains minimal. Many schools are still inactive, reflecting the slow pace of recovery.
On a positive note, active fighting has ceased and the sound of guns has stopped, but challenges persist in preventing crimes, maintaining law and order, and delivering justice to victims. While the Pretoria Agreement successfully ended the fighting, which is an achievement, its implementation over the past two years has been insufficient. My overall assessment is that the agreement has fallen short in its execution and broader objectives.
As a political analyst closely monitoring the country’s political landscape, do you believe the northern war could have been avoided? If so, what measures might have prevented it?
The war was a strategic and collaborative effort involving the federal government, the Eritrean government, and Amhara regional forces. While it might have been prevented, the political narratives and framing pursued over several years made it inevitable. The Eritrean government had been seeking alliances for years, while Amhara elites propagated toxic narratives against Tigray for over a decade. Simultaneously, a faction within the federal government exploited these dynamics, leading to the collaborative agenda of these three forces, which ultimately triggered the avoidable conflict.
For instance, the relationship between the Asmara and Addis Ababa governments was primarily centered on targeting Tigray, with no broader mutual benefits. This is evident from the closure of the borders between the two countries less than six months after reopening, signaling that Eritrea’s goal was not peace but isolating Tigray. On Tigray’s side, there was growing resentment toward the then EPRDF, exacerbated by internal power struggles aimed at forcing the TPLF to submit to the federal government’s agenda, often at the expense of the Tigrayan population and by holding them as hostages.
As mentioned, the war was not a spontaneous event but the culmination of years of planning. Although there were opportunities to stop it, particularly by the federal and Eritrean governments, the deeply entrenched narratives and premeditated plans made it increasingly difficult for them to back down from the path they had set.
What do you see as the reasons for the explosion of ethno-political fanfare in the past few years, particularly following the 2018 political reform?
I am unsure how the assessment of ethnic politics is evaluated, but I see no inherent issue with fostering identity consciousness. This awareness typically develops over time through education and exposure to information. In Ethiopia, questions of ethnic identity have always existed, but awareness has grown significantly in recent years due to various influences. Additionally, the recognition of ethnic identity by the country’s constitution has amplified its prominence. That said, I am not arguing for or against the formation of political parties based on ethnic backgrounds.
For instance, in Kenya, political parties are often associated with specific ethnic groups based on the support they receive, even though they can be identified by other formations. Similarly, Ethiopia’s governmental regional structure is organized along ethnic lines. However, this approach could manifest differently and evolve into alternative organizational frameworks. Three key elements shape the question of ethnic identity: identity consciousness, the political structure, and the governmental structure. These elements have sharpened the issue of ethnic identity but failed to provide an adequate resolution due to the lack of a proper governmental framework. This shortfall is compounded by a federal system dominated by a single party and the persistence of centralism.
Consequently, when the issue of ethnic identity arises, these structural elements hinder its proper implementation. This challenge has been particularly pronounced since Ethiopia’s political reforms in 2018. Overall, the core problem lies in how ethnic politics is managed in the country, particularly the absence of an organizational structure capable of addressing such demands. Additionally, the lack of democratic practices and mechanisms for self-correction has contributed to the ongoing misunderstandings and challenges.
Can you walk us through the internal political divisions within the TPLF, particularly following after the Pretoria Agreement? Why is the TPLF experiencing an internal split, and do you think the factions will eventually reconcile, or is one side likely to prevail?
First of all, it is common to encounter challenges in the post-war period. During a conflict, whether or not the objectives are achieved, wars create lasting impacts such as economic instability, political crises, and widespread frustration. For instance, the Prime Minister who led England to victory in the Second World War lost his position in the subsequent national election. Post-war periods inevitably bring negative consequences for both communities and political landscapes, which often differ significantly from the pre-war context.
In the case of Tigray, issues such as how the region ended up in the war, how it was managed, and who bears responsibility have sparked accusations and internal divisions. Another contributing factor is the competition for ruling power, particularly between the two key figures, Getachew Reda and Debretsion Gebremichael, raising the question of which faction will emerge victorious. The current tensions are the result of these accumulated factors.
Regarding whether the factions will reconcile, it seems unlikely. I think they have already passed that chapter. While there may be superficial agreements, any meaningful unity appears far-fetched. The possibility of working together as members of one party is minimal. As for who might prevail, it is possible one faction will come out on top, but this may not be the ideal outcome. A better alternative would be for both factions to establish their own parties and continue their political efforts independently, given that each enjoys significant support from the community. This approach could benefit Tigray by fostering democratic pluralism in the region.
Would their split open a venue for the federal government and the incumbent Prosperity Party to intervene in Tigray politics?
While it is possible to consider the idea theoretically, it is not practical in reality. Under the Pretoria Agreement, the federal government was granted the mandate to enter Tigray, protect the borders, and manage federal institutions. However, these responsibilities have largely been left to regional forces, with only a small federal presence in the region. Federal forces are not visibly active in Mekelle or other areas. This is partly because the federal government lacks sufficient manpower, as most of its forces are engaged in conflicts across the country.
Additionally, the federal government lacks the political and resource capacity to fully enter Tigray and carry out its responsibilities. Managing the region would be an enormous undertaking. This likely explains why the government opted not to assert its presence in the region from the outset, despite facing no direct opposition to doing so. Furthermore, it appears the federal government refrained from appointing political officials in Tigray due to a lack of incentive and the absence of broad acceptance for such actions.
Why has the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) struggled to effectively carry out its responsibilities?
There may be several reasons why TIA has struggled to succeed. One key factor is its patchwork formation, comprising members from various groups, including the TPLF, academia, opposition parties, and others. This diverse composition creates challenges for cohesion and effective governance. Another issue is that the TIA was not established with the intention of functioning fully, and the federal government has shown little interest in enabling it to operate comprehensively.
It appears the federal government lacks both the political will and the capacity to support the TIA. The government has delegated responsibilities to the interim administration, seemingly to avoid external interference and with the expectation that regional actors will manage matters independently. Additionally, the federal government has not demonstrated a strong commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Pretoria Agreement, opting instead for a phased and gradual implementation.
Internal divisions within the TPLF have also hindered the TIA’s effectiveness. Furthermore, the initial agreement that established the interim administration explicitly avoided assigning it the mandate to implement significant changes, such as civil service or bureaucratic reforms, during the three-month party conference following the Pretoria Agreement.
Notably, about half of the TIA’s members are from the TPLF, and the agreement seems designed to ensure the interim administration remains under the TPLF’s influence. This arrangement appears intentional, as there is little desire to see the interim administration succeed independently, possibly to prevent it from overshadowing the TPLF or gaining excessive control. Additionally, the federal government seems hesitant to allow the TIA to grow in strength and popularity, as this could lead to increased demands from the region.
Could this be seen as a sign of another potential conflict emerging in the region?
I do not foresee a major conflict originating from Tigray in the near future, although the region remains prone to localized tensions. Any conflict that does emerge is likely to be limited to specific woredas or zones and unlikely to destabilize the region as a whole. However, a potential conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea could draw Tigray into the fray, pushing forces in the region to take sides. Beyond such scenarios and occasional verbal disputes, the likelihood of widespread conflict appears low, as the people seem increasingly disinterested in engaging in such confrontations.
Even if the term of the TIA is extended, it appears unlikely that it will remain in place until the next national election. How do you think the government plans to address this gap? Do you believe the region will have the opportunity to participate in the upcoming polls?
The establishment of the TIA is rooted in the Pretoria Agreement, which set the framework for political dialogue between the federal government and the TPLF. The agreement stipulated that the interim administration would function until the next election and emphasized inclusiveness. However, this agreement is primarily a political document. During discussions, the federal government refrained from involvement, choosing not to appoint officials to the interim administration and leaving the TPLF to handle the matter internally.
In 2023, the TPLF held a conference where they formed a committee comprising 27 members, with the president to be elected from within the party and 14 of its members assigned to the committee. It was decided during this conference that the interim administration would remain in place for six months to one year, although this timeline lacks legal backing.
The legal foundation for establishing the TIA and appointing its president lies in articles 533/2015 and 539/1995 of the Ethiopian constitution, which permit federal intervention. According to these provisions, the interim administration is constitutionally mandated to remain in power for two to two-and-a-half years. This means the TIA could legally continue until next year. The six-month timeline mentioned by the TPLF reflects their internal preference and is not part of any formal agreement with the federal government. The role of the Ethiopian Election Board will be critical in determining the next steps.
However, if law and order, as well as peace and security, are not restored in Tigray before the next national election, it is unlikely that the region will participate in the polls. As noted, much of this depends on the evaluation and decisions of the Election Board.
A lot is said about who is and who is not ruling Tigray. Is Tigray being administered by military officers?
This claim is highly exaggerated and does not reflect the current situation in Tigray. While the regional forces are part of the government structure, they operate independently through their military council. This administrative system is common everywhere, as even national armies function within similar frameworks.
That said, it is undeniable that these forces are influential and capable of exerting significant sway. They include prominent leaders and individuals who wield considerable influence in the region. Additionally, they have access to resources that were untapped both during and after the war. Their voices carry weight in political discussions and decision-making within the region. However, the assertion that the regional forces are governing Tigray is unfounded. The situation has not reached that level.
Illegal mining and human trafficking are widespread in the region, with crimes becoming a daily occurrence. Why are both the federal and regional governments unwilling or unable to address and put an end to these activities?
These issues are the result of cumulative practices, where high-ranking officials are divided into two or three factions, spending much of their time in power struggles rather than focusing on administrative priorities. Additionally, the region has lacked a strong government for over three years, as it was largely under military mobilization during that period. Restoring order and functionality to administrative sectors in such a short time is challenging, especially since most sectors only began to become operational last year or shortly thereafter.
Another contributing factor is the presence of influential individuals who made significant contributions during the war, often dedicating their personal resources to the effort. These individuals now use their wartime contributions as leverage to secure personal benefits or rewards. This situation makes it difficult for authorities to hold them accountable, as their contributions are perceived as exceptional, leading to a natural tendency to delay taking action against them.
What are your takes on the transitional justice and national dialogue process underway in the country?
In my view, both initiatives—the National Dialogue and the Transitional Justice process—seem cosmetic in their formation and application. The National Dialogue was initiated during the war, and its member selection process lacked transparency and inclusivity, rendering it ineffective in mediating diverse groups. I see it as incapable of achieving its stated objectives. Ultimately, I suspect its primary aim is to recommend the establishment of a presidential system in Ethiopia and to centralize power within the federal government.
As for the Transitional Justice process, it appears to be a circus in creating false equivalence between opposing sides by focusing on mutual accusations of wrongdoing. A thorough and genuine approach would involve carefully selecting specific issues for accountability and reconciliation. However, those facilitating the Transitional Justice process, such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, have shown clear biases during the Tigray conflict, which undermines their credibility.
Broadly speaking, in Ethiopia, federal institutions have long been influenced by the central government, whether over the past six years or even the previous three decades. So, these initiatives are primarily superficial efforts aimed at reducing pressure from donor countries, securing funding, or providing incentives for officials under the guise of hosting meetings or conferences in the name of National Dialogue or Transitional Justice.
Tensions between the federal government and Eritrea are becoming increasingly apparent, particularly with the issue of sea access highlighting the divide. What could be the outcome of the Ethio-Eritrean relationship as it faces these renewed challenges?
As for me, a possible scenario would involve a war breaking out near the Assab port in Eritrea. I don’t believe the Ethiopian government has plans to dismantle Eritrea, and the Eritreans also do not wish to engage in another conflict with Tigray. This reluctance stems from their desire to avoid opening a new front in the war. Aligning with Tigray to create another front seems unlikely, as they do not want to divert their resources towards this endeavor.
The Eritrean President is politically savvy; however, he is not as active now due to age. He wishes to avoid experiencing the international isolation because of Abiy Ahmed similar to that faced during the reign of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. Given these considerations, it would be a significant undertaking for Isaias to instigate a war in the Tigray region. Instead, he may choose to create problems for Ethiopia through Somalia.
My primary perspective on this situation is that Somalia may become a battleground for a proxy war. Ethiopia’s countermeasure could involve launching an offensive against Eritrea, targeting the Assab port to gain control. The conflicts between these two nations could spill over, directly or indirectly affecting Tigray. Ultimately, the main theaters of conflict are likely to be either Somalia or Assab.
Regarding recent developments in regional geopolitics, do you think Ethiopia will abandon the MoU associated with the Ankara declaration? What could the implications of the Asmara-Cairo-Mogadishu axis be for Ethiopia?
It is clear that the Ethiopian government aspires to access the Red Sea. This desire has not only been present in the current administration but has also been a goal of previous governments. There was a misguided belief that the Eritrean government would grant access to the Red Sea, which can be seen as a naive hope. The bilateral military agreement signed between Ethiopia and France was part of this ambition, as the French government began supporting the Ethiopian naval forces shortly after Abiy Ahmed came to power.
This aspiration has primarily been associated with the federal government. Furthermore, last year, without adequately considering the circumstances, the Ethiopian government aired a documentary highlighting its interest in accessing the Red Sea. This provocative move added further tension to the already strained relations between the two nations, leading the Eritrean government to perceive the Ethiopian government as having intentions to invade Eritrea. Consequently, this action resulted in an automatic diplomatic backlash against Ethiopia. I believe that their signing of the MoU with Somaliland was an attempt to redirect the tense situation with Eritrea and shift focus to a different issue. The same applies to the Ankara Declaration.