Home/Opinion/Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz: Flashpoint for next great power confrontation
April 14, 2026
Addis Abeba — Currently, the world’s strategic gaze is fixed on two narrow waterways: the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts warn that the ongoing tensions in these corridors through which nearly a third of global energy flows and a significant share of international trade passes could ignite the next great power confrontation. Yet this prevailing narrative contains a critical blind spot. It underestimates Africa’s agency, and more dangerously, it misreads where the first spark may emerge.
That spark is far more likely to come from the Horn of Africa than from the Persian Gulf. For decades, Africa has been framed as a passive arena acted upon rather than acting. But today, the Horn is not merely absorbing external rivalries; it is actively reshaping them. At the center of this transformation lies Ethiopia, a rising regional power confronting the structural constraints of geography, demography, and history.
With a population exceeding 130 million, Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country. Its leadership, under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has increasingly framed the lack of sea access not just as an economic limitation but as a strategic vulnerability. The description of Ethiopia as a “geographic prison” is not a rhetorical flourish; it reflects a doctrine in the making.
The January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland must, therefore, be understood in this context. The agreement granting Ethiopia access to a stretch of coastline has triggered alarm far beyond Somalia, which views the move as a violation of its sovereignty. It is not simply a bilateral dispute; it is a geopolitical inflection point that challenges the post-Cold War order in the Red Sea basin.
The reactions have been swift and layered. Egypt, already locked in a protracted dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, perceives the port deal as a strategic encirclement risk. Meanwhile, Turkey and Gulf powers have moved to protect their own interests, often backing opposing sides. The emerging alignment is less about ideology and more about access, influence, and control over maritime chokepoints. The United Arab Emirates has shown openness to Ethiopia’s port ambitions, seeing opportunity in logistics and infrastructure. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has deepened coordination with Egypt, prioritizing Red Sea stability under existing arrangements. These diverging positions risk transforming the Horn into a theater of proxy competition.
Tigray Aftermath: Unfinished war, expanding crisis
Complicating matters further is the unresolved aftermath of the war in Tigray. Although the Pretoria Agreement formally ended large-scale hostilities, its implementation remains incomplete. Eritrean forces have not fully withdrawn, and political normalization within Tigray has stalled.
The Bab al-Mandab, already under strain from regional conflicts, could become a convergence zone for multiple crises.”
The role of Eritrea is particularly consequential. Its ambiguous post-war posture, combined with shifting tactical relationships within northern Ethiopia, raises the specter of renewed instability, which could lead to increased violence and humanitarian crises in the region. A relapse into conflict in Tigray would not remain contained. It would extend outward, toward critical corridors linking inland Ethiopia to the coast. At that point, the Bab al-Mandab, already under strain from regional conflicts, could become a convergence zone for multiple crises. Maritime insecurity would no longer stem solely from Middle Eastern tensions but from a land-sea nexus rooted in African instability. The implications would be immediate: disrupted shipping, rising insurance costs, and cascading inflation across already fragile economies.
What is striking in this unfolding scenario is not only the scale of risk but also the limited role of continental institutions. The African Union, despite its central role in brokering the Pretoria Agreement, has struggled to enforce compliance or sustain diplomatic momentum. External actors have increasingly filled the vacuum, as seen in mediation efforts led by Ankara rather than Addis Abeba. This institutional gap is not merely procedural; it is strategic. Without an African-led framework, the Red Sea’s future will be negotiated elsewhere, shaped by interests that may not align with those of the continent. A different path remains possible, but it requires urgency and coordination.
First, the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement must be prioritized not as a regional obligation but as a continental security imperative. Durable peace in northern Ethiopia is the foundation upon which broader stability depends. Second, Africa must articulate a coherent maritime strategy. A Red Sea security framework anchored by littoral states Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Egypt under the auspices of the African Union would provide a platform for coordinated governance of one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
Third, economic resilience must accompany diplomatic efforts. The promise of the African Continental Free Trade Area lies precisely in reducing vulnerability to external shocks. By strengthening intra-African trade corridors, the continent can mitigate its exposure to disruptions along global shipping routes. The central argument is not that Africa is doomed to become the epicenter of the next global conflict. It is that Africa is already a decisive arena, and its internal dynamics will shape how, where, and whether that conflict unfolds.
The danger lies in misreading the moment. The next crisis may not begin with a dramatic naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf. It may begin quietly, through incremental escalations in the Horn of Africa, where domestic fragilities intersect with global ambitions. By the time it reaches the sea, it may already be too late to contain.
Africa stands at a maritime crossroads. The question is no longer whether external powers will compete along its shores. It is whether the continent can assert enough strategic coherence to shape that competition on its own terms or be defined by it. AS
Editor’s Note: Gebremichael Negash is a refugee who was displaced from Western Tigray and is now an active member of Tsilal (ፅላል), a civil society organization dedicated to the people of Western Tigray. He can be reached at wele63776@gmail.com