March 7, 2026

By Surafel Getahun
Introduction: The Theater of Power
From the gleaming high-rises of the “Corridor Development Project” to the freshly paved boulevards of Bole, parts of Addis Ababa have been transformed into a showcase of modernity. For international diplomats arriving for African Union summits, the Ethiopian capital appears to be a city on the move—a physical manifestation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s “medemer” (synergy) philosophy.
But for millions of Ethiopians, this shiny vista is a carefully constructed illusion. Beyond the city limits where the cameras stop rolling, the country is being torn apart by renewed civil war, economic collapse, mass displacement, and a brutal crackdown on dissent. As the ruling Prosperity Party gears up for national elections scheduled for June 2026, it is engaged in what political scientists would recognize as a sophisticated project of legitimation through spectacle—a project that masquerades as progress while the state disintegrates.
This article examines the Ethiopian situation through the lens of political science theory, drawing on foundational concepts from Hannah Arendt, Niccolò Machiavelli, F.G. Bailey, and contemporary research on authoritarian propaganda to understand how the Prosperity Party manufactures consensus, deploys “basic lies,” and weaponizes information to maintain power amidst catastrophic failure.
Part I: The Theoretical Framework — Understanding Political Lies
Hannah Arendt: Truth, Politics, and the Destruction of Common Sense
“What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed?… If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer. This is because lies, by their very nature, have to be changed, and a lying government has constantly to rewrite its own history… And a people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind. It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge. And with such a people you can then do what you please.”
Hannah Arendt’s observation, made in a 1974 interview, cuts to the heart of what is happening in Ethiopia today. The political theorist, who fled Nazi Germany and became one of the twentieth century’s most incisive analysts of totalitarianism, understood that the most profound damage inflicted by political lying is not the temporary success of any particular falsehood, but the gradual destruction of the very faculty by which citizens orient themselves in the world.
Arendt argued that truth and politics have “never been on good terms with one another” . The lie has always been a justified tool in political dealings. But when lying becomes systematic—when a government “constantly rewrites its own history”—the consequence is not mass credulity but mass disorientation. Citizens cease to believe anything because they have no stable ground on which to stand. They lose what Arendt called “common sense”—the sixth sense that allows us to co-exist and share a world in common .
In Ethiopia today, this process is unmistakable. The government broadcasts images of a “shining” Addis Ababa while Tigray burns. It proclaims peace while Fano fighters and government forces exchange fire in Amhara. It announces economic progress while the Birr collapses and inflation makes bread unaffordable. Citizens are bombarded with so many competing versions of reality that many simply withdraw into apathy—deprived, as Arendt warned, of “the capacity to act but also of the capacity to think and to judge.”
The “factual truth” that Arendt identified as the bedrock of political community—the record of events woven into collective memory and history—is precisely what is most endangered in contemporary Ethiopia. Facts and events, she wrote, “are infinitely more fragile things than axioms, discoveries, theories, which are produced by the human mind” . They can be “maneuvered out of the world for a time, and possibly forever.” In Ethiopia, this maneuvering is not accidental but systematic—a deliberate strategy to replace shared reality with manufactured spectacle.
Machiavelli: The Prince and the Politics of Appearances
Five centuries before Arendt, Niccolò Machiavelli offered a practical politics that emphasized image over reality—a framework that illuminates the Prosperity Party’s governance with uncomfortable precision.
“It is not necessary for a prince to have all of the above-mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary for him to appear to have them… for instance, to seem merciful, faithful, humane, forthright, religious… but his mind should be disposed in such a way that should it become necessary not to be so, he will be able and know how to change to the contrary.”
Machiavelli’s insight was that political power rests not on the actual possession of virtues but on the appearance of them. The prince must “appear merciful, faithful, humane, forthright, religious”—whether he actually possesses these qualities is irrelevant. What matters is perception.
The Corridor Development Project in Addis Ababa is a Machiavellian project par excellence. By demolishing old buildings and widening boulevards, the government creates the appearance of development. International visitors see a capital transformed and report that Ethiopia is progressing. The actual displacement of small businesses and low-income residents, the destruction of communities, the diversion of resources from essential services—these realities remain invisible to the casual observer.
Machiavelli’s politics reduces governance to “a theater of power” . The prince performs for his subjects and for foreign observers, and the success of the performance determines the success of the rule. In contemporary Ethiopia, the Prosperity Party has elevated this theatrical approach to an art form. Every major government initiative is evaluated not by its substantive outcomes but by its visual impact—how it will appear on state media, how it will be received internationally, what image it projects of a nation “on the rise.”
F.G. Bailey: The Basic Lie and the Collusion of the Governed
Anthropologist F.G. Bailey’s work on deceit and power adds another crucial dimension to my analysis. Bailey distinguishes between ordinary lies—statements that contradict verifiable facts—and what he calls the “basic lie.”
The basic lie fixes as truth what is ambiguous and arguable. It sets the terms of the culture in which politicians act and in which citizens live. “What purports to be a search for truth… is in reality an effort to dominate by persuasion.”
Basic lies are not simple falsehoods. They are framing devices that establish the categories through which reality is understood. When the Prosperity Party claims that Ethiopia is “progressing,” this is not a statement that can be definitively falsified—it depends on what counts as progress, whose experience is privileged, what time frame is considered. The party’s “basic lie” is that it represents prosperity, that its rule delivers development, that the country is moving forward under its guidance.
Crucially, Bailey argues that basic lies are “collusive lies” . They require the cooperation—whether active or passive—of those who are governed. Citizens demand certainty from their leaders, and basic lies provide that certainty. They simplify a complex and ambiguous reality into a coherent narrative that offers orientation and meaning.
In Ethiopia today, the Prosperity Party’s basic lie is reinforced by the very chaos it generates. Faced with war, displacement, and economic collapse, many citizens desperately want to believe that someone is in control, that there is a plan, that things will improve. The party’s propaganda offers this reassurance—even if it contradicts lived experience. The alternative—acknowledging that the state is failing, that leaders are incompetent or corrupt, that the future is uncertain—is psychologically unbearable for many.
Contemporary Political Science: Hard Propaganda in Unstable Autocracies
Recent political science research provides empirical support for these theoretical frameworks. A 2024 study in the Annual Review of Political Science examines the role of propaganda in authoritarian settings, noting that regimes invest in propaganda “believing that it is effective” even while scholars debate “whether, when, and how it actually is effective” .
The concept of “hard propaganda”—overt, crude messaging designed not to persuade but to signal regime strength and coercive power—has been developed primarily through studies of China . Research by Huang (2015, 2018) argues that hard propaganda communicates “strength in social control and capacity to meet potential challenges.” Citizens recognize such propaganda as such but nonetheless absorb its implicit message: the regime is powerful, resistance is futile.
A 2025 study in the Journal of Peace Research tests these propositions in Venezuela—a “crucial case” for understanding hard propaganda in “contested and unstable autocratic contexts” . The researchers found that even in crisis-ridden Venezuela, propaganda images depicting the leader with armed forces were perceived as communicating strength and reduced respondents’ willingness to join anti-government protests. Crucially, this held true “regardless of whether respondents overall perceived the government as strong or weak” .
The Ethiopian case fits this pattern. Despite manifest failure—multiple insurgencies, economic collapse, mass displacement—the Prosperity Party’s propaganda continues to project strength. Images of Abiy Ahmed with military commanders, coverage of infrastructure projects, carefully staged diplomatic engagements—all communicate that the regime remains in control. And as the Venezuela study suggests, such messaging may indeed deter some citizens from challenging the regime, even while it “erodes regime legitimacy” over the longer term .
Another recent study, published in The Journal of Politics, offers a complementary framework. The authors argue that autocrats deploy “redistributionist propaganda” to “fortify a façade of democracy” . Many citizens do not hold a strict procedural view of democracy; instead, they understand democracy “through the lens of social equity.” By boasting about redistributive efforts—however fictional or inadequate—autocrats can manipulate public perception of how “equity-promoting” the regime is.
In Ethiopia, this takes the form of grandiose development projects and claims of economic transformation. The Prosperity Party presents itself as delivering prosperity to the masses—even as the actual beneficiaries are a small elite and the majority struggle to afford basic necessities. By framing its rule in terms of equity and development, it taps into popular understandings of what legitimate governance should provide.
Part II: The Machinery of Manufactured Consensus
The Spectacle of Development
The Corridor Development Project in Addis Ababa exemplifies the Prosperity Party’s approach to governance. On the surface, it appears as urban renewal—modernizing the capital, improving infrastructure, creating a world-class city. State media broadcasts images of gleaming new buildings, smooth roads, and delighted residents.
But beneath the surface lies a different reality. The demolitions were carried out “without adequate consensus building and resident involvement” . Small businesses were destroyed, low-income residents displaced, communities scattered. The benefits of the project flow primarily to elites connected to the ruling party, while the costs are borne by those least able to absorb them.
This is not development—it is the theater of development. Its purpose is not to improve lives but to project an image of progress. It is a Machiavellian performance designed to convince domestic and international audiences that the regime is competent, modernizing, and forward-looking.
The Red Sea Provocation
In early 2026, images circulated online showing high-ranking Ethiopian military officials holding maps that assigned Eritrea’s sovereign territory to Ethiopia. These were not casual errors or isolated incidents—they were deliberate provocations.
This episode reveals another dimension of the Prosperity Party’s propaganda machinery: the manufacture of external threats to consolidate internal support. By stoking nationalist sentiment around Red Sea access, the regime deflects attention from its domestic failures. It presents itself as the defender of national interests against foreign enemies—a classic authoritarian strategy.
The Election Spectacle
As the June 2026 elections approach, the Prosperity Party is engaged in a massive campaign to present the vote as a democratic exercise. Abiy Ahmed has framed it as the country’s “best” election to date. State media broadcasts images of campaign rallies, voter registration drives, and electoral preparations.
But the reality is that the pre-conditions for a free and fair election are non-existent. Large swathes of Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray are engulfed in conflict. Opposition leaders face “significant pressure, intimidation, threats, and arrests” . Journalists are jailed, civil society organizations suspended, the political space “extremely narrow—almost to the level of danger.”
The election is not a democratic contest but a legitimacy ritual—a performance designed to create the appearance of popular consent. As Bailey might say, it is a “basic lie” that fixes as truth the proposition that the Prosperity Party governs with the people’s mandate.
Part III: The Erosion of Reality
The Destruction of Common Sense
Arendt’s most profound warning concerned the destruction of “common sense”—the faculty by which we orient ourselves in the world and share reality with others. When a government systematically lies, citizens lose the ability to distinguish fact from fiction. They can no longer trust their own perceptions or judgments. They become dependent on the regime for orientation.
In Ethiopia today, this process is well advanced. Citizens are bombarded with competing narratives: the government’s story of progress and development versus the lived reality of war and hardship; state media’s images of a thriving capital versus reports of mass displacement and starvation. Many respond by withdrawing into private life, abandoning politics altogether. Others embrace conspiracy theories that offer simple explanations for complex realities. The common fabric of shared understanding frays and tears.
The Pathology of Hard Propaganda
Research on hard propaganda identifies a paradox: while such messaging can deter anti-regime activities in the short term, it simultaneously “erodes regime legitimacy” over the longer term . Huang (2018) terms this the “pathology of hard propaganda”—the phenomenon whereby heavy-handed messaging “worsens citizens’ opinions of the regime and provokes agitation and greater dissatisfaction.”
The Venezuela study found that respondents exposed to hard propaganda reported a lower willingness to join anti-government protests but simultaneously expressed “greater motivation to challenge the regime” . The propaganda worked in the short term—but at the cost of deeper alienation.
Ethiopia may be experiencing this pathology. While the Prosperity Party’s propaganda may temporarily deter overt opposition, it simultaneously breeds resentment and cynicism. Citizens see through the lies—but feel powerless to act. The regime maintains control, but at the cost of its long-term legitimacy.
Part IV: The Reality Beneath the Mirage
War on Multiple Fronts
While the government broadcasts images of progress, the country is at war with itself. In late January 2026, heavy fighting reignited between Ethiopian National Defence Forces and Tigrayan Security Forces near the Amhara border. UN human rights chief Volker Türk warned of a “deepening crisis” and a “precarious human rights and humanitarian situation” . Civilians are once again “caught between escalating tensions.”
In Amhara, the Fano militia remains locked in conflict with federal forces. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army insurgency continues, with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission confirming ongoing attacks resulting in “killings, bodily injuries, abduction, and displacement” .
This is not a nation at peace—it is a nation at war with itself on multiple fronts.
Economic Collapse
The economic indicators tell a story of distress masked by propaganda. Inflation hovers near 30%. The Birr has been devalued as part of IMF conditionalities. War spending has drained resources that might have supported development. An estimated $30 billion was lost in the Tigray conflict alone.
For ordinary Ethiopians, this means struggling to afford basic necessities. Food insecurity is at crisis levels in multiple regions. The “prosperity” the party promises is a cruel joke for those who cannot afford bread.
Humanitarian Catastrophe
More than 2 million people remain internally displaced in Amhar,Oromia and Tigray regional states.These are not abstractions—they are human beings whose lives have been destroyed by war and displacement. They are the reality that the Addis Ababa mirage conceals.
Part V: Conclusion — Seeing Through the Mirage
The Prosperity Party’s project is not development but spectacle—not governance but theater. It deploys the “basic lie” of prosperity to mask catastrophic failure. It manufactures consensus through propaganda while destroying the conditions for genuine political community. It performs democracy while dismantling democratic institutions.
“Truth isn’t political. If anything it is anti-political, since historically it has often been positioned against politics. Truth-tellers have always stood outside the political realm as the object of collective scorn.”
The truth-tellers in Ethiopia today—the journalists who report from conflict zones, the activists who document human rights abuses, the opposition leaders who speak despite intimidation—stand outside the realm of official power. They are the objects of collective scorn, the targets of state repression. But they are also the guardians of factual truth, the witnesses whose testimony preserves the record of what is actually happening.
Arendt asked near the end of her life: “Let truth be told though the world may perish?” Her answer was yes. The truth must be told, even at great cost—because without truth, there is no common world to share, no basis for judgment, no possibility of genuine political community.
As the June 2026 elections approach, the international community must see through the Addis Ababa mirage. The gleaming buildings and freshly paved roads are not evidence of progress but props in a political theater designed to mask disintegration. The elections are not democratic contests but legitimacy rituals. The propaganda is not communication but manipulation.
The Ethiopian people deserve better than spectacle. They deserve a government that addresses their actual needs—peace, security, economic opportunity, political freedom. They deserve leaders who tell the truth, however uncomfortable, rather than performing lies.
Until then, the mirage will continue—shining brightly for those who view it from a distance, concealing the devastation from those who might otherwise act. And Ethiopia will continue to burn.
Surafel Getahun is a Political Science and International Relations lecturer, researcher, seasoned political analyst, and journalist. With numerous insights into the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics, diplomacy, and conflicts, he has published several scholarly articles and numerous analyses in various national and international media outlets.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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