July 16, 2026
By Abdifetah Musa Mumin
Ethiopian Comparative Politics Analyst based in Jijiga, Somali Region
Abstract
Ethiopia stands at a historic crossroads. The ongoing National Consultation — a broad-based dialogue among political actors, civil society, communities, and citizens — presents a generational opportunity to redesign the architecture of the state. This article examines two interconnected pillars emerging from the consultation: the restructuring of ethnic federalism into micro-ethnic states alongside special city-state administrations, and the adoption of a presidential system — at both federal and regional levels — anchored in biometric census, free elections, and a managed multiparty framework. It argues that these reforms, while ambitious, are essential for building a stable, inclusive, and functional Ethiopian democracy.
Introduction
The past decade has been among the most turbulent in modern Ethiopian history. Starting from 2015, the nation witnessed the catastrophic unraveling of its political order — a cascade of ethnic violence, large-scale internal displacement, and a devastating civil war in the Tigray region that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. The war, which began in November 2020, drew in forces from Eritrea and the Amhara region, featured atrocities documented by international investigators, and left infrastructure in northern Ethiopia in ruins. Beyond Tigray, communal conflicts in Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and the Somali region have killed thousands more, while approximately 4.5 million Ethiopians remain internally displaced — one of the highest figures in Africa.
These conflicts share a common root: the failure of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system to manage the tensions it was designed to resolve. The 1995 Constitution organized the state around ethno-linguistic lines, creating powerful regional hegemons that incentivized ethnic mobilization as the primary path to political power and economic resources. As competition intensified, identity hardened, and the language of grievance replaced the language of citizenship. Political parties organized almost exclusively along ethnic lines, the security forces fragmented regional loyalties, and the central government oscillated between heavy-handed repression and paralysis. The result was a state that could neither contain its internal conflicts nor command the trust of its diverse population.
The Pretoria Peace Agreement of November 2022 brought an end to the Tigray war, but peace is not the same as resolution. The underlying structural faults remain. It is in this context that the National Consultation — a deliberative process inviting Ethiopians from all walks of life to debate how they wish to be governed — has emerged as a rare and necessary intervention. The views presented in this article are my own individual perspective, developed through observation of the consultation’s proceedings and reflection on Ethiopia’s constitutional trajectory. They are offered not as a definitive blueprint but as a contribution to an urgent and ongoing national conversation.
Pillar I: Micro-Ethnic States and City-State Administrations — From Hegemonic Federalism to Genuine Self-Governance
The Legacy of Ethnic Federalism
Ethiopia’s 1995 Constitution established ethnic federalism as a response to centuries of centralized, imperial rule. The system created regional states organized along ethno-linguistic lines — Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Afar, and others — each with significant autonomy and the constitutional right to self-determination, including secession.
However, this architecture produced unintended consequences. Large regional states wielded disproportionate demographic and political power, creating intra-federal imbalances. Minority groups within these large states found themselves marginalized within their own regions. The system effectively transferred domination from the center to regional hegemons.
The Case for Micro-Ethnic States
The consultation has surfaced a compelling alternative: the division of current macro ethnic states into smaller administrative units. This micro-ethnic state model draws on several rationales:
Proximity and Accountability. Smaller states bring the government closer to the people. When administrative boundaries align with genuine communities of identity and interest, citizens can more effectively demand accountability from their representatives. A micro-ethnic state of, say, the Sidama or Wolayita — already realized in recent referenda — creates a governance unit small enough that officials remain within reach of their constituents.
Protection for Minority Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. Under the current system, dozens of ethnic groups — the Hadiya, Kembata, Gamo, Gedeo, and others — exist as minorities within larger regional states. A micro-ethnic restructuring allows these groups to exercise genuine self-governance within a territorially coherent unit, fulfilling the Constitution’s promise of equality among all Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities.
Reducing Ethnic Rent-Seeking. Large ethnic states create incentives for ethnic mobilization as a strategy for capturing regional resources. Smaller units break these monopolies, dispersing political and economic power across a broader set of actors. This fragmentation of ethnic bargaining power can, paradoxically, reduce the salience of ethnic identity in national politics.
A Laboratory for Federal Experimentation. Micro-ethnic states can serve as policy laboratories, experimenting with different approaches to development, land administration, and cultural preservation. Successful models can then be adopted by other states, fostering organic, bottom-up policy innovation.
Special City-State Administrations
In addition to micro-ethnic states, I propose the creation of special city-state administrations for large urban centers approaching or exceeding one million in population — cities such as Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Bahir Dar, Hawassa, Adama, Mekelle, Gondar, Jijiga, Harar, and Jimma. These cities have become engines of economic growth, cultural exchange, and demographic diversity, and they face governance challenges distinct from those of predominantly rural regions.
A city-state status would grant these urban centers direct administrative autonomy within the federal structure, with an elected mayor and city council possessing powers over urban planning, transportation, housing, public services, and economic development. Importantly, city-state administrations would be multi-ethnic by design, their boundaries defined not by ethnic identity but by functional urban geography. They would serve as spaces where Ethiopians of all backgrounds interact as neighbors, colleagues, and citizens — counterbalancing the ethnic logic of the surrounding micro-ethnic states and fostering a lived experience of national integration.
Challenges and Considerations
Critics of the micro-ethnic model raise legitimate concerns. First, the proliferation of states — potentially numbering 30 to 40 or more — could create an unwieldy federal structure with high administrative costs. Second, the process of boundary demarcation risks igniting inter-communal conflict, particularly in multi-ethnic zones and contested territories. Third, micro-ethnic states must be designed with robust mechanisms for protecting intra-state minority rights, lest the pattern of domination merely replicate at a smaller scale. City-state administrations, meanwhile, must be carefully demarcated to avoid conflicts with surrounding regions over jurisdiction, revenue sharing, and service delivery.
Nevertheless, the consultation’s emerging consensus — and my own assessment — suggests that these risks, while real, are manageable through careful sequencing, constitutional safeguards, and the second pillar of reform discussed below.
Pillar II: Presidentialism, Biometric Integrity, and Managed Party Pluralism
The second pillar addresses the architecture of Ethiopia’s government at both the federal and regional levels. It encompasses four interlocking components: a presidential system, biometric census and elections, genuinely inclusive democratic participation, and a framework of limited but strong political parties.
2.1 The Presidential System — Federal and Regional
Ethiopia currently operates under a parliamentary system where the Prime Minister serves as head of government and the President holds a largely ceremonial role. At the regional level, presidents are elected by regional state councils rather than directly by the people. The consultation has revealed widespread consensus — which I share — that this arrangement has failed to deliver stable, accountable governance.
Direct Mandate and National Unity. A directly elected federal president receives a national mandate that transcends regional and ethnic divisions. Unlike a prime minister selected by parliamentary coalition — often producing backroom deals and fragmented accountability — a president answers directly to the entire electorate. This creates a focal point for national identity and unity.
Directly Elected Regional Governors. Critically, this principle should extend to the regional level. The governor of each micro-ethnic state and the mayor of each city-state administration should be directly elected by the people of that state or city. Currently, regional executives are chosen by state councils, making them beholden to party machinery rather than ordinary citizens. Direct election would make regional governors independently accountable to their constituents, create clear lines of responsibility for state-level performance, and empower voters to reward or remove leaders based on tangible outcomes rather than ethnic affiliation or party loyalty. This dual direct election — federal president and regional governors — would create a comprehensive system of popular accountability from the local to the national level.
Stability and Continuity. Parliamentary systems in ethnically divided societies are prone to frequent government collapse as coalitions form and dissolve. The Ethiopian experience between 2018 and 2022 illustrates this fragility. A presidential system with fixed terms provides governance stability, shielding executives at both levels from parliamentary votes of no confidence and enabling long-term policy implementation.
Clear Lines of Accountability. In a presidential system, the executive and legislative branches are separately elected and independently accountable. Voters know precisely whom to credit for success and blame for failure — whether the federal president, their state governor, or their local representative. This clarity is essential for democratic accountability in a society building democratic habits.
Separation of Powers and Checks. A presidential system, properly designed, strengthens the separation of powers. An independently elected legislature serves as a genuine check on executive power, and an independent judiciary, with secure tenure and adequate resources, arbitrates disputes between the branches. This tripartite structure — as distinct from the parliamentary fusion of powers — provides multiple points of access for citizens and civil society.
2.2 Biometric Census and Elections
Free and fair elections are impossible without an accurate and trusted voter registry. Ethiopia’s electoral history has been marred by allegations of inflated voter rolls, multiple registrations, and systematic disenfranchisement. Biometric technology offers a path to electoral integrity.
Biometric Census as Foundation. A comprehensive, technology-driven national census — capturing fingerprints, facial biometrics, or iris scans — creates a single, deduplicated registry of all eligible voters. This eliminates the possibility of double registration and provides an authoritative count of the electorate. The census must be conducted by an independent, professionally staffed body with international observation and transparent methodology.
Biometric Voter Verification. On election day, biometric verification at polling stations ensures that each voter casts only one ballot and that their identity is authenticated. This dramatically reduces the potential for impersonation, multiple voting, and ballot stuffing — the most common forms of electoral fraud in Ethiopia’s past elections.
Digital Transmission and Tabulation. Results from polling stations can be transmitted digitally, with parallel manual verification, to a central tabulation center. Real-time, publicly accessible results dashboards — displaying data at the polling station level — enable independent verification by political parties and civil society observers.
Trust as the Central Currency. The primary benefit of biometric systems is not technological but sociological: they build trust. When citizens, parties, and international observers can verify the integrity of the electoral process — at both federal and state levels — the likelihood of post-election disputes and violence decreases substantially. Trust in elections is trust in democracy itself.
2.3 Inclusive and Free Democratic Participation
Beyond technology, genuine democracy requires a culture and practice of inclusive participation. The National Consultation has emphasized that elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for democracy.
Civic Education and Voter Awareness. A sustained program of civic education — delivered through schools, community organizations, and media — must accompany institutional reforms. Citizens must understand not only how to vote but why voting matters, what their representatives do, and how to hold them accountable between elections.
Lowering Barriers to Participation. This includes accessible polling stations for persons with disabilities, language accommodations for Ethiopia’s diverse linguistic communities, provisions for pastoralist and remote populations, and robust absentee and early voting mechanisms. Participation must be a practical possibility, not merely a theoretical right.
Civil Society and Free Press. Inclusive democracy requires a vibrant ecosystem of independent civil society organizations and free, pluralistic media. These institutions monitor government performance, articulate citizen demands, and provide the information citizens need to make informed choices.
Women, Youth, and Marginalized Communities. Special measures — including candidate quotas, campaign finance support, and targeted capacity building — are needed to ensure that women, youth, persons with disabilities, and historically marginalized groups can participate not only as voters but as candidates, party leaders, and elected officials.
2.4 Limited but Strong Political Parties
Perhaps the most innovative and contentious element of the proposed reforms is the deliberate limitation of the party system to a manageable number of strong, programmatic parties.
The Problem of Party Proliferation. Ethiopia has historically experienced extreme party fragmentation. In recent elections, dozens of parties contested, most with negligible support, regional appeal only, or ethnic bases. This fragmentation produces coalition governments that are inherently unstable, encourages ethnic outbidding, and confuses voters.
Programmatic, Not Ethnic, Parties. The vision emerging from the consultation — and one I endorse — is of a party system organized around competing policy visions — economic development strategy, social policy, foreign policy orientation — rather than ethnic identity. Programmatic parties’ aggregate interests across ethnic and regional lines, building cross-cutting coalitions that moderate conflict and promote national integration.
Designing Limited Pluralism. Several mechanisms are under consideration:
- Minimum threshold requirements. Parties must demonstrate a minimum level of national support to qualify for ballot access or parliamentary representation.
- Merger incentives. Electoral laws could provide campaign finance benefits, media access, or ballot placement advantages for parties that meet size and organizational criteria.
- Registration standards. Parties could be required to demonstrate internal democracy — elected leadership, transparent finances, regular conventions — as a condition of registration.
- Constitutional recognition. The Constitution could formally establish a legal framework that encourages consolidation without mandating it.
The Delicate Balance. The goal is not one-party rule or artificial restriction of political competition. Rather, it is the deliberate cultivation of a party system capable of generating stable, accountable, programmatic governance. Limiting the number of parties to perhaps three to five nationally competitive formations — with space for regional parties at the state level — would represent a significant departure from the current fragmented landscape.
The Interconnection of the Two Pillars
These two pillars are not merely compatible — they are mutually reinforcing. Micro-ethnic states and city-state administrations address demands for recognition, autonomy, and self-governance at the local level, reducing the stakes of control over the central government. When communities feel secure in their identity and governance at the state level, and when diverse urban populations have their own autonomous space, they are more willing to participate in a national political system organized around programmatic, cross-ethnic parties.
Conversely, a strong presidential system at both federal and regional levels, with a limited number of national parties, provides the cohesion and stability necessary for a highly decentralized federal structure to function. The federal president serves as a unifying figure and the guarantor of the federal order, while strong programmatic parties compete over national policy rather than ethnic mobilization. Directly elected governors anchor accountability at the state level, ensuring that the decentralization of power does not become the decentralization of impunity.
The biometric electoral system provides trust infrastructure for both pillars. Accurate voter registries and verifiable elections ensure that outcomes at the state, city-state, and national levels reflect genuine citizen choice, reducing the temptation to resolve disputes through extra-constitutional means.
Conclusion
The Ethiopian National Consultation represents a rare and precious moment — a society consciously deliberating on its fundamental political architecture. The two pillars discussed in this article — micro-ethnic states and special city-state administrations on one hand, and a comprehensive presidential system with biometric electoral integrity, inclusive participation, and programmatic party competition on the other — offer a coherent and ambitious reform agenda.
These reforms are not without risks. The transition to a new political system always carries uncertainty. Yet the risks of inaction are greater, and the last decade has made this painfully clear. The current system has demonstrably failed to deliver stability, inclusion, or prosperity. It has produced war, displacement, and deepening ethnic polarization. The National Consultation’s emerging reform agenda — imperfect, contested, and evolving — represents
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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