Europe can help stabilise the Horn of Africa with a daunting project: a commercial corridor in Somalia that allows Ethiopia access to the sea
Visiting Fellow
- Commentary
- 21 January 2025
After a year of spiralling tensions, Ethiopians and Somalis are talking again: on 11 January, Somalia’s president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud went to Addis Ababa to reestablish diplomatic relations. The meeting marks a crucial step in the rapprochement fostered by the Ankara Declaration, a Turkish-mediated settlement signed in December. Now, the settlement faces another major obstacle, critical to its long-term viability: the development of a commercial corridor between the two nations that allows Ethiopia access to the sea, as enshrined in the Ankara Declaration.
This is a challenging but achievable endeavour, and it should be a European priority. Europe has significant security and economic interests in the Horn of Africa, including access to maritime routes in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean, containment of violent extremism and external hostile actors in Africa, and the stability of regional states where European investments are considerable, such as Kenya. It’s also an opportunity to expand geoeconomic footprint in the region, boosting long-term trade and investment with two key partners. It would also help mitigate the dominance of China in Africa’s infrastructure and connectivity sector.
Europeans need to stand ready to support the detente, including the establishment of the corridor, with tangible resources as pledged. In partnership with Turkey, the EU and its member states can play a key role in ensuring its success.
The heart of the conflict
After years of relative calm, Ethiopia and Somalia’s tensions were reignited in January 2024 when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the breakaway republic of Somaliland. The deal centred on the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base on Somaliland’s shores and the creation of a trade corridor to the Berbera port city. In exchange, Addis Ababa pledged to recognise Somaliland as an independent state.
Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has often emphasised that access to the sea is a vital national interest, as the country depends on Djibouti for 95% of its foreign trade transit. But Ahmed also used the issue to rally a populace divided by ethnic conflicts and economic crisis, employing inflammatory rhetoric that alarmed Ethiopia’s coastal neighbours.
The deal sparked the anger of the Somali government, which viewed it as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It officially requested Ethiopia to withdraw its army from its territory unless Addis Ababa cancelled its MoU with Somaliland. Ethiopian troops have been stationed there since 2006, either through bilateral agreements or African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions, to spearhead the fight against jihadi groups, especially al-Shabaab. To date, AU peacekeeping missions—and Ethiopian troops within them—have played a decisive role in keeping al-Shabaab at bay in central and southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu.
The withdrawal request has become a major stumbling block to the formation of the new AU peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AUSSOM), along with funding challenges. On top of that, Burundi, the second largest troop contributor after Ethiopia, has threatened to withdraw from Somalia over disagreements on troop allocation in late December.
AUSSOM officially began its operations in Somalia on 1 January, but with many gaps: funding is still not fully allocated, and Ethiopian troops, while deployed, don’t have an official mandate; there’s also uncertainty over Egyptian deployment, besides the possible withdrawal of Burundi. Taken together, these unaddressed issues cast an ominous shadow on the new mission that could soon create fixtures for al-Shabaab to exploit and claim more territory.
An ambitious settlement
In August 2024, Turkey took on the role of mediator between Ethiopia and Somalia, reaching a breakthrough in December. The Ankara Declaration is a testament to how economic and security partnerships have won Turkey huge political capital in the two nations. Although not explicitly stated, the agreement expects Addis Ababa to renounce the MoU and commits Somalia to developing an infrastructural trade corridor connecting Ethiopia to a Somali port, replacing the Berbera-Addis route. This port will most likely be Mogadishu, where Turkey already has a concession, and because the other ports fall in Somali states at odds with the federal government.
However, building such a corridor is a challenging project in a country like Somalia, where al-Shabaab has a significant presence. In 2018, a similar infrastructure initiative had to be put on pause due to security concerns. Conditions have improved since 2022, as a clan-led uprising freed from al-Shabaab a substantial land corridor that stretches from the coast to Ethiopia’s border. Yet, the area remains exposed to al-Shabaab attacks and will require the Somali government to set up a robust buffer zone around the potential corridor.
In order to do so, it must ensure that economic benefits from construction and trade reach local militias affiliated with the Hawiye clan, who rose against al-Shabaab in 2022. It should also entice more sub-clans, especially those located west of the Shabelle river, to take up arms against the jihadi group. Clan militias, with the support of AUSSOM and Ethiopian bilateral troops, will need to have a key role in protecting the trade corridor from potential al-Shabaab incursions.
Another important aspect of the Ankara Declaration concerns the presence of Ethiopian troops in AUSSOM. The recognition of Ethiopian troops’ sacrifices in the fight against al-Shabaab, as well as recent high-level security discussions, indicate that Ethiopia’s participation in the next AU mission is back on the table. This development is promising. Security cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia, within AU missions and beyond, remains critical to prevent a major resurgence of al-Shabaab and to uphold security and stability across the Horn of Africa.
Europe: Standing up or standing by?
The EU can play a decisive role in this dialogue given its significant contributions to Somalia’s security and development
With the detente resting upon further negotiations, Europeans cannot afford to remain passive. The EU can play a decisive role in this dialogue given its significant contributions to Somalia’s security and development. The EU currently deploys three civilian-military missions in the country, is the largest financial contributor to AU peacekeeping operations, and is a major provider of development and humanitarian aid.
Germany and Italy are well-positioned to lead the block on this specific issue, standing out as leading European providers of development and security to Somalia. Under their guidance, the EU should collaborate with Turkey to ensure the upcoming negotiations advance discussions on the trade corridor and the reintegration of Ethiopia in the fight against al-Shabaab. Progress in this area is critical to consolidating de-escalation. This effort should start by coordinating messages with Ankara to increase pressure on the involved parties.
In partnership with Turkey, the EU and its member states could deploy their financial instruments and institutions through the Global Gateway framework, designed to develop infrastructure projects in Africa and beyond. Key European capitals should also engage other countries invested in the Horn of Africa, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and potentially India, which could contribute with funds and companies to the commercial corridor. To ensure effective implementation, sponsoring countries should involve their private sectors and make sure, together with Somali authorities, that local actors benefit from the project at every stage of its development.
Building on this, the EU and its key partners should also make sure that Ethiopia’s participation in AUSSOM is formalised. Ethiopian troops, along with other AU peacekeepers, could also contribute to the protection of the trade corridor, in collaboration with the Somali federal forces and local clan militias.
The development of the trade corridor would strengthen the internal position of Somalia’s government. help Ethiopia reach a long-pursued goal without threatening its neighbours, and restore bilateral relations between two rivals. The window for progress is narrow, but Europeans cannot afford to dismiss this opportunity. They and other regional partners need to actively pull their weight behind this rapprochement to ensure its longevity.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
Author
Visiting Fellow