May 2, 2026
Opinion Contributor | Political Analyst (Horn of Africa)
Introduction: The Ballot in a Time of Bullets
On paper, Ethiopia’s upcoming June election appears as a routine democratic exercise. The Ethiopian National Election Board (NEBE) has announced schedules and voter registration drives. Yet, for the political scientist studying hybrid regimes, a troubling discontinuity emerges. How can a “free and fair” election occur when approximately one-third of the national territory is under some form of emergency rule, ethnic militia control, or active political standoff with a legally ambiguous interim administration?
The coming June election is not a bridge to democracy. It is a facade – a carefully painted stage set designed to hide a collapsing house. Behind the ballots and banners, Ethiopia is burning. From the unresolved wounds of the Tigray war, to the relentless OLA insurgency, to the Fano militias fighting over territory in Amhara, our country faces a security crisis worse than at any time since the 1990s. And the Prosperity Party (PP) government wants you to believe that a single day of voting will fix it.It will not. Worse, the election itself is now part of the problem
This article posits that the coming June election is a facade—a political theater designed to project an image of stability to international donors while masking an entrenched state of internal war. By connecting electioneering rhetoric to the ground realities of the renewed Tigray crisis, the ongoing insurgency in Oromia (OLA), and the territorial contests in Amhara,I argue that the ballot serves as a security apparatus, not a democratic one.
Part One: The Anatomy of a Facade – What Political Scientists Know
Before we examine the specific issuess, we must understand the concept of a “facade election.” Political scientists have studied this phenomenon across the globe – from Russia’s managed democracy to Egypt’s Sisi-era votes, from Cameroon’s perpetual incumbents to Azerbaijan’s dynastic ballots. The technical term is electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010). But the everyday language of citizens in such regimes is more direct: “We vote, but nothing changes.”
A facade election has three defining characteristics:
Procedural legality, substantive illegality. The government holds the election on time, prints ballots, and counts votes. But behind the scenes, opposition candidates are arrested, media is shut down, and security forces intimidate voters. The form of democracy is preserved. The substance is emptied out.
Selective inclusion and exclusion. In regions where the government controls security, polling stations open. In regions where armed groups operate, the government simply does not deploy. Those entire populations are disenfranchised – not by law, but by war. The government then claims that the excluded areas “chose not to participate” or that their absence reflects “peaceful acceptance.”
Legitimacy laundering for international donors. The European Union, the United States, and the African Union all have policies that tie aid and diplomatic recognition to “democratic progress.” A flawed election is better than no election. So donors issue cautious statements about “areas for improvement” while continuing to fund the regime. The government gets its money. The facade holds.
Ethiopia under the Prosperity Party (PP) has perfected these techniques. But the June 2026 election will be the most audacious facade yet – because it is being held while the country is, by any honest measure, in a state of low-intensity civil war.
Part Two: The National Picture – A State That Cannot Guarantee Safety
Let us begin with the most basic requirement for any election: security. For a citizen to cast a vote without fear, the state must have a monopoly of legitimate force (Weber’s famous definition of the state). The state must be able to protect polling stations, prevent armed groups from intimidating voters, and ensure that ballots can travel safely from rural kebeles to counting centers.
By this measure, Ethiopia fails catastrophically.
As of April 2026, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is actively engaged in counter-insurgency operations in:
Oromia region: Western,central and southern zones, against the OLA.
Amhara region: Parts of North Shewa,South Gonder, wollo, and the contested western lowlands, against Fano militias.
Benishangul-Gumuz region: Sporadic ethnic militias.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that 2.7 million Ethiopians are internally displaced – the fourth-highest number in the world. Most have been displaced for more than a year. They live in camps, host communities, or open fields. They have no permanent address. Many have no identification documents, which were lost during flight. How do they register to vote? The NEBE has no answer. Its “mobile polling” plans cover only a tiny fraction of displaced populations.
Furthermore, the government has declared states of emergency in multiple zones, granting security forces the power to arrest without warrant, ban public gatherings, and censor communications. In such conditions, opposition rallies are impossible. Even a simple campaign poster can be treated as “incitement to violence.”
The conclusion is inescapable: Ethiopia does not meet the minimal conditions for a free and fair election. Yet the election will proceed. That is the first proof that it is a facade.
Part Three: Tigray – The Rejection of the Pretoria Order and the Specter of Electoral Exclusion
Tigray is once again at the heart of a renewed political tension that directly undermines any claim that the June election will be national, let alone democratic. After the November 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, a federally appointed interim administration was installed in Mekelle, effectively nullifying the 2020 regional election that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had unilaterally conducted. For the past two years, this interim order has been tolerated but never accepted by key TPLF factions.
That fragile arrangement collapsed decisively when the TPLF leadership decided to reinstate its pre-war regional council—the elected body from the 2020 ballot that Pretoria had rendered void. This move was a deliberate political signal: the TPLF no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the post-war interim administration. In response, the federal government escalated its own unilateral actions. The recent reappointment of Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede as the head of the interim administration, conducted entirely without TPLF participation or consultation, has deepened the standoff into a full-blown political crisis.
From a political science perspective, the core unresolved issue is now elections themselves. The TPLF argues that the 2020 regional election (which it won) remains the only legitimate mandate. The federal government insists that the Pretoria Agreement requires a new, jointly supervised election before any devolution of power. Yet, with the June 2026 national polls approaching, no mechanism for a Tigray-specific regional vote has been established. The reality is grim: Tigray risks total exclusion from the upcoming national elections, either because the NEBE cannot deploy staff to contested zones, or because the TPLF will instruct its base to boycott a vote that omits a regional ballot.
How does this make the June election a facade? In three ways:
Selective Participation: The federal government will likely proceed with the national election in Addis Ababa and other regions while declaring Tigray a “security zone” where voting is impractical. The result will be a national parliament elected without a single representative from a region of over six million people. No democracy can claim legitimacy under such exclusion.
Weaponizing the Interim Administration: By reappointing Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede without TPLF consent, the federal government signals that it views the interim administration as a permanent imposition, not a transitional body. The June election thus becomes a tool to bypass the Pretoria Agreement’s promise of an eventual Tigrayan-led government.
Conflict Spillover: The standoff has already revived low-intensity skirmishes along the boundary between Tigray and Amhara (particularly in Western Tigray). If the June election proceeds while Tigray remains outside the process, the TPLF will interpret this as a unilateral abrogation of Pretoria, likely triggering a return to armed confrontation. The election, far from being a democratic exercise, becomes a trigger for renewed war.
In short, the Tigray case epitomizes the facade thesis. A genuine election would require a prior political settlement on the status of the 2020 council, a consultative process for appointing interim officials, and a concrete roadmap for Tigray’s inclusion in national polls. None of these exist. Instead, the June election is being rushed forward while Tigray is locked in a constitutional no-man’s-land—proving that the ballot is a mask for continued political exclusion, not a bridge to peace.
Part Four: Oromia – The Election as a Counter-Insurgency Weapon
4.1 The OLA Insurgency and the Failure of Politics
Oromia, Ethiopia’s most populous region, has been in a state of low-intensity civil war since at least 2018. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), split from the legal Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), controls significant rural areas in Wollega, Guji, Borena, parts of Shewa and West Arsi. The ENDF’s response has been brutal: drone strikes, mass arrests, and collective punishment of villages suspected of harboring OLA fighters.
The human cost is staggering. The Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC) documented at least 1,200 extrajudicial killings by security forces in Oromia in 2025 alone. The OLA, for its part, has been accused of attacks on civilians and road ambushes. The conflict has created a humanitarian catastrophe: over 800,000 displaced in Oromia in the last 18 months, with food aid blocked by both sides.
4.2 How the Election Becomes a Facade
The Prosperity Party’s strategy in Oromia is cynical but coherent.
Step one: systematically eliminate any credible Oromo opposition. The OLF was co-opted in 2018; its leaders are now either in government or sidelined. The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) has been so harassed that its leaders operate from abroad. The new Oromo Freedom Party (launched 2024) was denied registration on a technicality.
Step two: label the armed opposition as “terrorists” and thereby criminalize any political expression of Oromo nationalism. In Ethiopian law, praising a “terrorist group” carries a prison sentence of up to 15 years. This means that even a candidate who says, “The OLA has legitimate grievances” can be arrested.
Step three: hold the election only in secure zones. Where the OLA controls the roads, NEBE will not go. Those areas are simply removed from the voter rolls. The remaining areas – towns, garrison villages, and PP strongholds – then produce a landslide for the ruling party.
Step four: after the election, announce that the PP won 95% of the vote in Oromia, “proving” that Oromos reject the OLA and embrace the government. Use this “mandate” to justify continued military operations. Cut off any negotiations with the OLA because “the people have spoken.”
This is not democracy. It is counter-insurgency using election statistics as propaganda.
4.3 The Security Consequence
By using the election to delegitimize the OLA, the government ensures that the OLA will not lay down its arms. Why would it? If the ballot box is a rigged game, the only remaining tool is the gun. Meanwhile, Oromo civilians who might have supported a peaceful opposition see no alternative. The moderate center shrinks. The war continues.
The facade thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the government claims that security prevents elections, then holds a fake election, which makes security worse, which justifies more fake elections. The spiral never ends.
Part Five: Amhara – The Paradox of the Competing Armed Movements
5.1 Fano, the ENDF, and the Fight for Survivals and Territory
Amhara presents a different kind of crisis. Unlike Tigray (secessionist) and Oromia (nationalist insurgency), Amhara is torn by a multi-polar conflict involving the federal army, regional special forces, and the Fano militias – loose, ethnically Amhara armed groups that see themselves as defenders of Amhara land.
The core grievance is territorial. Before the 1991 transition, large areas now in Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz were historically administered as part of the Amhara heartland. The 1995 constitution, based on ethnic federalism, redrew boundaries. Fano fighters demand the return of Welkait, Raya, Tsegede, and parts of Kemant. When the Tigray war broke out in 2020, Fano fought alongside the ENDF against the TPLF. After the war, the federal government refused to formalize Amhara control over these territories. Fano turned against the ENDF.
Since 2023, the ENDF has conducted repeated military campaigns against Fano. The most infamous was the Merawi massacre (May 2024), where government forces reportedly killed over 200 civilians in a single day. The ENDF denies it, but satellite imagery and witness testimony are consistent.
5.2 The Electoral Facade in Amhara
The June election in Amhara will be a masterclass in spatial exclusion. The NEBE has announced that polling will take place only in “non-conflict zones.” By that definition, the following areas are effectively excluded:
The entire Western Zone (Welkait, Tsegede, Kafta Humera) because their administrative status is disputed.
Large parts of North Shewa and South Wollo, where Fano controls rural areas.
Parts of the Kemant Zone, where ethnic cleansing campaigns have displaced tens of thousands.
These excluded areas hold millions of Amhara citizens. They will not vote. Their non-participation will be cited by the government as evidence of “insecurity,” not as a failure of the state to provide basic democratic rights.
In the remaining areas, local officials have reportedly been told to deliver 100% turnout for the PP. A leaked memo from the Amhara regional government (verified by Ethiopia Insight, January 2026) instructed district administrators to “ensure that every civil servant votes and that their families vote. Non-compliance will be treated as insubordination.” This is not campaigning. It is coercion.
5.3 The Fano Response
What will Fano do during the election? The signs are not good. Several Fano commanders have issued statements calling the election a “fake” and warning that “anyone who collaborates with the PP in our areas will be treated as an enemy.” In practice, this means that in rural areas under Fano influence, polling stations may be attacked, election officials abducted, or voters intimidated.
The federal government will then cite this violence as justification for military escalation. The election, rather than being a pause from conflict, becomes a trigger for more fighting. And again, the facade serves the security state, not the citizen.
Part Six: The International Complicity – Why Donors Keep the Facade Alive
No discussion of Ethiopia’s electoral facade is complete without acknowledging the role of international partners. The European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the African Union all have a presence in Addis Ababa. They all provide aid – Ethiopia receives approximately $3.5 billion in official development assistance annually. They all, admit that Ethiopia is not a democracy.
So why do they accept the facade?
The answer is a combination of realpolitik and bureaucratic inertia. First, the alternative to the PP is seen as much worse. If the government collapses, Ethiopia could fragment into multiple warring statelets, with catastrophic consequences for the Horn of Africa. Second, donors have invested heavily in the “transition to democracy” narrative since Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. Admitting that the transition has failed would be an admission of their own policy failure. So they issue statements, demand minor reforms, and quietly accept the façade.
Consider the EU’s Election Observation Mission (EOM) protocol. After a flawed election, the EOM will issue a report that lists “positive steps” alongside “areas for improvement.” The government will promise to implement the recommendations. Then nothing changes. The next election comes, and the same ritual repeats. This is what political scientist Staffan Darnolf calls “zombie election observation” – the living dead of democratic oversight.
The United States is even more pragmatic. Ethiopia is a key security partner in counter-terrorism, particularly in Somalia. The U.S. needs the ENDF to fight Al-Shabaab. Democracy is a secondary concern. This is not an unreasonable calculation. But it is an admission that the facade serves Western interests as well as Ethiopian ones.
Part Seven: What Would a Real Democratic Election Look Like?
If the June 2026 election is a facade, what would a genuine democratic election in Ethiopia require? I offer five concrete, non-negotiable preconditions – none of which currently exist.
Precondition 1: A comprehensive ceasefire and DDR. Before any election, all major armed groups – the OLA, Fano, and any TPLF remnants – must sign a negotiated ceasefire. The government must engage in good-faith negotiations, including international mediation. Only after a verified disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process can security be guaranteed.
Precondition 2: An independent electoral board. NEBE must be reconstituted with representatives from all major political parties, civil society, and the judiciary. The chairperson must be selected by consensus, not appointed by the executive. Without independence, the board is simply a rubber stamp.
Precondition 3: Freedom of assembly, speech, and media. Opposition parties must be allowed to campaign anywhere in the country. Media critical of the government must be protected. The anti-terrorism proclamation must be amended to explicitly exclude political speech. International observers must have unrestricted access.
Precondition 4: Resolution of territorial disputes. The status of Western Tigray (Welkait, etc.) must be resolved through a constitutionally defined process – either a referendum or a federal arbitration. As long as territories are under disputed administration, no credible election can be held there.
Precondition 5: Mobile and absentee voting for IDPs. The government must establish a system for displaced persons to vote, whether through mobile polling teams, diaspora-style absentee ballots, or extended registration periods. Disenfranchising 2.7 million people is not democracy.
The Prosperity Party will agree to none of these preconditions. Why? Because they would likely lead to the PP losing power. The facade is not an accident. It is a survival strategy.
Part Eight: The Consequences of Pretending – Why the Facade Must Be Named
I want to end this long article with a plea – not to the government, which has no interest in listening, but to Ethiopian citizens, to journalists, to diplomats, and to anyone who still believes that our country can find a different path.
When the June election comes, and when the results are announced – a predictably overwhelming majority for the Prosperity Party – do not look away. Do not accept the headlines that say “Ethiopia holds peaceful election.” Do not let the international observers’ mealy-mouthed statements replace your own judgment.
Name the facade for what it is.
Because the cost of pretending is measured in lives. Every time we accept a rigged election as “good enough,” we tell armed groups that peaceful politics is useless. Every time we allow the government to exclude conflict zones from the voter rolls, we deepen the alienation of those regions. Every time we nod along when the PP claims a mandate it does not have, we make the next war more likely.
Ethiopia has suffered too much. We have seen too many funerals, too many IDP camps, too many children who cannot name their hometown. The June election will not heal us. It will simply add another layer of fiction over a bleeding wound.
The real election – the one that matters – will happen afterwards. It will happen in the quiet conversations where citizens refuse to be intimidated. It will happen in the courtrooms where lawyers challenge the electoral board. It will happen in the international pressure campaigns that demand real reform. And, if the facade persists, it will happen again in the hills and forests where desperate people take up arms because the ballot box has failed them.
I do not know when Ethiopia will have a genuine democracy. But I know that pretending we already have one is the surest way to never achieve it.
Conclusion: The Facade’s Cost to Democracy
To claim that Ethiopia’s coming June election is a facade is not to argue for its cancellation. Rather, it is a diagnostic tool. A genuine democratic election requires three preconditions that Ethiopia currently lacks: (a) a near-monopoly of legitimate violence by the state, (b) freedom of association for all political tendencies, and (c) judicial mechanisms to adjudicate electoral fraud. Given the renewed political crisis in Tigray—marked by the TPLF’s reinstatement of its pre-war council, the unilateral reappointment of Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede, and the real risk of Tigray’s exclusion from the June polls—these preconditions are catastrophically absent.
Therefore, the June 2026 election will not produce democracy. It will produce a simulacrum of democracy: ballots without choice, results without accountability, and a government that claims a mandate while the nation burns. For political scientists, the lesson is clear: until Ethiopia resolves the core electoral dispute in Tigray, ends the OLA insurgency, and negotiates with Fano militias, every subsequent election will remain a dangerous facade—a ritual that postpones peace rather than delivering it.
About the author: Surafel Getahun is a Political Science and International Relations lecturer,researcher, seasoned political analyst, and journalist. With numerous insights into the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics, diplomacy, and conflicts, he has published several scholarly articles and numerous analyses in various national and international media outlets.
Suggested citation for online commentary:Surafel Getahun, “Why Ethiopia’s Coming June Election Is a Facade – And How It Deepens Peace and Security Crisis,” Borkena.com, May 2026.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
__
Join our Telegram Channel : t.me/borkena
To Support Borkena : https://borkena.com/subscribe-borkena/ – one time support or small monthly options available. Inquire information about it : info@borkena.com
Like borkena on Facebook
To submit Press Release, send submission to info@borkena.com