Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have soured since the war in Tigray ended in 2022. The region is now a tinderbox for conflict: Europeans need to intervene and pull the various opposing factions back from the brink
Visiting Fellow
- Commentary
- 17 April 2025
Ethiopia and Eritrea are playing a dangerous game of chess; Tigray lies right in the centre of the board. The relationship between the two nations has deteriorated over the past few years, with the governments of both countries now indicating they are ready for conflict. In February, Eritrea launched a nationwide mobilisation, with Ethiopia following suit in March; reports suggest that heavy weaponry and mechanised units are being stationed close to the border in the Afar region.
The last conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which ran from 1998 until 2000, began as a border dispute but soon escalated. This time, Tigray could be the flashpoint: in 2022, after two years of brutal war, the Pretoria Agreement (otherwise known as the Tigray peace agreement) created a rift between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and left other warring parties disgruntled—including in Tigray. Now tensions within the region’s local leadership could drag Addis Ababa and Asmara into full-scale war. The international community—and especially Europe—needs to push for incremental and de-escalatory steps to fully phase out that risk.
Disrupting conflict flows
Europe has a strong interest in preventing war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A conflict could further destabilise an already precarious situation in the Horn of Africa, likely sparking a humanitarian crisis which would drive refugee flows toward Europe and increase aid needs. War would also strain Ethiopia’s fragile internal stability and risk spreading violence across the Horn region, including worsening Sudan’s civil war due to Ethiopia and Eritrea having opposing alliances in the conflict. A second conflict would additionally threaten security in the Red Sea and pave the way for external powers such as Egypt, Iran and Russia to exploit the chaos. This, in turn, would challenge European influence and disrupt its geoeconomic stakes in the region.
There is a chance that Egypt could intervene as an ally for Eritrea, such as by providing military equipment and supplies, due to its feud with Ethiopia over its Nile dam. In this scenario, Egypt’s involvement would likely aggravate the scale of the conflict. Iran has also enjoyed close relations with Eritrea since the latter’s independence in 1993: Tehran could leverage military support for Eritrea to regain a logistical channel in favour of Yemen’s Houthi rebels, which are currently under pressure from a US bombing campaign.
America led the original diplomatic action that ended the war in Tigray in 2022; this time the Trump administration is unlikely to step in. The EU therefore needs to take over this role as leader of diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Ethiopia and Eritrea as critical geopolitical, security, economic and migratory developments hang in the balance. Within the bloc, Italy—arguably the only major Western country with ties to both Ethiopia and Eritrea—should spearhead this effort, with support from France and Germany.
With estimates indicating that the war in Tigray claimed the lives of 600,000 people, more than the wars in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine combined, it is clear that Europeans cannot let such a tragedy be repeated.
Abiy and Afwerky: the key chess players
In 2018, Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed Ali and Eritrea’s president Isaias Afwerky signed a historic peace agreement, which shaped the countries’ collaboration in the war against the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF). But the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the civil war in Tigray, was negotiated by Abiy’s government and the TPLF, and sidelined Eritrea and other Ethiopian groups.
Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have since soured; Abiy has intensified his rhetoric around Ethiopia’s historical right to sea access, which it lost following Eritrean independence. Asmara considers such rhetoric from Ethiopia as a direct threat to its territorial integrity. The Eritrean port of Assab seems to be Ethiopia’s primary objective—it has concentrated its recent deployment in the Afar region, which is in close proximity to Assab. Despite Abiy’s attempts to rule out potential aggression, Eritrea remains deeply wary of Ethiopia’s intentions.
Asmara has manoeuvred to counter Ethiopian influence in the region, forging deeper political relations with Egypt and Sudan via the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Even Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which facilitated the 2018 peace agreement, have fallen along either side of this divide: Saudi Arabia is showing growing support to Eritrea and its partners via meetings and investment pledges, whereas the UAE has deepened its relationship with Ethiopia, Somaliland and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
External actors showing support for either nation could further entrench the divide between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also risks dragging multiple actors directly or indirectly into the conflict.
Tigray in the centre
While regional dynamics are undoubtedly impacting local tensions, it is Tigray that could spark the war. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement split the Tigrayan leadership into two rival factions, with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) and its president, Getachew Reda, at loggerheads with the backbone of TPLF’s leadership, led by Debretsion Gebremichael. The sluggish implementation of the peace deal and dire humanitarian conditions, exacerbated by recent US aid freezes, has put public pressure on both Tigrayan factions. After the TIA suspended three Tigrayan commanders, on March 11th, the region’s armed forces rallied behind Gebremichael and took over Tigray, forcing Reda to flee to Addis Ababa.
Abiy did not resort to war against the TPLF; he instead removed Reda and appointed Tedesse Worede to the TIA after negotiations with the TPLF. With Ethiopia’s governmental forces stretched across the country’s multiple crises, the country cannot reopen the front with the TPLF because it would likely see the involvement of Eritrea—which, from its side, has seen Afwerky open to the TPLF leadership and hold talks in Asmara. But this is part of Afwerky’s attempts to divert Ethiopian military attention and resources away from the Assab area.
While Eritrea’s level of support for the TPLF remains unclear, it signals its readiness to back Gebremichael’s faction in a war against Addis Ababa. Consequently, any military escalation in Tigray would likely turn into a major war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Crisis in Amhara
Ethiopia’s other major crisis is an insurgency in the Amhara region. A plethora of small ethnic militias (“Fano”) fought alongside the Ethiopian government during the 2020-2022 Tigray war but have since turned against it, following attempts at demobilising them. Though loosely organised, Fano groups have recently captured towns in the Amhara region, with some now seeking to coalesce.
Eritrea shares the Fano’s dissatisfaction with the Pretoria Agreement and maintains its wartime ties with the Ahmara groups; it could leverage them militarily in case of escalation with Addis Ababa. While the two crises in Tigray and Amhara are for now holding back Ethiopia and Eritrea, at the same time they could trigger a domino effect. Overall, a fragile equilibrium is taking shape—but any minor miscalculation could disrupt this, unless the international community steps up its efforts to contain the tensions.
Europe’s next moves
Europe’s most immediate concern is to revert Ethiopia’s deployment in the Afar region, and Eritrea’s nationwide mobilisation, to mitigate the risk of escalation.
Europe’s most immediate concern is to revert Ethiopia’s deployment in the Afar region, and Eritrea’s nationwide mobilisation, to mitigate the risk of escalation
The EU should coordinate mediation efforts with other regional stakeholders to increase pressure on the parties. This should involve Turkey, given its strong interests in the region; Qatar, which mediated successfully in the spat between Eritrea and Djibouti; and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could exert pressure and dispense incentives to Eritrea and Ethiopia, respectively. Any coordination should equally involve the AU and its mediating role in African conflicts, a matter that needs more attention ahead of the next EU-AU summit (ostensibly planned for 2025).
In parallel, the EU and European countries need to help defuse tensions in Ethiopia’s northern-most state. This could be achieved by relaunching the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and supporting a compromise solution on the contested region of Western Tigray, which is contributing to the Ahmara insurgency. European aid agencies also need to scale up their assistance to the area, filling the US gap as much as possible, to help defuse the pressure of the humanitarian crisis for Tigrayan leaders.
Europeans can press non-Western donors in Asia and the Gulf to co-contribute, upholding the principle of burden-sharing. Aid should also be deployed to facilitate a solution for western Tigray, either by supporting the resettlement of Amharas who now reside on the land, or by helping displaced Tigrayans find a new home and livelihood.
The EU and European countries can consolidate the de-escalation with a comprehensive economic package. Ethiopia has recently reached a preliminary debt relief agreement for $8.5bn, pushed forward by France and China through the G20 Common Framework. Further restructuring could be tied more closely to de-escalatory policies, which is also in the interest of both Europe and China.
Additionally, European members states should support private investment in Ethiopia’s mineral and agri-food value chains, possibly involving Gulf and other Asian investors too. On top of growth and employment, these investments would be relevant for Europe’s food and energy security, as well as Ethiopia’s macroeconomic stability. Europe could, despite governance challenges, try to support Eritrea’s high-potential tourism sector, which would disincentivise aggressive actions by its leadership.
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An uneasy equilibrium is keeping Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Tigray and Amhara, from descending into conflict. But this constellation needs external support. Europeans are well-placed to showcase their ability to handle critical politico-security files in collaboration with other stakeholders and relaunch multilateralism, building upon the success on previous debt negotiations. Failure to do so, however, would increase the marginalisation of European players in regional affairs.
Last but certainly not least, Europeans cannot let another tragedy like the war in Tigray happen again. It is their duty to make all the necessary attempts to prevent this.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.