Interview Only ‘organic solutions’ can end regional volatility, corruption:
March 8, 2025
Professor Abdel-Ahmed
With a background in finance, Professor Mohamed Abdel-Ahmed has established himself as a leading commentator on East African geopolitics, contributing as a columnist, political analyst, and researcher. His academic experience includes teaching Advanced Corporate Finance at a university in the United States.
Abdel-Ahmed’s published and forthcoming works, such as “Wings of Inequality: Ethiopian Airlines’ Success and the Marginalization of the Somali Region” and “The Illusion of Peace: Evaluating the ONLF and Ethiopian Federal Government Peace Accord,” demonstrate his focus on critical regional issues.
He asserts that the Somali region’s unique strategic position demands the Ethiopian federal government’s serious commitment to the ONLF peace agreement.
In a conversation with Abraham Tekle, Mohamed Abdel-Ahmed explored a range of crucial topics, including the complexities of Horn of Africa politics, the impact of foreign actors, and the growing problem of corruption in the Somali Region. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: East African nations and communities possess a rich tapestry of shared cultural, economic, and political experiences. However, the region remains beset by recurring conflicts, including political rivalries, border disputes, and economic disagreements. To what factors can these persistent tensions be attributed? Are they primarily driven by internal political and economic dynamics, external interference, or a complex interplay of these elements?
Mohamed Abdel-Ahmed (Prof.): I think it is a complex issue. This region’s conflicts are complex, driven by both economic and political factors, as well as external interference. Similar to the Middle East, it has rarely experienced sustained peace. Throughout history, conflicts have persisted between Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other neighboring states. The region is prone to instability, influenced not only by external forces but also by internal dynamics among its people.
For over a century, foreign powers have played a role in shaping the region’s conflicts. The colonial powers left behind unresolved divisions, and the geopolitical landscape remains fractured. Borders drawn during colonial rule separated families and communities, deepening tensions. As a result, the region continues to face geopolitical challenges that will take time to resolve. Like the Middle East, it has never experienced a prolonged period of stability.
Some experts argue that the issue primarily stems from the region’s political elites. What is your perspective on this?
That is true to some extent, but you have to go back to what are the root causes of this. While external influences contribute to regional instability, it’s crucial to examine the underlying causes. The limited experience with stable governance over the past century suggests that the roots of these conflicts extend back to the colonial era and its imposed structures. Therefore, while external factors play a role, they must be considered within the context of these deep-seated historical legacies which have never been resolved.
While East African nations, especially in the Horn of Africa, frequently seek intervention from the AU and IGAD, their track record suggests limited capacity for resolving regional conflicts. Given these systemic weaknesses, how long will this pattern of reliance continue, and what fundamental reforms are necessary to achieve durable peace and stability?
The reality is that institutions like the AU and IGAD lack financial autonomy. They are not self-funded, and their operations are largely dependent on external sources, as evidenced by the funding for the AU headquarters. This external reliance hinders the ability of African nations to address their own challenges. True solutions require a shift towards internal problem-solving and self-sufficiency. You cannot ask someone who is a part of the problem to help you get out of the problem. So, Africa, especially in this region, they need to really come to their sense that the problem they own must be solved themselves.
When nations take ownership of their issues, without relying on external actors—some of whom may be implicated in the problems—they can develop more effective political resolutions. Dependence on those who contribute to the problem obstructs genuine progress. I think they need an organic solution.
Given the need for self-sufficient, internal solutions, what concrete strategies would constitute an ‘organic’ approach to resolving these regional issues?
They must first clearly define the problem, take full ownership of it, and recognize that the solution must come from within. No external party should be involved, even if they are not directly part of the issue. Africa, particularly this region, must adopt a mindset of self-reliance—acknowledging that it is their responsibility to find and implement solutions without external intervention. The challenge, however, lies in external assistance, which often provides only superficial relief without addressing the root causes. True resolution requires an organic approach, led by African leaders, scholars, and intellectuals. There are some indications that such a solution may be possible, but it will require a strong commitment from within the continent.
Why do these nations consistently seek external alliances and interventions to address their problems? What underlying factors drive this pattern of reliance? Are ideological differences a significant contributing factor?
These countries lack uniform leadership. Some leaders have remained in power for over 30 years, adhering to their own ideologies and decision-making processes, which differ significantly from those of younger leaders. This prolonged leadership creates a major challenge because, without alignment among leaders, they struggle to see eye to eye. Newer leaders may aspire to extend their rule by following the example of those who have held power for decades. Meanwhile, some long-serving leaders may remain in office without the genuine consent of their people. This misalignment in leadership—where leaders come from different generations and lack shared experiences—creates instability. Friendships between leaders often seem superficial, leading to sudden shifts from alliances to conflicts.
A key issue is the absence of leadership genuinely chosen by the people through free and fair elections. Many leaders come to power through force rather than democratic means. This lack of legitimate leadership contributes to ongoing instability in the region. Additionally, shifting alliances between these leaders exacerbate the problem. If any leader had the full support of their people, they might take a different approach to governance. However, since many remain in power without genuine public backing, leadership remains a fundamental issue for the region.
The Ethiopian-Somaliland MoU triggered a period of heightened tension between Ethiopia and Somalia, prompting the consideration of a strategic alliance between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt. Although the Ankara Declaration has seemingly eased tensions, what is the present state of this proposed alliance? Has it been abandoned, or does it still represent a potential geopolitical alignment?
The proposed Somalia-Eritrea-Egypt alliance, while not formally dissolved, appears weakened. It primarily served as a mechanism to exert pressure on Ethiopia following their controversial agreement with Somaliland. Ethiopia’s initial misstep, perceived by Western powers and regional actors, resulted in a diplomatic setback. Somalia effectively capitalized on this, gaining international support. The Ankara Accord subsequently provided Ethiopia with a diplomatic reprieve, effectively replacing the Asmara Security Summit. However, Eritrea and Egypt are likely seeking ways to maintain their strategic influence.
Ethiopia and Somalia both sought de-escalations. Somalia’s President Hassan, facing internal challenges including territorial losses and declining popularity, needed to neutralize Ethiopia as a potential adversary. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia also desired a diplomatic resolution. President Hassan’s warm reception of Prime Minister Abiy signalled a mutual desire to ease tensions. It’s speculated that President Hassan sought Ethiopia’s support in addressing issues with Jubaland and other regions. This de-escalation was advantageous for both Ethiopia and Somalia, as it reduced the possibility of further conflict.
Rumors suggest President Hassan requested specific assistance from Prime Minister Abiy during his visit. Regardless of the details, the outcome represents a diplomatic victory for Ethiopia and Somalia, and a setback for Egypt and Eritrea. However, the region’s fluidity necessitates ongoing vigilance to maintain this rapprochement. Ethiopia’s diplomatic isolation in early 2024 was reversed in 2025 by neutralizing a potential adversary and establishing a collaborative relationship. While comprehensive trade and security agreements may not yet be in place, Ethiopia has gained a strategic advantage over Egypt and Eritrea, who sought to exacerbate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia deserves credit for effectively managing this diplomatic situation and achieving de-escalation.
What explains President Hassan’s sudden reversal of position?
I think people have to really understand the reason why Hassan changed his approach to Ethiopia. President Hassan’s shift in approach towards Ethiopia is primarily attributed to his military setbacks in Jubaland. His failed attempt to remove the Jubaland president left him in a precarious position. Strategically, he recognized Ethiopia as a more immediate threat than Eritrea or other actors. Therefore, he calculated that offering concessions to Ethiopia would prevent further escalation against his government.
Ankara, recognizing both Ethiopia and Somalia as crucial economic and strategic partners, played a significant role in mediating the dispute. They sought to prevent a potential military conflict involving Eritrea, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The Ankara Accord facilitated a political resolution, effectively ending the hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, President Hassan’s significant loss of Ras-Kamboni weakened his position, forcing him to accept the terms of the mediation. This presented Prime Minister Abiy with a strategic opportunity to rectify past diplomatic missteps and solidify Ethiopia’s relationship with Somalia.
Considering Egypt’s potential inclusion in the newly formed AUSSOM force, what are the anticipated effects on the region’s existing geopolitical power structures?
The proposed arrangement remains problematic. While Egypt will contribute 1,090 troops and Ethiopia 2,500 to the AUSSOM force, their simultaneous presence in Somalia raises concerns. Although a political resolution between Egypt and Ethiopia is desirable, both nations will maintain a military presence. Furthermore, Egypt intends to deploy additional troops to Somalia through a separate bilateral agreement. Ethiopia already has a substantial force in Somalia, and they will continue to operate there.
Ethiopia currently maintains a force of approximately 12,000 troops in Somalia, with 2,500 designated for the AUSSOM mission. President Hassan’s internal situation remains unstable, as he has not consolidated his power and has experienced declining popularity. Consequently, Ethiopia must maintain close vigilance. For Egypt, a political settlement with Addis Ababa would be a more productive approach than attempting to exert pressure in the region. The situation is far from resolved.
The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia has deteriorated significantly, and some analysts believe that conflict is increasingly likely. Some experts believe that the tensions between these two nations add another layer of complexity to the already volatile regional security landscape.
Given that religious issues contribute to regional divisions, how does Somalia’s religiously motivated affiliation with the Arab world and the Arab League impact the geopolitical landscape?
During past Arab League meetings, Somalia actively portrayed Ethiopia as an adversary seeking territorial annexation. This narrative garnered support from Arab and Islamic nations, culminating in a diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia that yielded significant momentum. In the preceding year, Ethiopia struggled to counter this diplomatic offensive, finding itself on the defensive. However, the tone shifted dramatically during the most recent Arab League meeting attended by the Ethiopian Prime Minister.
Comparing the two meetings, President Hassan previously characterized Ethiopia as a threat to Somalia’s territorial integrity, particularly regarding the Red Sea. He emphasized the MoU with Somaliland as a point of contention. However, in the recent meeting, his posture was notably different. While Egypt continues to frame the Red Sea issue as a matter of Somali sovereignty, a key Egyptian interest, Somalia has notably refrained from labeling Ethiopia as an enemy. This represents a significant shift and a diplomatic setback for Egypt. However, the situation remains fluid, contingent on Ethiopia’s actions. Egypt maintains a substantial presence in Mogadishu, including recent military shipments.
The Arab League will likely continue to emphasize its commitment to safeguarding Somali sovereignty. However, Ethiopia is no longer perceived as a direct threat in this context. Consequently, it remains unclear how Egypt will leverage the Red Sea issue as a bargaining chip. Close monitoring of Egypt’s activities in Mogadishu is crucial.
In light of Somaliland’s governmental transition and the subsequent ambiguity surrounding their commitment to the Ethiopian MoU, what is the current practical status of the agreement, and what potential trajectories do you foresee for this situation?
The current situation presents a win-win outcome for the Somaliland president. The MoU had become a political liability, particularly as his electoral base expressed dissatisfaction with its terms. Consequently, the new administration has strategically avoided actively promoting the agreement, only addressing it when directly questioned. This suggests a tacit understanding that the MoU is effectively stalled. Neither the Somaliland president nor Ethiopia appears inclined to advance its implementation, rendering further public discourse on the matter largely unproductive. So, talking about MoU is a dead end.
The assertion has been made that Ethiopia’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was primarily intended as a public demonstration of its unwavering commitment to securing maritime access. What is your evaluation of this hypothesis?
The MoU undeniably generated significant international attention by sending a shockwave, effectively placing Somaliland at the forefront of regional discourse. This provided Somaliland with a long-desired opportunity to assert its strategic importance within the Horn of Africa. The MoU afforded Ethiopia a period of diplomatic leverage, prompting Somalia to engage in discussions regarding Ethiopian access to maritime resources.
While Somalia now proposes access to commercial ports in the Indian Ocean, Ethiopia has not entirely relinquished its pursuit of Red Sea access. This strategic maneuver successfully mitigated Ethiopia’s diplomatic isolation experienced in the previous year. Although the MoU’s outcomes may not fully align with Ethiopia’s initial aspirations, it served as a catalyst for renewed dialogue and positioned Ethiopia to explore various avenues for securing maritime access. Some analysts believe this constituted a strategic victory for Prime Minister Abiy.
Could Ethiopia be strategically employing this situation to achieve its goal of accessing the sea through Assab?
While Prime Minister Abiy’s precise intentions remain unclear, his pursuit of Red Sea access represents a significant strategic gamble. Although the long-term consequences are uncertain, this initiative will undoubtedly be a notable historical event. Regardless of its eventual success or failure, it was a demonstrably bold move, particularly considering the simultaneous internal challenges Ethiopia faced. This decision reflects a high-stakes approach.
In light of the intensification of tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, what is your evaluation of the widespread expert opinion that armed conflict is now inevitable?
Yes, it is inevitable because the northern region remains unstable, and Tigray is not fully reintegrated under the federal government. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki feels sidelined by the Pretoria Agreement. Initially, the situation seemed to be progressing slowly, but now tensions appear to be surfacing. Isaias is aligning himself with Abiy’s opponents wherever he finds them. Ethiopia recognizes that Eritrea’s interference is persistent and understands the need for a response. However, the key factor is Tigray’s stance. If Tigray rejects conflict and prioritizes stability, the region can remain peaceful. If it aligns with the Ethiopian government—of which it is a part—Isaias may withdraw. However, if factions within Tigray seek external support, Ethiopia will be forced to act. This is a dangerous situation, and while escalation should be avoided, if conflict erupts, it could have significant consequences for the entire region.
Should conflict erupt between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which party do you foresee the Tigray forces siding with?
It is a complex situation. The military strength and unity of the TPLF remain uncertain. They are a highly sophisticated group that does not make decisions lightly. However, if they act strategically, they can prevent further conflict, considering the devastation and destruction of the past two years. The scars of war are still evident.
If the TPLF splits into factions, with some aligning with Isaias Afwerki—despite knowing the harm he inflicted on their people—their direction remains unclear. The key question is what they ultimately decide and whom they choose to align with. Much also depends on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s approach. If he finds a solution that fosters unity rather than division—bringing the factions together under the interim administration—TPLF can make a clear decision on regional leadership in the short term.
Avoiding war hinges on these dynamics. If TPLF aligns with Ethiopia, Isaias is done. However, if TPLF aligns with Isaias, Ethiopia will face a significant challenge. Accusations of secret talks with Eritrea have surfaced, though they have been denied. Still, there are suspicions of undisclosed dealings. Ultimately, the future of Tigray depends on TPLF’s choices. If they prioritize Tigray’s stability and commit to fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement—just as Abiy must—it could lead to a less volatile northern Ethiopia in the future.
Considering the widespread perception of an unprecedented increase in corruption across the Somali region, what specific factors and patterns have you observed contributing to this trend?
The Somali region is a very important part of the Ethiopian state—not just as an autonomous region within the federation but also in terms of its contribution to education for the Ethiopian people. Over the past six and a half years, there has been significant progress. However, corruption and nepotism have plagued the region, and these challenges are not disappearing anytime soon.
It is important to note that the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) took a peace deal, which was a commendable step. The region has experienced a level of peace it had not seen before in the last six and a half years. However, this stability is now shifting, and a crisis is already being felt. It is up to both the regional government and, more importantly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at the federal level to take ONLF seriously. He should not dismiss this issue as a trivial political mistrust that can be managed temporarily. A containment strategy may work in the short term, but it could backfire.
The broader situation in Africa is already fragile, and instability in the Somali region could impact not only the southeast of Ethiopia but also parts of Afar and Oromia. If small factions begin to stir unrest, external actors could exploit the situation. It is critical to prevent such influence.
Good governance will take time to establish, but the Prime Minister must conduct a thorough internal review of the region. Corruption has become highly visible, with numerous reports on the issue. It is not just a matter of governance now—the biggest concern is the future of the peace accord between ONLF and the federal government.
Everyone acknowledges that there are unresolved issues. ONLF itself has split into two factions, partly as a result of the containment strategy. However, this situation must be addressed seriously. The federal government needs to find a way to integrate ONLF into the political system to ensure lasting stability in the region.
What strategic responses might the ONLF consider if the present situation remains unchanged?
The ONLF is not facing internal challenges on its own but is also being influenced by external factors. If the ONLF can come together and resolve its internal divisions, and if the Ethiopian government approaches the situation with genuine intent, there should be no reason for conflict in the Somali region—whether small, medium, or large. Once a conflict begins, even at a small scale, it often escalates.
The administration should facilitate serious engagement with all parties. However, before that happens, the ONLF itself needs to unify, establish a solid political structure or movement, and create a framework for meaningful dialogue with the Ethiopian government. This would allow for discussions on governance, integrity, and political inclusion. At this stage, ONLF has nothing to lose—but if the situation deteriorates, the region as a whole will suffer. The stability and relative calm currently enjoyed in the Somali region must not be disrupted.
The federal government, led by the Prosperity Party and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, should take the ONLF issue seriously. A structured and serious engagement is needed to address the grievances raised. These issues, while significant, are not insurmountable; they can be managed and resolved.
If regional leaders, particularly President Mustafe Omer, act genuinely, and figures like Ahmed Shide—who holds significant influence in the federal government—play a constructive role, the situation can be stabilized. However, their handling of the issue has raised concerns about balance and commitment. While Prime Minister Abiy is undoubtedly occupied with national matters, he must also prioritize this issue to prevent further instability.
What about the Somali regional state’s representation in the federal government? Has the new administration answered the demands?
In theory, yes, but it depends on who holds those positions. Somali representation within the Prosperity Party (PP) appears stronger politically, but in terms of delivering on public expectations, it has been weaker. While the presence of Somali leaders in the federal government is visible, many feel that the expected changes and tangible outcomes have not materialized. The representation exists, but it has not necessarily translated into the results people anticipated.
What comprehensive and durable solutions do you believe are essential for establishing a future of sustained peace and prosperity in the region?
We need to seek organic solutions. The Horn of Africa—and Africa as a whole—has immense potential. There is hope that, once we address economic challenges like inflation, we can create the conditions necessary for real progress. To achieve this, we must support one another instead of undermining each other. If we stop working against each other, this region has the potential to thrive.
Our resources are vast, yet they remain largely untapped. Take, for example, the natural gas reserves in the Somali region—discovered over 70 years ago but still unexplored. We have abundant resources across the continent, but true prosperity requires political stability.
Looking at past governments, I have never seen one that truly prioritized long-term economic development. In my 54 years, much of what I have witnessed has felt like a joke—empty promises rather than real progress. We need to stop undermining ourselves and instead seek organic, homegrown solutions. Scholars and intellectuals must take the lead, working toward inward-focused solutions rather than looking outward for help.
The West may smile at us when we ask for assistance, but they have never genuinely wanted to help. They might offer superficial support, saying, “Don’t kill each other,” while at the same time providing the tools that fuel conflict. True change will come only when we rely on ourselves and build organic solutions from within.