May 5, 2026
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
Liam Brown
The removal of the Undersecretary for Petroleum on March 27, 2026, has not resolved the controversy surrounding South Sudan’s crude oil allocations. Internal documentation indicates the persistence of a system structured around a limited number of recurring actors—primarily Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy—where last-minute decisions, repeated allocation patterns and pricing mechanisms appear to systematically disadvantage the state.
South Sudan remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, yet part of the value generated appears to be diverted through a network of intermediaries and pre-financing arrangements. Internal records consistently identify the same entities at the center of allocations: Chiang Wei, Euro American International Energy, Cathay Petroleum and BGN. A key distinction emerges between allocation beneficiaries and actual offtakers. Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy frequently appear as beneficiaries of cargoes without necessarily acting as final buyers. Their role appears to consist in controlling access to cargoes by securing allocation letters, locking in pricing formulas, arranging pre-financing, and subsequently transferring or assigning the lifting to other entities with operational capacity. Companies such as Cathay Petroleum and BGN tend to appear at this second stage, handling operational or commercial execution. In this structure, margins are captured upstream, prior to physical loading.
Chiang Wei is identified in the documents as a central corporate actor rather than a peripheral participant. The company appears repeatedly in sensitive cargo allocations, particularly those approved at the very end of officials’ mandates. Despite the dismissal and arrest of senior figures associated with a previous opaque allocation system, both Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy continue to feature prominently across allocation records.
The timing of allocations is a critical element. On March 27, 2026, an official decree signed by Africano Mande Gedima, Minister of Presidential Affairs, confirmed the departure of Dr. Chol Deng T. Abel and the appointment of Dr. Santino Ayuel Longar as his successor. On that same day, immediately before leaving office, Dr. Chol signed allocation letters granting cargoes to Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy. This effectively secured their position at the point of administrative transition.
This pattern of end-of-mandate decisions is not isolated. Other officials, including Deng Lual and Bak, also approved cargo allocations on their final day in office, repeatedly benefiting the same group of actors.
The April 2026 Dar Blend cargo illustrates the mechanism in detail. A shipment of 600,000 barrels, scheduled for loading on April 29–30, 2026, was initially allocated to Euro American International Energy on March 27 by Dr. Chol. On March 31, Dr. Santino Ayuel Longar reassigned the same cargo to Trinity Energy Limited as part of a debt-servicing arrangement linked to Afreximbank. Trinity was designated as lifter, with proceeds to be retained by Afreximbank for government debt obligations. However, on April 3, 2026, a further letter attributed a cargo of identical volume and loading schedule to Euro America International Energy DMCC. In this document, Euro American International Energy reappears as lifter, with authority to retain proceeds for application to government financing obligations.
Within less than one week, the same cargo appears to have moved through three separate allocations: EuroAmerican on March 27, Trinity on March 31, and again EuroAmerican on April 3. If these documents refer to a single cargo, this raises unresolved questions regarding effective control, beneficiary entitlement and legal basis of allocation decisions.
Beyond allocation sequencing, pricing mechanisms represent a major financial issue. Internal documents indicate that at least one cargo lifted in March 2026 was priced using February benchmarks, when crude traded at approximately 70 to 72 dollars per barrel. Shortly thereafter, following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, global oil prices rose sharply to between 100 and 110 dollars per barrel. Under such conditions, South Sudan appears to have been paid at around 70 dollars per barrel, while the same cargo could be resold above 100 dollars.
On a 600,000-barrel cargo, a 30-dollar differential represents approximately 18 million dollars, while a 40-dollar differential represents approximately 24 million dollars. These margins appear to accrue to intermediaries rather than to the state. The documents suggest the use of pricing clauses or options enabling the application of earlier, lower benchmarks to cargoes lifted in a rising market. This allows intermediaries to capture market upside while the state is paid as if prices had remained unchanged. Similar mechanisms may apply to other cargoes currently under allocation.
These pricing arrangements are less visible than direct per-barrel discounts, as they are embedded within contractual structures. However, their economic effect is comparable or greater, resulting in the diversion of oil value at a time when increased global prices should strengthen public finances. This occurs in a context where government entities reportedly face ongoing difficulties meeting salary obligations.
Euro American International Energy’s repeated reappearance across allocation documents, particularly during administrative transitions, suggests the use of layered contractual instruments. Incoming officials inherit commitments formalized shortly before their appointment through allocation letters, cancellations or restructuring agreements. These overlapping documents create competing claims that are difficult to unwind, enabling actors such as Euro American International Energy, owned by Idris Taha, to regain effective control over cargoes even after formal reassignment.
The April cargo sequence illustrates this dynamic: despite reassignment to Trinity Energy under a structured Afreximbank arrangement, subsequent documentation appears to restore control to Euro American International Energy. The formal administrative sequence is therefore less determinative than the ultimate outcome, in which the same beneficiary re-emerges.
A compliance report dated March 9, 2026, raises additional concerns regarding Chiang Wei’s operational structure. According to this report, WellBred Trading DMCC provides financial backing to Chiang Wei LLC FZ, which then participates in South Sudan crude allocations. The report also indicates that Chiang Wei conducted RMB-denominated transactions with Shandong Hi-Speed Group in connection with oil cargo operations, and refers to potential links with financial flows associated with Iranian oil networks under sanctions.
While these elements remain allegations requiring further investigation, the report outlines a potential model in which Chiang Wei secures allocations, arranges lifting and resale, and may retain part of the proceeds rather than fully transferring them to the South Sudanese state. The report recommends suspending commercial relations with Chiang Wei LLC FZ pending financial investigation.
Two principal concerns arise from this structure. First, that pricing mechanisms enable the capture of differences between February and March market levels. Second, that the financing and resale structure may operate as a closed loop, in which part of the oil’s value is recycled into subsequent transactions, limiting the proportion of revenue reaching the state.
The implications for South Sudan are significant. Revenue losses linked to pricing discrepancies directly affect public finances at a time of elevated oil prices. At the same time, reliance on actors such as Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy exposes the country to risks including sanctions scrutiny, trade-based money laundering concerns and potential diversion of sovereign revenues.
Despite leadership changes within the Ministry of Petroleum, the underlying allocation system appears unchanged. Structural reforms would require publication of allocations, identification of ultimate beneficiaries, implementation of competitive tendering, alignment with market-based pricing, use of escrow accounts and independent auditing of allocation processes.
As long as Chiang Wei and Euro American International Energy continue to dominate cargo allocations through opaque and contested mechanisms, control over South Sudan’s oil revenues remains unclear. The central unresolved issue is that although the state formally owns the oil, the same actors continue to capture its value through opaque structures that remain difficult to trace or challenge.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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