The Red Sea System and the Unraveling of Horn Stability – Borkena

February 16, 2026

Sisay M (Amoraw)

The Horn of Africa  has moved from the periphery of Middle Eastern strategy. It  now functions within the Red Sea security system, where port concessions, training missions, recognition politics, and logistics corridors intersect with fragile states. What is unfolding in Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia is  less episodic instability than the gradual absorption of the Horn into Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean power competition.¹

The lead actors in the middle of this geopolitical theatre are Saudi Araba and the UAE. The rivalry between this two, once most obvious in Yemen, has become a quieter but more significant struggle for influence along the western Red Sea.¹ Instead of open confrontation, they battle through port management contracts, security cooperation agreements, sovereign wealth deployment, and carefully calibrated political patronage. When Somalia canceled its agreements with the UAE in early 2026, it was presented as defending sovereignty, but it was really a strategic move within this competitive geopolitical matrix.⁸ At the same time, Saudi Arabia increased its military cooperation with Somalia, showing how quickly alliances can form when port access and maritime security are at stake.¹

Meanwhile, the other growing power, Turkey has strengthened its presence in Somalia, now moving from security training to exploring offshore energy.¹³ Since 2011, Turkey has taken steady steps: starting with humanitarian aid, then building state partnerships, developing defense infrastructure, and now focusing on energy. Sending a Turkish deep-sea drilling ship to Somali waters is more than a business move; it gives Turkey a real stake in the region’s maritime affairs at a time when the Red Sea is strategically important.¹³ This approach puts Turkey in a different alignment compared to the UAE, even though alliances are still shifting.¹⁶

Against this backdrop, Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 added a new and important factor to an already tense situation.¹⁴ Somaliland’s status has long been uncertain, but recognition from a country with strong Red Sea security interests turns a local constitutional issue into a major geopolitical event.¹⁴ In the Horn, recognition politics is not just symbolic; it is used as leverage in port and base negotiations and affects African Union rules about borders. With the politics of recognition becoming a bargaining tool, the chances for escalation will continue to grow.

The United States sees this scenario in a different lens, yet they have similar concerns. Washington’s major goal is not to get everyone on the same page ideologically, but to keep the corridor stable and the Red Sea safe from threats and maritime route disruptions. U.S. publications on Ethiopia’s human rights failures and continuous violence highlights legal and reputational concerns,⁵ but in reality, the U.S. often focuses on stopping fragmentation that could disrupt shipping or let rivals in. The U.S. response to Ethiopia’s internal problems is affected by the conflict between American values and the need for corridor security, even though the corridor security always takes precedent in Trump’s America first foreign policy. 

Ethiopia is at the center of the Horn of Africa’s present strategic frictions. It is the second most populated country on the continent and is landlocked, yet it has always looked to the Red Sea, both in history and in its national attitude. Recent political talk in Addis Ababa about getting to the sea needs to be understood in light of what’s going on inside the country. Ethiopia is having this argument at a time when it is facing major problems at home, such as economic problems, violent conflicts in numerous areas, and a growing loss of political legitimacy for the Abiy government. In this situation, talking about outside threats can do two things: it signals deterrence abroad and bring them together at home. When Ethiopian officials say that Eritrea is being aggressive and supporting armed groups,⁹ and Eritrea strongly dispute these charges,¹⁰ it explains that this isn’t only diplomatic conflict but also that international tensions affect internal politics. Also, the memory of the war from 1998 to 2000 still affects how officials on both sides think about security. The 2018 peace deal made diplomatic relations better, but it didn’t get rid of the deep distrust that still exists in military, political, and intelligence circles.⁹ 

Eritrea is frequently thought of as a small player, but it still has a big role to play in the Red Sea region. The key premise behind Eritrea’s foreign policy towards Ethiopia are driven by two main concepts: Ethiopia’s size and economy are a hidden strategic threat, and that Eritrea’s coastline is its biggest strength. Eritrea’s focus on preventive action and preserving its sovereignty began during the war from 1998 to 2000 and has continued throughout the peace treaty in 2018. The TPLF led the Ethiopian government in that fight, which is why Eritrean sees TPLF as a lasting concern. Eritrea is still worried that the TPLF will retake power in northern Ethiopia, even if the struggle between Addis Ababa and Mekelle changed the balance of power since TPLF was ousted from power. However, the fundamental concern for Eritrea isn’t political partnerships; it is whether changes in northern Ethiopia could bring back the same strategic situation that existed before 2018.¹⁷

The exchange of accusations between Addis Ababa and Asmara in February 2026 showed that deep mistrust still exists.⁹,¹⁰ Eritrea usually makes decisions based on practical concerns and regime security, not ideology. When Ethiopia faces internal problems, Eritrea reassesses its approach: instability might weaken Ethiopia’s influence, but it can also make the border more unpredictable. As a result, Eritrea sometimes cooperates and sometimes blocks Ethiopia, depending on whether Ethiopia seems to be coming together or falling apart.¹⁷

If relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea get worse, it will affect Ethiopia’s internal security. Fighting in the north would overlap with other conflicts, like the war in Amhara. The International Crisis Group has called the Amhara conflict ominous, highlighting deep problems in the country rather than an immediate collapse.³ Reports from Human Rights Watch and the U.S. Department of State about abuses make it harder to see these conflicts as only domestic issues.⁴,⁵ For outside observers focused on Red Sea stability and the situation in Sudan, these reports show that Ethiopia’s internal conflicts are closely linked to wider regional security concerns.

To the west, Sudan’s war has become international in ways that make spillover a constant risk, not just a possibility. The UN Security Council has often warned that Sudan’s conflict could spread to neighbors like Ethiopia.² Reuters has reported on alleged training sites linked to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces inside Ethiopia, which shows how quickly Ethiopia can get pulled into Sudan’s war logistics.¹² Even if direct state support is unclear, just the idea of cross-border help changes diplomatic thinking. Proxy wars do not need formal agreements; they work best in uncertain situations.

Considering all the intricacies discussed above, Horn’s security is being shaped more by shared strategic concerns than by formal alliances. Gulf countries are concerned about Red Sea chokepoints and Iran’s influence. Turkey wants a lasting maritime presence. Israel watches corridor security. The United States fears the region breaking apart. Sudan’s groups look for outside support, and Ethiopia tries to keep its territory together. None of these players focus only on Ethiopia’s internal politics. Their main concern is keeping the corridor stable and managing risks.

In this context, the conflict in Amhara is not just a domestic Ethiopian issue. Outside actors see it mainly as a question of whether it will disrupt the corridor, cause interstate conflict, or lead to more proxy fighting. This view does not rule out diplomacy, but it limits what outcomes are acceptable. When the risk of fragmentation grows, managed stabilization such as ceasefires, protecting corridors, and allowing humanitarian aid often becomes the preferred solution.²–⁵ However, this kind of stabilization can freeze political problems instead of solving them. It is tempting to predict either total collapse or a major realignment in the region, but caution is needed. What is more likely is an ongoing tension with occasional flare-ups such as recognition events, border clashes, or new logistics developments, all absorbed into an already complex security picture. 

The Horn is now deeply entangled in Middle Eastern strategic competition, and it is unlikely to separate from it. The key question now is not whether rivalry will continue, but how much it will affect Ethiopia’s internal divisions before corridor stability becomes the main concern for outside powers.¹,²,⁹

References 

1. Reuters. African Union summit clouded by Saudi-UAE rivalry in Horn of Africa. Published February 14, 2026. Accessed February 10, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/african-union-summit-clouded-by-saudi-uae-rivalry-horn-africa-2026-02-14/
2. United Nations Security Council. Sudan’s “internationalized” conflict could spill into Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Security Council warned. Published December 22, 2025. Accessed February 10, 2026. https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16261.doc.htm
3. International Crisis Group. Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara. Published November 16, 2023. Accessed February 10, 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara
4. Human Rights Watch. World Report 2025: Ethiopia. Published 2025. Accessed February 11, 2026. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/ethiopia
5. U.S. Department of State. 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia. Published August 14, 2025. Accessed February 11, 2026. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia
6. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Gulf countries reconsider their involvement in the Horn of Africa. Published June 1, 2021. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/06/gulf–horn-of-africa/
7. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Vying for Regional Leadership in the Horn of Africa. Published February 24, 2025. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/vying-regional-leadership-horn-africa
8. Reuters. Somalia ends port deals and security cooperation with UAE. Published January 12, 2026. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-annuls-all-agreements-with-uae-including-port-deals-2026-01-12/
9. Reuters. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of military aggression, backing armed groups. Published February 8, 2026. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-accuses-eritrea-military-aggression-backing-armed-groups-2026-02-08/
10. Reuters. Eritrea calls Ethiopia’s accusations of military aggression “deplorable”. Published February 9, 2026. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eritrea-calls-ethiopias-accusations-military-aggression-deplorable-2026-02-09/
11. International Crisis Group. Eritrea: The Siege State and the Horn’s Strategic Calculus. Published 2020. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea
12. International Crisis Group. Nile Dam Talks: A Short Window to Embrace Compromise. Published April 2021. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/africa-report-295-nile-dam-talks-short-window-embrace-compromise
13. Council on Foreign Relations. Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: Dispute over the GERD. Updated 2025. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypt-ethiopia-and-nile-dispute-over-gerd
14. Reuters. Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say. Published February 10, 2026. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ethiopia-builds-secret-camp-train-sudan-rsf-fighters-sources-say-2026-02-10/
15. Reuters. Turkey dispatches deep-sea drilling ship to Somalia in first overseas mission. Published February 15, 2026. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-dispatches-deep-sea-drilling-ship-somalia-first-overseas-mission-2026-02-15/
16. Reuters. Israel becomes first country to formally recognise Somaliland as independent state. Published December 26, 2025. Accessed February 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-recognises-somaliland-somalias-breakway-region-independent-state-2025-12-26/
17. Critical Threats Project. Africa File: Horn of Africa escalation monitoring. Published February 2026. Accessed February 14, 2026. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com     

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