March 20, 2025
Ethiopia’s ambition to secure Red Sea access and Eritrea’s interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs and a power struggle in Tigray could explode into a wider regional war.
More on this story: Estimations: Will Ethiopia and Eritrea start military conflict over Red Sea ports access
The threat of war is looming over the Horn of Africa again. A return to fighting in Tigray is possible and could lead to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Ethiopia’s ambition to secure access to the Red Sea via ports it lost to Eritrea in the 1990s, alongside Eritrea’s continued interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, have led to a dramatic deterioration of the relationship between the countries over the past two years. The mobilization of troops along both sides of their shared border highlights the seriousness of the situation.
With the rules-based international order under significant strain, Ethiopia – the world’s most populous landlocked country, with over 120 million people but no coastline – may consider this an opportune moment to be more assertive in its efforts to break out of its ‘geographical prison’.
Having lost two ports, Assab and Massawa, when Eritrea seceded in 1993, Ethiopia believes it has legal and moral grounds for re-establishing access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia also has financial incentives: it incurs about $1.6 billion per year in port fees to Djibouti and sea access could potentially enhance its economic growth by 25-30 per cent.
Addis Ababa thinks Ethiopian attempts to find legal routes to secure this access have failed due to Eritrean intransigence. Frustrated, Ethiopia has resorted to disruptive and aggressive diplomacy. Eritrea has responded by fuelling proxy conflict within Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost state, which is still suffering the aftershocks of the devastating two-year war that ended in 2022. This standoff could result in another bout of deadly conflict.
Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a long and complex history, with key periods of conflict and renewed hostilities. Here’s an overview of when and why tensions have arisen:
1. Eritrean War of Independence (1961–1991)
- Why? Eritrea was an Italian colony until 1941, then placed under British administration. In 1952, it was federated with Ethiopia, but Emperor Haile Selassie annexed it in 1962, making Eritrea part of Ethiopia.
- Tensions? Eritrean rebel groups, mainly the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), fought for independence.
- Outcome? Eritrea gained independence in 1991 after Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown. It became a sovereign state in 1993.
2. Ethiopia-Eritrea Border War (1998–2000)
- Why? A border dispute over the town of Badme escalated into a full-scale war.
- Tensions? Both countries accused each other of violating borders. The war led to around 100,000 deaths and massive displacement.
- Outcome? A peace agreement was signed in 2000 (Algiers Agreement), but Ethiopia refused to implement a 2002 ruling granting Badme to Eritrea. Tensions remained high for years.
3. Cold Peace (2000–2018)
- Why? Ethiopia continued to control Badme, and Eritrea remained hostile, supporting armed opposition groups in Ethiopia.
- Tensions? Cross-border skirmishes and proxy conflicts continued, leading to a prolonged state of hostility.
- Outcome? Relations remained frozen until 2018.
4. 2018 Peace Agreement and Renewed Tensions (2020–Present)
- Why? In 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a peace deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, officially ending the war.
- Tensions? Cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Tigray War (2020-2022) led to new tensions:
- Eritrean troops entered Tigray, committing alleged war crimes.
- Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) saw Eritrea as an aggressor.
- Eritrea remained uneasy about Ethiopia’s internal instability and power struggles.
- Outcome? While official peace remains, recent disputes over Red Sea access and Ethiopian troops near the border have reignited concerns about conflict.
Current Situation (2024–2025)
- Rising Ethiopian nationalism over Red Sea access has alarmed Eritrea.
- Eritrea has started military mobilization, fearing Ethiopian aggression.
- Ethiopia’s internal instability, especially in Tigray and Amhara regions, makes it vulnerable, but it may still seek regional dominance.
Conclusion
Ethiopia and Eritrea have experienced recurring conflicts due to border disputes, nationalism, and regional power struggles. While the 2018 peace deal improved relations, tensions remain, especially with Ethiopia’s recent geopolitical ambitions. The risk of another conflict depends on diplomatic efforts and internal stability in both countries.
Eritrea continues to play a provocative role in Tigray, where the Ethiopian government was allied with Eritrea in a bloody conflict against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), in which an estimated 600,000 peoplewere killed between 2020 and 2022.
While the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria Agreement to end the war in November 2022, tensions in the region remain high, including between rival factions of the TPLF.
Eritrea is one of the main drivers of the split between a faction loyal to TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael (TPLF-D) and those around his former deputy Getachew Reda (TPLF-G).
The Pretoria Agreement mandated the establishment of an interim administration, and Getachew was appointed its president in early 2023, despite commanding minimal support within the TPLF’s rank and file. Getachew has accused his former colleagues of colluding with Eritrea. The federal government shares this view.
The crisis risks escalating beyond Tigray into war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with spillover in Sudan and across the region.
The Ethiopian federal government believes the TPLF-D’s objective is to unseat Getachew and seize the contested Western Tigray area by force. It regards this possibility as a grave security threat that would effectively terminate the Pretoria Agreement.
Tigrayan fighters are also playing a significant role in supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in neighbouring Sudan, where Eritrea also supports the SAF.
The Ethiopian federal government feels threatened by the presence of Tigrayan forces in Western Tigray, a disputed border area with Sudan. Moreover, credible reports suggest that Eritrea has secretly discussed a tactical alliance with elements of the TPLF-D, which may seek Eritrean support should the federal government intervene to prevent them from toppling Getachew.
Eritrea, in turn, aims to leverage this situation to undermine Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ambitions for sea access by supporting his domestic adversaries. The risk of conflict is high.
Ethiopia could also support Red Sea maritime security and strengthen regional stability. At the same time, Ethiopia should continue exploring additional alternative sea access routes in the region to its growing import and export demand, notably through Somalia and Somaliland, in collaboration with Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
A peaceful resolution with Eritrea would also create political space for the Ethiopian government to manage its internal tensions. In Tigray, the federal government faces a difficult choice between the TPLF-D and the TPLF-G. Getachew is considered dependable by the government but lacks the authority and influence to run Tigray. In contrast, the TPLF-D is seen as less reliable but has a well-equipped infrastructure to administer the region and effectively control Tigrayan security forces.
As a compromise, the federal government could consider appointing a suitable candidate to replace Getachew, with a primary mission to normalize life in Tigray, facilitate the return of IDPs, implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, put a halt to illegal gold mining and, most notably, prepare the ground for regional elections. Currently, Tigray does not have representatives in Ethiopia’s bicameral parliament or representation in the Federal government, which should change as soon as possible.
To prevent conflict, it is imperative to recognize Ethiopia’s legitimate right to reliable sea access and Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Recent developments have heightened concerns about potential conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, particularly due to instability in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. A dissident faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has seized control of parts of Mekelle and Adigrat, raising fears of renewed civil war that could draw in Eritrea.
Eritrea has responded by mobilizing its military nationwide, while Ethiopia has deployed troops near the Eritrean border. These actions have led to increased tensions, with experts warning of the potential for a regional conflict that could destabilize the Horn of Africa.
However, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has publicly ruled out war with Eritrea over issues such as Red Sea access, emphasizing a commitment to peaceful dialogue.
This stance suggests that, despite the heightened tensions, both governments may seek to avoid direct military confrontation.
In summary, while the probability of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has increased due to recent events, efforts by leaders like Prime Minister Abiy to pursue peaceful resolutions may help mitigate the risk of war.