January 31, 2026
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
Mekuria
Following the death of Emperor Yohannes IV in 1889, Ras Mengesha Yohannes emerged as a central figure in the ensuing succession crisis. Rather than consolidating authority and national unity, Mengesha pursued power through repeated rebellion, shifting political alignments, and, at times, engagement with Italian colonial authorities. Although he later fought alongside Emperor Menelik II at the Battle of Adwa, his political career was characterized more by opportunism and regional ambition than by sustained loyalty to the Ethiopian state. This pattern was repeated in the next generation when Dejazmach Haile Selassie Gugsa, a prominent Tigrayan noble, openly collaborated with Fascist Italy during the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia. These cases illustrate a recurring tendency among segments of the Tigrayan elite to prioritize regional power and personal advancement over national cohesion.
At the same time, Ethiopian history demonstrates that earlier rulers developed mechanisms to manage elite defection and rebellion. From Emperor Tewodros II through Emperor Haile Selassie I, the imperial state relied on a pragmatic “carrot-and-stick” strategy: loyalty to the center was rewarded with authority and recognition, while rebellion was met with decisive sanction. Though imperfect, this approach helped preserve imperial sovereignty and restrain centrifugal elite behavior. The collapse of this political tradition after 1974, following the rise of the Derg regime, marked a critical rupture. The Derg dismantled Ethiopia’s historical statecraft without replacing it with a coherent governing philosophy, resulting in institutional decay, ethnic fragmentation, and the eventual rise of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a dominant political force.
This historical pattern resurfaced most clearly in the post-1991 period. Ethiopia’s loss of access to the Red Sea and the formal separation of Eritrea were not inevitable outcomes of history alone but were significantly shaped by political decisions taken by the TPLF-led transitional government. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 would not have received international recognition without the explicit consent and diplomatic sponsorship of that government. Absent this intervention, Eritrea might have remained a contested territory—comparable to Somaliland—subject to future negotiation or reintegration. That strategic option has since been irreversibly foreclosed.
From an Amhara political perspective, the pragmatic course at present is to accept Eritrea as a sovereign and independent state and pursue cooperation based on mutual interests. Portraying Eritrea as a historical enemy is analytically unsound and politically counterproductive. Eritreans fought a protracted war of independence and, like most liberation movements, employed propaganda and strategic narratives during wartime—practices that should be understood within their historical context rather than treated as uniquely illegitimate.
A comparative assessment of conduct is instructive. Eritrea has not engaged in systematic arrests of Amharas, nor has it carried out mass violence against Amhara civilians, nor has it pursued territorial expansion into Amhara regions. By contrast, the record of the TPLF administration includes widespread allegations of killings, forced displacement, mass detentions, and territorial dispossession affecting Amharas. Claims that the TPLF “refused to fight” to reclaim western and southern Tigray are better understood as street-smart political narratives rather than credible historical explanations.This narrative is propagated through Zara / Reyot media and amplified by willingly naïve political activists like Lidetu Ayalew and Yilkal Getnet to confuse Amharas. There is no single statement we have heard from the so-called “horses’ mouths,” neither Getachew nor Debresion. In fact, Getachew has, after the Halala meeting, praised plans to invade Amhara — ይህን አልማድነቅ አይቻልም ነበር ያለው።
Even if the TPLF refused to ally with the federal government to reclaim western and southern Tigray by fighting against Fano, it is not because it seeks to avoid conflict with Amharas. There is war fatigue throughout Tigray. The TPLF’s army defeat, culminating in the unconditional surrender under the Pretoria Agreement, remains a vivid memory. Even the war hawks, Alula Solomon and Daniel Berhane, are now reluctant to criticize the federal government and have entered a “no-war” campaign mode against conflict between Tigray and the federal state. Figures like Tewodros Tsegaye, who downplayed the Pretoria Agreement from the start, are now acknowledging that Tigray’s survival depends on this peace settlement. Expecting anything beneficial from Tigrayan elites is daydreaming. Today in Tigray, the main actors — Salsawi, Woyanie, Baytona, Free Tigray Party, and Arena Tigray for Democracy and Sovereignty — are even more radical than the TPLF itself.
More concerning is the emergence of discourse among segments of the contemporary Amhara political elite advocating renewed alliances with the TPLF. Such positions reflect a significant deficit in historical consciousness and political philosophy. Ethiopian history consistently demonstrates that alliances formed without regard to prior patterns of elite behavior tend to reproduce instability rather than resolve it.
Misreading Abiy Ahmed: Strategic Gaps Among Amharas
Claims that attribute all manner of speculative intentions to Abiy Ahmed regarding the permanent exclusion of Wolkait from Tigray reflect flawed political reasoning. Abiy’s political philosophy has consistently exhibited hostility toward Amhara political power, coupled with an apparent intent to weaken the region structurally and economically. Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to question why Abiy would return Raya to the TPLF while simultaneously withholding Wolkait, when both territories are subject to legal and historical dispute, with Amharas asserting longstanding claims of ownership.
Some naïve Amhara political commentators argue that Abiy will never allow Wolkait to fall under Tigrayan control because it would create a strategic corridor linking the TPLF to Sudan. This interpretation misunderstands Abiy’s tactical approach. Rather than acting on principle or territorial logic, Abiy appears to be waiting for complete TPLF surrender before acting decisively. Getachew Reda’s posture—characterized by political accommodation and overt appeasement—suggests an attempt to reclaim Wolkait through diplomatic submission rather than leverage. Should Abiy receive sufficient assurance that the TPLF no longer possesses the military capacity to pose a strategic threat, there is little reason to believe he would hesitate to concede Wolkait.
Indeed, Abiy could pursue negotiations mediated by a third party, trading territorial concessions or political guarantees in exchange for short-term stability or elite compliance. Such an outcome aligns with his broader governing pattern. Given this reality, the critical question is not what Abiy intends in the abstract, but how Fano should respond strategically. The answer lies in mobilizing its support base and the broader Amhara community, while politically isolating itself from the Amhara Prosperity Party (PP), whose alignment with federal power has repeatedly failed to safeguard Amhara territorial and political interests.
Lessons from History: Strategic Orientation and Leadership
The historical record raises pressing questions regarding the strategic orientation, leadership structure, and political maturity of contemporary Amhara movements, including Fano. How should such movements respond to the reported re-entry of TPLF forces into areas such as Telemt and Raya—through passive observation, political normalization, or strategic resistance grounded in law, legitimacy, and popular consent? What forms of leadership are appropriate for a mass movement operating under conditions of existential threat?
Fano and its leader, Zemene Kassie, face immediate decisions. Should they remain passive spectators, or applaud TPLF’s actions? The only responsible approach is strategic: It should out right reject TPLF’s intervention. Fano should treat this incursion as an opportunity to catalyze a mass local uprising, organizing and empowering residents of Telemt and Raya to form a fighting wing drawn directly from the local population. There is no strategic necessity to redeploy fighters from Gojjam, Shewa, Wollo, or Gondar; rather, the priority should be to enable local communities to defend themselves through organization, training, and coordination.
Simultaneously, political messaging must be carefully managed. If figures such as Yilkal Getnet continue to appear on Reyot Media—widely perceived by many Amharas as reinforcing narratives that downplay or normalize TPLF claims on Amhara land—Amhara strategic clarity risks being undermined at a critical moment. Zara/Reyot Media personalities, including Stalin, Tewodros Tsegaye, Alula Solomon, Daniel Berhane, and other Tigrayan elites, consistently frame discussions around western and southern Tigray and Tigrayan sovereignty. It is reasonable to ask why Yilkal Getnet does not challenge this narrative, yet gives interviews with Tewodros Tsegaye without contesting his framing. After all, Yilkal claims to be a more committed Amhara nationalist than Eskinder, yet his actions fail to reflect this stance in practice.
Organizational Rectification: Leadership and Governance
Equally urgent are questions of internal governance and leadership selection. Historical experience demonstrates that successful resistance movements require leadership legitimacy rooted in competence, accountability, and clear political vision. Figures whose past political records are closely associated with discredited regimes or failed strategies may carry significant political liabilities, regardless of their military experience. Conflating military expertise with political leadership has repeatedly proven costly in Ethiopian history. Fano must therefore ensure that its leadership is principled, capable, and broadly respected, avoiding patterns of perpetual or unmerited authority that have weakened ethnic movements in the past.
There is the need for organizational rectification within Fano’s political bureau. Tefera Mamo should have maintained a low profile and confined his role to that of a military adviser. Instead, leadership roles should be reassigned based on competence, credibility, and historical record. Mirie Wodajo would be more suitable as commander of the army, with Desalegn Siyasb Shewa serving as his deputy or omeone else. Tefera Mamo is a political liability and should not be given public-facing roles or invited for interviews. He has demonstrated no tangible capacity to advance Amhara political interests. For those familiar with his background, opposition to his leadership is not personal but principled. He was a former ANDM fighter who played a role in bringing Meles Zenawi to power. That record alone should disqualify him from leadership within an Amhara resistance movement. Moreover, he is a late entrant into the Fano movement, having joined for reasons that are widely understood and raise legitimacy issues.
Amhara organizations must operate on the basis of principle, consistency, and defensible logic, not political appeasement or rehabilitation of compromised figures. While it is necessary to exercise restraint and strategic caution in the face of ongoing Amhara genocide, elevating such individuals into leadership positions reflects a deeper leadership deficit within the younger generation. Historical precedents are instructive: figures like Beyene Petros and Merera Gudina became perpetual leaders within their respective ethnic organizations largely due to similar strategic and leadership deficits. This outcome reflects a reluctance among the younger generation to take assertive roles. Fano must ensure that this pattern does not repeat itself
Claims that attribute all manner of speculative intentions to Abiy Ahmed regarding the permanent exclusion of Wolkayit from Tigray reflect flawed political reasoning. Abiy Ahmed’s political philosophy has consistently exhibited hostility toward Amhara political power, coupled with an apparent intent to weaken the region structurally and economically. Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to question why Abiy would return Raya to the TPLF while simultaneously withholding Wolkayit, when both territories are subject to legal and historical dispute, with Amharas asserting longstanding claims of ownership.
Some naïve Amhara political commentators argue that Abiy will never allow Wolkait to fall under Tigrayan control because it would create a strategic corridor linking the TPLF to Sudan. This interpretation misunderstands Abiy’s tactical approach. Rather than acting on principle or territorial logic, Abiy appears to be waiting for complete TPLF surrender before acting decisively. Getachew Reda’s posture—characterized by political accommodation and overt appeasement—suggests an attempt to reclaim Wolkait through diplomatic submission rather than leverage. Should Abiy receive sufficient assurance that the TPLF no longer possesses the military capacity to pose a strategic threat, there is little reason to believe he would hesitate to concede Wolkait.
Indeed, Abiy could pursue negotiations mediated by a third country, trading territorial concessions or political guarantees in exchange for short-term stability or elite compliance. Such an outcome would align with his broader governing pattern. Given this reality, the critical question is not what Abiy intends in the abstract, but how Fano should respond strategically. The answer lies in mobilizing its support base and the broader Amhara community, while politically isolating itself from the Amhara Prosperity Party (PP), whose alignment with federal power has repeatedly failed to safeguard Amhara territorial and political interests.
Conclusions
The Ethiopian historical record does not require reinterpretation but disciplined study. Recurring patterns of elite betrayal, opportunism, and regionalism have consistently undermined national cohesion. A sustainable political strategy for the Amhara constituency—and for Ethiopia more broadly—depends on recognizing these patterns, restoring principled statecraft, strengthening institutional leadership norms, and grounding alliances in historical experience and long-term interests rather than sentiment or short-term expediency.
Fano’s immediate task should be clear, and its actions must be guided by lessons from history. Principled leadership, strategic vigilance, and community mobilization are not optional—they are the only path to survival and self-emancipation. Anything less risks repeating the mistakes of the past.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
__
Support Borkena : https://borkena.com/subscribe-borkena/
Join our Telegram Channel : t.me/borkena
Like borkena on Facebook
Add your business to Ethiopian Business Listing / Ethiopian Business Directory Business Listing Toronto