March 26, 2026
Extended comment and opinion on “Ethiopia on the Brink” by Yonas Biru
Sirak Zena
Dear Dr. Yonas,
Your article, “Ethiopia on the Brink: The Politics of Abundance in an Economy of Scarcity,” offers a comprehensive examination that encompasses macro, institutional, and microeconomic aspects. The independent data, along with the regime-generated data you used, effectively corroborate your primary assertion, “Ethiopia on the Brink,” making your argument easy to follow.
The article offers an informative, clear, and essential viewpoint on the topic. I derived significant insight from it. I appreciate the analysis and details you provided.
Although economics is not my primary field, I offer this comment and opinion from a political economy perspective. I trust that my comment will not be seen as epistemic trespassing.
Comment and Opinion:
Dr. Yonas’s article provides a compelling diagnosis of structural imbalances – particularly the misalignment between political ambition and resource discipline, the erosion of property rights, and the weakening of the productive base. These are important contributions to the ongoing debate on Ethiopia’s economic trajectory. This extended comment and opinion examines the article through the lens of political economy, focusing not on the accuracy of its economic recommendations, which are often valid, but on the political and institutional prerequisites for making such reforms credible, enforceable, and sustainable.
The analysis largely remains at the diagnostic level. As a diagnostic economic critique, the article is rigorous, persuasive, and well-structured. The diagnostic depth transcends superficial indicators (GDP growth) to analyze fiscal composition, capital vs. recurrent expenditure, industrial structure, and institutional quality. Many of the – rebalancing expenditure, restoring institutional discipline, and prioritizing productive sectors- are sound economic policy prescriptions. However, they remain policy corrections rather than a political settlement capable of sustaining them.
Economic logic may define what should be done, but politics determines whether it can be done. The primary focus lies not solely on understanding economic stagnation and contraction or on pinpointing essential reforms but on discerning the political circumstances that facilitate their effective implementation. Highlighting the political aspect as paramount underscores that salvaging the economy is crucial to preventing the nation’s collapse. Even the most well-grounded economic prescriptions risk remaining aspirational if the incentive structure of political actors is not addressed.
In Ethiopia, where power is inadequately restrained, where war has become the modus operandi to maintain power, public funds are used for patronage to maintain elites’ loyalty, coercion, structural dependence on foreign aid, and inequality are rising, widespread discontent exists, and an autocratic regime holds power; the main limitation is not only a lack of technical expertise but also the prevailing political framework. Fundamental political change thus becomes a precondition, not a byproduct, of economic reform.
While the article insightfully treats instability as endogenous to economic governance, it stops short of outlining a credible political and institutional stabilization mechanism. If weak property rights, rent-seeking, and institutional erosion generate instability, then reform requires a framework that can simultaneously restore order, constrain predation, and reassure both domestic and diaspora investors. Without such a mechanism, the analysis leaves a critical gap between diagnosis and implementation, in which sound economic prescriptions lack the institutional conditions necessary for their implementation.
The comparative references to China and Vietnam are instructive, particularly regarding sequencing, policy discipline, and coordinated state capacity. However, highly centralized systems enabled their experiences, enforcing long-term policy consistency and institutional coordination. This evidence does not invalidate the lessons, but it qualifies them. Economic transformation is inseparable from political organization. Selective policy borrowing is possible, but only when adapted to Ethiopia’s institutional realities and capacity for credible implementation, including an understanding of the unique political landscape and governance structures that influence policy effectiveness.
Ultimately, the relationship between politics and economics remains decisive. Economic reform becomes viable only where political transparency, democratic accountability, and credible constraints on executive discretion are institutionalized. In such environments, rules become credible, and institutions constrain discretion rather than enable it. The shift from ambition-driven policy to disciplined economic management cannot occur through policy prescriptions alone; it requires a political order that enforces trade-offs, limits arbitrary power, and aligns elite incentives with long-term productivity.
Economic distress may diminish support for the regime; yet, in the absence of political mobilization, it is often endured in silence rather than opposed by the public. Regrettably, we currently lack a strong political party or coalition, both within the country and among the diaspora, capable of effectively facilitating political mobilization.
Yonas’s article makes a valuable contribution by clearly outlining the issues and offering recommendations to address them. The next step for the broader discourse is to complement this diagnosis with a realistic account of political transition and institutional incentives that can make reform durable.
We anticipate Yonas’s forthcoming book on Ethiopian politics to provide valuable insights, and we will review it alongside perspectives from other scholars.
Despite the wealth of proposals from intellectual or ideational elites, such as academics and public intellectuals, offering potential solutions to current political challenges, these ideas have not garnered significant attention or implementation. The issue no longer stems from a lack of innovative ideas or strategic plans, but rather from a failure of those in positions of power and influence to take meaningful action.
Mobilizing elites, activists, movement leaders, and influencers has not effectively translated this intellectual capital into sustainable organizations, focused campaigns, or inclusive partnerships. Similarly, executive elites, party political leaders, and armed resistance groups have struggled to achieve substantial political progress, often resorting to symbolic gestures and reactionary measures. As a result, despite variations in roles and overlapping domains, ideational elites, mobilizing actors, and executive leaders remain insufficiently synchronized, creating a persistent gap between the generation of ideas, the orchestration of political action, and the conversion of those ideas into effective, coordinated political initiatives.
Consequently, the constraint is no longer a shortage of ideas or analytical frameworks but a failure of political organization and coordination. The challenge is not conceptual innovation but the capacity to translate intellectual capital into credible institutions, sustained collective action, and enforceable political outcomes.
Ultimately, the question is not whether Ethiopia’s economic problems are well diagnosed but whether the political conditions exist to make reform credible, enforceable, and durable.
I extend my deepest appreciation to Dr. Yonas Biru.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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