February 14, 2026
Eyassu Epheraim G Hanna
London, UK
Abstract
This paper analyses the evolving confrontation between the Ethiopian federal government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Amhara Fano movement, now operating under the AFNM framework. It argues that recent federal force redeployments represent a strategy of selective engagement and conflict sequencing rather than retreat or incoherence. Drawing on military science theories of counterinsurgency, operational art, and legitimacy warfare, and supported by historical parallels, the paper contends that the conflict is structured less by immediate battlefield outcomes than by competition over time, legitimacy, and territorial control. The unresolved status of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) constitutes a systemic constraint shaping federal and AFNM behaviour.
1. Introduction
The confrontation between the Ethiopian federal state and armed Amhara actors has entered a new phase following the partial territorial control exercised by Fano forces and their reorganization under the AFNM banner. The apparent withdrawal of federal forces from South Gondar, coupled with selective military operations in Shewa and restraint in Gojjam and Wollo, has generated interpretations of state weakness. This paper argues instead that these patterns reflect a strategic recalibration consistent with established principles of military science, particularly sequential war strategy and battlefield shaping operations (Clausewitz, 1832/1976; U.S. Army, 2022). The analysis situates current developments within broader theories of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and political warfare.
2. Selective Military Engagement as Operational Strategy
2.1 Geographic Differentiation
Federal military operations display marked geographic selectivity: active operations in Shewa, withdrawal from South Gondar, and relative restraint in Gojjam and Wollo. In operational art, such differentiation reflects shaping operations, defined as actions designed to create favourable conditions for later decisive engagements (U.S. Army, 2022).
Shewa’s proximity to Addis Ababa, its mixed demographic composition, and its transportation corridors makes it suitable for probing attacks that test AFNM command-and-control capacity while minimizing the risk of region-wide mobilization. By contrast, Gojjam constitutes a core ideological base of Amhara nationalism and historically exhibits high resistance potential. Military science warns against initiating combat in zones of maximal enemy mobilization unless decisive superiority is assured (Liddell Hart, 1967). While Wollo has often been interpreted primarily through the lens of ethnic complexity, it is more analytically useful to conceptualize it as a logistical corridor linking central Ethiopia to the Tigray theatre. In this sense, federal restraint in Wollo reflects not political hesitation but the preservation of lines of communication essential to a potential renewed confrontation with the TPLF. This logic parallels the treatment of North Gondar and Welkait, which function less as contested political spaces than as operational rear areas. Such behaviour is consistent with Clausewitzian emphasis on the protection of communications and with modern doctrine regarding rear-area stability in multi-front conflicts (Clausewitz, 1976; U.S. Army, 2022).
South Gondar’s partial abandonment aligns with a strategy of inducing AFNM forces to exchange rural manoeuvre space for urban responsibility. From a counterinsurgency perspective, this reflects an effort to shift the adversary from guerrilla warfare toward fixed positional authority, thereby increasing vulnerability to later counteraction (Galula, 1964).
3. Strategic Postponement and Conflict Sequencing
Sequential war strategy is a rational response to multi-front constraints. Clausewitz emphasized that political objectives determine the distribution of force, requiring prioritization among threats (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). In the Ethiopian context, TPLF remains the only actor with demonstrated capacity for conventional warfare and external political linkages. Accordingly, federal strategy appears oriented toward postponing decisive confrontation with AFNM until the Tigray risk is neutralized.
This logic parallels historical cases. Sri Lanka delayed its final offensive against the LTTE until diplomatic and logistical constraints were resolved (2006–2009), enabling concentrated effort and political insulation (De Silva, 2012). Colombia’s state consolidation strategy similarly prioritized territorial recovery before dismantling FARC’s rural enclaves (Leech, 2011). In both cases, insurgent organizations exercising territorial administration became increasingly targetable once isolated.
4. The Proto-State Trap and Insurgency Theory
Counterinsurgency theorists stress the primacy of mobility and legitimacy. Mao Zedong argued that guerrillas must operate like fish in water, sustained by popular support (Mao, 1937/2000). Galula similarly maintained that insurgents are defeated politically before they are defeated militarily (Galula, 1964).
When insurgent movements transform into proto-state authorities—administering cities, holding public assemblies, and enforcing law—they gain symbolic power but lose operational concealment. AFNM’s assumption of urban control places it at risk of what can be termed the proto-state trap. Historical precedent supports this dynamic. The LTTE’s establishment of police and courts facilitated its later defeat through international isolation and military encirclement (De Silva, 2012). Hamas’s governance of Gaza transformed it from a dispersed insurgent network into a territorially fixed authority subject to siege (Berti, 2013). The Taliban’s 1996–2001 regime illustrates how territorial authority can provoke decisive counteraction once legitimacy collapses (Rashid, 2000).
TPLF’s own insurgent experience demonstrates the inverse logic: during its guerrilla phase, it avoided premature urban control, emphasizing rural mobility until state collapse rendered cities politically safe to seize (Young, 1997).
5. Risks Confronting AFNM
AFNM’s consolidation yields short-term political capital but introduces strategic vulnerabilities. Urban fixation reduces operational flexibility and increases dependence on supply lines susceptible to interdiction (U.S. Army, 2022). Moreover, punitive actions against perceived government supporters undermine legitimacy and invite legal framing as an unlawful armed authority. Galula’s doctrine stresses that insurgencies lose wars primarily through political isolation rather than battlefield annihilation (Galula, 1964).
Unity under AFNM enhances coordination but magnifies the costs of indiscipline. Without a coherent political narrative and enforceable command structure, unity risks becoming symbolic rather than functional. Fragmentation under pressure would allow the federal government to defeat AFNM sequentially, mirroring patterns observed in Colombia and Sudan (Leech, 2011; Johnson, 2016).
6. Likely Federal Reassertion Strategy
Military science suggests that a state seeking to retake territory from an entrenched insurgent authority will avoid direct decisive battle in favor of phased pressure:
- Narrative and Legal Preparation: Designation of AFNM as illegal or terrorist, emphasizing disorder and civilian harm (Galula, 1964).
- Economic and Communications Pressure: Restricting fuel, banking, and telecommunications to isolate populations (Berti, 2013).
- Selective Military Pressure: Targeting leadership and logistics rather than full urban invasion (U.S. Army, 2022).
- Incremental Reoccupation: Retaking towns through negotiated defections and limited offensives (De Silva, 2012).
This siege-and-fragmentation model parallels Israeli policy toward Hamas and Colombian campaigns against FARC enclaves (Berti, 2013; Leech, 2011).
7. The Systemic Role of TPLF
TPLF constitutes a structural variable shaping all strategic behaviour. For the federal government, it remains the only actor capable of imposing high-intensity warfare costs, constraining Addis Ababa’s ability to pivot fully toward Amhara without risking two-front war (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). For AFNM, TPLF’s persistence creates strategic space but political constraint, as overt coordination would be delegitimizing among Amhara constituencies.
Historically, multi-front insurgencies often precipitate state fragmentation. Lebanon’s civil war and Yemen’s contemporary conflict illustrate how simultaneous regional insurgencies overwhelm centralized authority (Traboulsi, 2012; Salisbury, 2017). Ethiopia risks similar diffusion should TPLF reengage militarily while AFNM consolidates territorial control.
8. Possible Futures
Three plausible trajectories emerge:
- Federal Reassertion: Stabilization of Tigray permits phased reconquest of AFNM-controlled areas, reducing AFNM to low-level insurgency (De Silva, 2012).
- AFNM Consolidation: AFNM maintains legitimacy and discipline, producing de facto regional autonomy and hollowing of central authority (Young, 1997).
- Fragmentation: Renewed TPLF conflict combined with AFNM territorial control and Oromo militancy generates systemic state breakdown (Traboulsi, 2012; Salisbury, 2017).
9.Time for coordination and strategic thinking
If Fano is truly united under a single command, then this is the moment when that unity should be demonstrated in practice. A united force should be capable of acting in a coordinated manner, rather than allowing the government to concentrate its efforts on only one area, such as South Gondar, while other regions remain inactive.
There should be coordinated pressure from multiple directions against government forces. In this way, Fano could undermine Abiy’s military strategy and potentially change the balance of power. So far, this has not occurred. Even though I cannot advise Fano’s military leadership, if I were in their place, I would expect coordinated movement from Gojjam, Wollo, and Shewa toward the centre.
A significant portion of diaspora media is portraying the current developments as a decisive Fano victory, fostering unrealistic expectations while neglecting the diplomatic and political repercussions that could follow. Short-term territorial gains should not be conflated with long-term strategic success. In the absence of deliberate political strategy and diplomatic groundwork, what seems like triumph today could evolve into vulnerability tomorrow. Rather than signalling victory, the present moment may represent a precarious strategic pause during which the federal government is consolidating diplomatic positioning and operational capacity for subsequent action. Excessive confidence among diaspora supporters’ risks obscuring the broader political, legal, and international dynamics shaping the conflict. As Sun Tzu cautions, perceived weakness can mask underlying strength; restraint, therefore, should be interpreted not as collapse, but as potential preparation.
10. Conclusion
The confrontation between the Ethiopian state and AFNM is best understood as a struggle over time, legitimacy, and political narrative rather than immediate battlefield dominance. The federal government seeks to control conflict sequencing and avoid simultaneous wars, while AFNM seeks to transform spatial control into political leverage. The unresolved status of TPLF acts as a strategic constraint shaping all choices. Military theory and historical precedent suggest that outcomes will depend less on firepower than on discipline, unity, and legitimacy over time.
References
Berti, B. (2013). Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Clausewitz, C. von (1976). On War (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1832).
De Silva, K. M. (2012). Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE. Penguin.
Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger.
Johnson, D. H. (2016). South Sudan: A New History for a New Nation. Ohio University Press.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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