The coexistence of ethnic federalism and public land ownership within Ethiopia’s constitutional framework has evolved into a critical governance challenge as the system fosters inequality, suppresses mobility, and intensifies conflict.
May 29, 2025
Daniel Hailu (PhD) is a senior child/social protection consultant and researcher at Litmus Research and Consultancy Plc.
Ethiopia’s 1995 Constitution is a singular legal document in the contemporary world. It institutionalises ethnic federalism – the division of the country into regional states based on ethnic identity – while simultaneously upholding public land ownership, a legacy of the Marxist Derg regime. While both these principles arose from distinct historical and ideological contexts, their coexistence within a single constitutional framework has produced a persistent structural tension.
Ethnic federalism seeks to empower distinct “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” through political autonomy, including the right to self-determination and secession (FDRE Constitution, Art. 39). Public land ownership, by contrast, centralises control over all land under the state, granting only usufruct rights to individuals and communities (FDRE Constitution, Art. 40). Taken together, these provisions create a contradiction between ethnic autonomy and individual economic freedom – an enduring issue with profound consequences for governance, development, and interethnic relations in Ethiopia.
Ethnic federalism: Decentralized political identity
The introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia following the fall of the Derg regime in 1991 was primarily motivated by the political objective of recognising and institutionalising the country’s deep ethnolinguistic diversity. The 1995 Constitution established a federal system in which regional states are largely delineated along ethnolinguistic lines, granting each the right to use its own language, develop local institutions, and, notably, to secede from the federation under Article 39.
Advocates of this model argue that it provides historically marginalised ethnic groups with autonomy and equitable access to political representation, thereby redressing longstanding centralisation and cultural suppression. However, critics contend that institutionalising ethnicity as the foundation of federalism has encouraged ethnonationalist mobilisation, fostered intergroup tensions, and weakened a cohesive national identity. Furthermore, the system has often resulted in the dominance of titular ethnic groups within their respective regions, marginalising minority communities and conflating state authority with ethnic majoritarianism.
Public land ownership: Centralized economic control
In contrast to its decentralised political system, Ethiopia maintains a highly centralised model of land control. Under Article 40 of the Constitution, land is the “common property of the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia,” and may not be privately owned. While land can be used and inherited under usufruct rights, individuals and private entities are prohibited from buying or selling land.
Originally a revolutionary policy meant to break the feudal landholding system, public land ownership has outlived the Derg regime. In the current era, however, it has become a significant constraint on economic development. Farmers lack long-term security over their land, deterring investment and innovation. Urban expansion and industrial growth are also impeded by bureaucratic hurdles and uncertain tenure. Moreover, because land is allocated and administered by ethnically defined regional governments, access becomes a function of ethnopolitical affiliation rather than legal equity.
The core contradiction
The intersection of ethnic federalism and public land ownership creates a structural contradiction: land, though constitutionally framed as a national resource, is controlled at the regional level by ethnically defined governments. This control transforms land into a political asset, used to consolidate local power, reward ethnic loyalty, and marginalise “outsiders” within the region.
This system fosters regional disparities. Larger and politically dominant ethnic groups can leverage their territorial and administrative control to attract investment and expand development projects, while smaller or landless groups face systemic exclusion. The economic implications are far-reaching: a fragmented land market, reduced internal migration, and inefficient land use contribute to national underdevelopment and rising tensions.
The decentralisation of power to ethnically based regional governments has exacerbated this issue, as local authorities prioritise the interests of their ethnic constituents over others. This has contributed to land-related conflicts, particularly where marginalised groups within a region are left without meaningful access to land or resources. These challenges have led to stagnation in key sectors, particularly agriculture and urban development, as land allocation remains entangled with political and ethnic loyalty.
Comparative perspectives
Ethiopia’s constitution is unique in explicitly combining ethnic federalism with public land ownership. Yet, insights from other countries – some with partial similarities – can offer comparative context. China maintains a system of ethnic regional autonomy, with regions like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia designated for minority groups. These regions have limited cultural and administrative self-governance, but in practice, ethnic autonomy is tightly constrained by the central government. Like Ethiopia, all land is publicly owned – urban land by the state, rural land collectively by villages. While this has enabled rapid economic development, it has come at the cost of ethnic repression and political centralisation, showing a different trade-off between state control and minority rights.
Vietnam recognises multiple ethnic groups and has implemented ethnic-sensitive development programmes in certain areas. The land remains publicly owned, and local governments administer access. However, ethnic autonomy is not formally institutionalised, making Vietnam a less decentralised model than Ethiopia, though similarly marked by land as a state-administered resource.
Russia is a federation that includes ethnic republics (e.g. Tatarstan, Chechnya), where titular ethnicities are constitutionally recognised. These republics have some self-governing powers, although political control is heavily centralised in practice. Land can be privately owned, but strategic or undeveloped lands remain under federal or regional control, creating partial overlaps with Ethiopia’s land policy. Conflicts like those in Chechnya highlight the dangers of combining ethnic federalism with state-dominated governance.
India, Belgium, and Canada contrast sharply with Ethiopia. India accommodates linguistic and cultural diversity through federalism but supports private land ownership, enabling internal migration and entrepreneurship. Belgium manages ethnic and linguistic divisions through a consociational federal model, again with private property rights. Canada allows provinces significant autonomy (e.g. Quebec) but ensures strong individual property rights, creating a balance between regional identity and economic integration.
These examples suggest that private land tenure systems tend to facilitate economic development and national integration, even in culturally diverse states.
Policy implications
Resolving Ethiopia’s constitutional paradox is critical for national stability and development. Three potential pathways for reform emerge. The first would be to liberalise land tenure while retaining ethnic federalism. In effect, allowing private land ownership could foster economic freedom, encourage migration, and boost cross-regional investment, while preserving cultural autonomy at the regional level. This would reduce the politicisation of land and align economic rights with individual citizenship rather than ethnic identity, potentially easing ethnic tensions.
The second would be to recentralise governance while retaining public land ownership. Shifting land administration to the federal level could ensure uniform access and standards, minimising the ability of regional elites to politicise land. However, this would require major constitutional changes and could face resistance from groups that see ethnic federalism as integral to their identity and self-determination.
The third pathway would be to privatise land and shift to a geographic-based federal system. This model could foster a market-driven economy, stimulate investment, and enhance migration. However, while this approach could streamline governance and promote economic growth, it risks provoking ethnic backlash by undermining the autonomy protections crucial for regional identity and self-rule. This change could ignite resistance, as many regions view ethnic federalism as vital for ensuring equitable representation and preserving cultural heritage.
Each of these pathways demands broad national dialogue, comprehensive legal reform, and transitional mechanisms to safeguard social inclusion and regional equity.
Ethiopia’s constitutional framework reflects a historically grounded attempt to balance diversity and unity, equity and identity. However, the coexistence of ethnic federalism and public land ownership has evolved into a critical governance challenge. By turning land into a politically contested and ethnically managed resource, the system fosters inequality, suppresses mobility, and intensifies conflict.
As Ethiopia approaches a constitutional crossroads, it must confront the contradictions embedded in its hybrid model. Whether the country opts for greater liberalisation, recentralisation, or a new hybrid model, a clear and inclusive reform process is essential. Only by resolving this paradox can Ethiopia unlock its full economic potential, deepen national cohesion, and foster a more inclusive and peaceful society.