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Mebratu Kelecha
April 16th, 2025
Ethiopia is desperate for more access to the Red Sea, while Eritrea regards its coastline as a symbol of its national sovereignty. Despite fighting on the same side only a couple of years ago, relations between the two countries are deteriorating quickly, writes Mebratu Kelecha.
The Red Sea, a vital waterway connecting Africa to the Middle East and beyond, sits at the crossroads of geopolitical competition. For Ethiopia, a landlocked country, gaining access to the Red Sea is not just a matter of economic convenience—it is a national imperative. Yet, this ambition puts Ethiopia at odds with Eritrea, which views control of the Red Sea as integral to its sovereignty.
Ethiopia’s claim to the Red Sea is deeply rooted in both historical entitlement and legal precedent. A 1950 United Nations General Assembly resolution recognised Ethiopia’s need for maritime access, establishing it as a legal right under the Ethiopia-Eritrea federation of the 1950s. However, Eritrea’s secession in 1993 derailed Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, leaving the country landlocked and dependent on rented ports in Djibouti for its external trade. Ethiopia’s frustration is palpable. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has said that restoring access to the Red Sea is “existential” for Ethiopia. This is not just about economic opportunity – it is about Ethiopia’s survival and regional standing. The Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal, is a vital global trade route and critical to Ethiopia’s economic development and geopolitical influence.
Eritrea, however, sees the situation very differently. For Eritrea, the Red Sea is not just an economic resource, but a symbol of national sovereignty. Eritrea fought for decades for independence from Ethiopia, and its control of the Red Sea coast is a testament to its hard-won freedom and identity. The idea of allowing Ethiopia access to its coastline would be seen as a betrayal.
Currently, Ethiopia relies on Djibouti for port services, at an annual cost of £1.5 billion. Ethiopia argues that a lack of full access to the Red Sea hinders its economic development and regional influence and frames the issue as one of national necessity rather than territorial ambition. However, from Eritrea’s perspective, Ethiopia’s vocal pursuit of Red Sea access is based on expansionist desires that threaten its territorial integrity.
In 2024, Ethiopia signed a deal with Somaliland that secured a 50-year lease on a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline in exchange for recognising Somaliland’s independence. This move has heightened regional tensions. Somalia sees Somaliland’s independence as a threat to its territorial integrity, while Eritrea fears Ethiopia’s actions will jeopardise its sovereignty, particularly concerning the port of Assab. Egypt, too, has a vested interest in countering Ethiopia’s growing influence, particularly due to concerns over the Nile River, regional dominance, and its strategic position in the Red Sea.
In response, Egypt and Eritrea have strengthened ties with Somalia, culminating in a trilateral summit in Asmara in October 2024, where the three nations agreed to enhance security cooperation. This alliance aims to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing influence and ambitions for Red Sea access. The Red Sea’s strategic importance and the competing interests of neighbouring countries make this issue a critical flashpoint in the Horn of Africa.
A brief history of Eritrea-Ethiopia relations
The Port of Assab was once an important economic hub for Ethiopia. It has remained largely dysfunctional for decades. Following Eritrea’s secession and Ethiopia’s loss of access to the port, the once-bustling port ceased to play its historic role. For Eritrea, Assab has become a symbol of its sovereignty rather than an economic asset, with the country’s poor economy leaving the port underused. The port’s decline reflects broader economic difficulties in both countries, with Ethiopia’s reliance on external ports and Eritrea’s isolation exacerbating regional economic woes.
Despite the years of war and economic tension, Ethiopia and Eritrea found themselves in an unexpected alliance in 2020. They were united by a common enemy: the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This cooperation was driven by pragmatic political considerations and based on military support rather than mutual trust or shared values. It was effective in the short term but lacked a shared vision for the future. Once the TPLF threat was neutralised, the cooperation quickly unravelled.
Relations have been further complicated by accusations of war crimes by Eritrean troops that fought in Tigray in support of the Ethiopian government. These include extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. Despite mounting evidence of Eritrea’s involvement in these abuses, both governments deny any wrongdoing, complicating the recovery from a humanitarian crisis and jeopardising the peace process.
Despite the Pretoria Peace Agreement, there remain tensions in Tigray. It remains an open question if Tigrayans should seek autonomy and possibly independence or attempt to reintegrate into the federation. As rival factions vie for control, Eritrea has covertly supported former Tigray President Debretsion Gebremichael. He views the interim administration established in Tigray under the 2022 peace agreement as a puppet regime under Abiy’s control. In response, Ethiopia’s military has mobilised to the border with Eritrea, increasing the risk of interstate conflict. Eritrea’s external interference has turned what might otherwise have been an internal conflict into a regional issue with international implications.
Where do we go from here?
The failure to resolve the issue diplomatically has led to an escalation of the military posture, raising the prospect of conflict despite both governments’ public commitments to peace. While Abiy has publicly called for “give and take” peace talks, the built-up of military forces along the border with Eritrea, makes it clear that diplomacy is not the only option on the table.
Eritrea remains steadfast in its refusal to engage in any negotiations that would allow Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Eritrea is militarising its border with Ethiopia and continues to interfere in the country’s politics by supporting militias trying to break up the country.
The broader geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa is also shaping the instability. The Red Sea and surrounding regions are of strategic importance not only to Ethiopia and Eritrea but also to regional and global powers. Egypt, which shares an interest in the Nile with Ethiopia but opposes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has deepened its alliance with Eritrea to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing regional influence. Eritrea has also forged closer ties with Somalia. External powers such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Western countries also have significant interests in the region, further complicating the situation. These powers, with their strategic interests in the Red Sea, have the potential to either stabilise the region or exacerbate tensions.
Despite deep divisions and external pressure, diplomatic solutions remain the most viable path forward. There is potential for Ethiopia and Eritrea to reach a compromise on access to the Red Sea, possibly granting Ethiopia partial access to Eritrea’s coastline, ensuring economic benefits for both without infringing on Eritrea’s sovereignty. Such an agreement would potentially be mutually beneficial but would require both countries to move beyond their entrenched positions and engage in meaningful dialogue.
International mediation will also be critical. Past peace processes have failed to diffuse tensions due to a failure to address the root causes of the conflict. A more inclusive peace process involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and key Horn of Africa stakeholders is needed to achieve lasting peace. The international community must go beyond calls for peace and actively promote concrete solutions to the issues of territory, economics and identity at the heart of the conflict. International actors can provide both diplomatic and economic support to ensure the sustainability of any peace agreement.
The Red Sea has the potential to be a source of cooperation rather than division. However, to achieve this, Ethiopia and Eritrea must confront their historical grievances, resolve the humanitarian crisis in Tigray, and engage in meaningful dialogue that respects both countries’ sovereignty and their shared regional interests. The future of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations depends on whether both countries can break free from cycles of mistrust and violence and chart a course toward a peaceful, shared future. The stakes are high, and the stability of the region depends on the willingness of both Ethiopia and Eritrea to overcome their differences and seek a common path forward.
Photo credit: David Stanley used with permission CC BY 2.0
About the author
Mebratu Kelecha
Mebratu Kelecha received his PhD from the University of Westminster, an MSc from Durham University and a BA from Addis Ababa University. His research interests include development politics, public policy, transition and contentious politics, conflict and peace studies, democratic theory, and innovation.
Posted In: Conflict | History | International Affairs