August 3, 2026
A Political Analysis
By Debebe Seifu Jr.
There are moments in the life of a people when political miscalculation crosses the threshold into moral catastrophe. The reported discussions surrounding a possible operational collaboration between elements of the Fano resistance movement and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) represent precisely such a moment. This is not a question of tactics, realpolitik, or the pragmatic calculus of insurgent warfare. It is a question of memory, of justice, and of whether the Amhara struggle retains the moral clarity that gives it its legitimacy.
To every Fano fighter who has bled in the mountains of Gondar and Wollo, to every Amhara mother who has buried a child, to every family displaced from the ancestral lands of Welkait and Raya, this analysis is written for you. Because what is being contemplated in certain political circles is not strategy. It is surrender, dressed in the borrowed language of pragmatism.
The Architecture of a Lie: TPLF’s Colonial Narrative
The TPLF did not merely oppress the Amhara people, a charge that, however serious, might be laid at the feet of any authoritarian governing party. What the TPLF constructed over decades was something far more insidious: an entire ideological architecture, rooted in fabricated colonial historiography, designed to justify the destruction of Amhara identity, political power, and physical safety.
From the earliest documents of the Tigrayan nationalist movement, including the foundational texts of TPLF predecessor organizations in the 1970s, the Amhara were cast not as fellow Ethiopians but as colonial occupiers, a ruling ethnic class that had imposed its language, religion, and identity on subjugated peoples across the empire. This narrative was weaponized far beyond any scholarly purpose. It was encoded into political education curricula, embedded in the rhetoric of allied ethnic movements, and broadcast to the international community.
The consequences of this narrative were not rhetorical. They were lethal. By defining the Amhara as colonial settlers rather than indigenous inhabitants of lands they had occupied for centuries, the TPLF provided the ideological permission slip for every atrocity that followed. The architects of this lie have never, in thirty-four years of political life, issued a single retraction, a single apology, or a single acknowledgment of the human cost of their manufactured history. Anyone proposing collaboration with TPLF without demanding that reckoning as a precondition has not read the death toll.
Fifty Years of Engineered Persecution
From its inception in late seventies to 2018, the TPLF did not just fought and govern Ethiopia poorly. It governed Ethiopia with deliberate and systematic anti-Amhara intent. The distinction matters enormously. Bad governance produces poverty and instability. The TPLF produced that too, but its policy toward the Amhara was not negligence or ideological incompetence. It was a program.
The Amhara military establishment was systematically dismantled. Amhara institutional power at the federal level was suppressed and substituted with a compliant regional structure, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, that functioned as a TPLF satellite rather than a representative body. The ethnic federalism framework enshrined in the 1995 constitution was engineered not to empower all ethnicities equitably, but to cage Amhara political potential within boundaries that could be managed, manipulated, and, when necessary, besieged.
Beyond institutional politics, TPLF funded and armed ethnically organized movements whose explicit operational mandates included the expulsion of Amhara populations from regions across Ethiopia. The massacres in Arba Gugu, the mass deportations from southern regions, the pogroms that swept through Benishangul-Gumuz: in every case, investigators who followed the intelligence, logistics, and political silence found TPLF fingerprints. The scale of organized, tolerated, and enabled anti-Amhara violence during the TPLF era was not coincidental. It was policy.
Institutionalized Hatred: Making Millions Stateless
Perhaps the most underappreciated dimension of the TPLF’s anti-Amhara project was its legal and bureaucratic institutionalization. The ethnic federalist architecture that the TPLF designed classified millions of Amharas living outside the formal boundaries of the Amhara Regional State as settlers, stripping them in one administrative stroke of their land rights, their voting rights, and ultimately, in too many instances, their physical safety.
Amhara farmers who had cultivated the same land for generations, land their grandparents had cleared and in which their ancestors were buried, were reclassified as illegal occupants, subject to expulsion at the discretion of regional authorities with institutional incentives to remove them. This was not bureaucratic error or the unintended consequence of an imperfect system. It was ethnic cleansing laundered through constitutional language, given the dignified cover of administrative procedure.
The result was millions of Amharas rendered stateless within their own country: citizens of Ethiopia without effective citizenship, inhabitants of land without secure tenure, people without the political standing to contest their own dispossession. This system remains, in its structural logic, largely intact. TPLF built it. TPLF defends it. TPLF’s political identity is inseparable from it.
Welkait and Raya: The Stolen Heartlands
No discussion of any Amhara political arrangement, particularly one involving the TPLF, can be conducted without centering the question of Welkait-Tsegede and Raya Azebo. These are Amhara lands. Their Amhara identity is documented in census records, church archives, land registries, and the living cultural memory of their inhabitants, until 1991, when the TPLF upon seizing state power redrew the political map with a pen dipped in ethnic ambition rather than historical legitimacy.
Welkait and Raya were annexed into the newly constituted Tigray Regional State not because demographic or historical evidence supported that boundary, but because their annexation served TPLF’s strategic and resource interests. The fertile lowlands of Welkait and the agricultural wealth of Raya were prizes of political geography, claimed by a movement that had learned to dress territorial appetite in the language of ethnic self-determination.
For three decades, the people of Welkait endured cultural erasure, language suppression, and systematic violence for the crime of remembering who they are. The Welkait Committee, made up of Amhara elders and community leaders who organized to assert their identity, saw its members arrested, imprisoned, and killed. Any Fano commander or political representative who sits across a table from TPLF without the unconditional restoration of Welkait and Raya as a non-negotiable precondition has already surrendered the most fundamental cause of the struggle.
The Deliberate Destruction of Amhara Civilian Infrastructure
When TPLF and TDF forces swept through the Amhara Regional State during the 2020 to 2022 conflict, the destruction they visited upon hospitals, health centers, and schools was not the collateral damage of military operations. It was, by every available measure, a deliberate campaign against the infrastructure of Amhara civilian life. The pattern is unmistakable: institutions were targeted with a thoroughness that implies planning, not chaos.
Health facilities in Kobo, Woldiya, Lalibela, and dozens of smaller towns were looted of their medical equipment, their pharmaceutical supplies, and their records, then damaged or demolished. Schools across the affected zones were occupied, vandalized, and destroyed. These were not military targets. They were the sinews of a society, the institutions through which the next generation of Amhara children would have been educated and healed. Their destruction was a calculated investment in Amhara generational disadvantage. TPLF sought to ensure that the Amhara people would emerge from the war unable to educate their children or treat their sick for years to come.
Mass Rape and Killing: TPLF’s War Crimes Against Amhara Civilians
The sexual violence committed against Amhara women and girls by TPLF and TDF forces during the recent conflict is documented by Amnesty International, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and the joint UN-Ethiopian investigative report. The scale and systematicity of these crimes place them, by any credible legal standard, in the category of crimes against humanity. Thousands of women were raped. Rape was used not as the incidental excess of undisciplined soldiers but as a deliberate instrument of war, deployed to terrorize, to humiliate, and to inflict trauma that would outlast the military campaign by generations.
Alongside the sexual violence, massacres of Amhara civilians were documented across the occupied territories. Killings of farmers, priests, teachers, and elders, people who posed no military threat, were recorded by Ethiopian and international investigators alike. The victims of these crimes are still waiting for justice. Their families are still mourning. Their perpetrators are now, in certain political conversations, being discussed as prospective partners.
One must ask in all seriousness: over whose body is this alliance being contemplated? Over whose violated dignity is this handshake being extended? If those who propose collaboration cannot answer that question honestly, they have no standing to speak for the Amhara people.
The Long Game: TPLF’s Strategic Interest in Permanent Amhara Weakness
It is essential to understand the strategic logic that has governed TPLF’s relationship to the Amhara at every stage of its political existence. The TPLF has never accepted a strong, unified, economically capable, or militarily organized Amhara people as compatible with its regional ambitions. A militarily capable Fano threatens Tigrayan strategic depth. A politically organized Amhara movement threatens TPLF’s ability to dominate federal political processes when it returns to influence. An economically recovering Amhara region threatens TPLF’s resource calculations.
This is not speculation. It is the consistent, documented record of thirty-four years of TPLF political behavior. When an enemy cannot be defeated militarily, the classical alternative is infiltration, co-optation, and internal division. The TPLF’s approach to movements it could not suppress has historically been to find actors within those movements who could be cultivated, flattered, financially incentivized, or ideologically confused into serving TPLF interests while believing they serve their own people’s interests.
The collaboration being discussed is not evidence of TPLF turning a new leaf, recalculating its interests, or acknowledging the justice of Amhara grievances. It is evidence of TPLF executing its oldest and most reliable playbook: using Amhara actors as instruments of Amhara destruction. Whoever in Fano leadership is entertaining this conversation should ask one simple question: what does TPLF gain from this? When they have answered that question honestly, they will understand why it cannot be allowed to proceed.
Division, Delegitimization, and the Gift to Regime Propaganda
The political consequences of any Fano-TPLF collaboration would be catastrophic for the Amhara resistance movement on multiple fronts simultaneously. The first and most immediate consequence would be internal fracture. The Amhara movement draws its coherence from a set of shared, foundational grievances: the dispossession of Welkait and Raya, the massacres and rapes of the recent war, and the institutional marginalization of the TPLF era. Any leadership element that enters into an arrangement with TPLF without addressing those grievances will find itself unable to retain the trust or the participation of the fighters and communities whose sacrifices have sustained the resistance.
The second consequence is the gift it delivers to the Abiy Ahmed government’s propaganda apparatus. The regime has consistently sought to characterize Fano as an unprincipled militia, motivated by narrow ethnic grievance rather than legitimate political demands. The moment elements of Fano are seen sharing platforms, signing frameworks, or coordinating operations with TPLF, the organization responsible for documented war crimes against Amhara civilians, that characterization writes itself across every state media broadcast in the country. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation will not need to fabricate anything. The imagery alone will be sufficient to confuse domestic audiences and alienate international observers who might otherwise have sympathy for the Amhara cause.
The Amhara struggle is legitimate. Its legitimacy rests on the documented history of what has been done to the Amhara people, on the clarity of the demands being made, and on the moral integrity of those making them. Every compromise of that integrity erodes the foundation on which international recognition and domestic solidarity are built.
The Convergence of Enemies: TPLF, the Oromo Prosperity Party, and the Shared Vision of Amhara Subjugation
There is a political truth that too many Amhara analysts have been reluctant to state plainly, perhaps for fear of appearing to fight on too many fronts simultaneously. But the convergence demands to be named: the TPLF’s foundational view of the Amhara people is not meaningfully different from the operational ideology of the Oromo wing of the Prosperity Party that currently governs Ethiopia. Both movements are built, at their ideological core, on the premise that Amhara political, military, and demographic power represents the primary obstacle to their respective visions of dominance. The language differs. The ethnic framing differs. The institutional vehicles differ. The conclusion is the same.
The TPLF characterized the Amhara as colonial oppressors whose historical dominance must be permanently reversed. The Oromo Prosperity Party, in its operational conduct if not always in its official rhetoric, has pursued precisely that same reversal through different instruments: the organized displacement of Amhara populations from Oromia, the arming and political shielding of Oromo Special Forces and affiliated militias responsible for massacres of Amhara civilians in Western Oromia and the Sheger zone, the deliberate exclusion of Amhara from federal security structures, and the systematic weakening of Amhara Regional State institutions. The target is the same. The perpetrators have simply rotated.
What makes this convergence strategically significant is not merely that both movements have persecuted the Amhara. It is that both movements share a common interest in a structurally weakened, politically fragmented, and militarily neutralized Amhara people as the precondition for their own long-term dominance of Ethiopian political life. A permanently disadvantaged Amhara is not a byproduct of TPLF and Oromo PP policy. It is the shared objective around which their otherwise competing interests quietly align.
This shared objective makes the prospect of TPLF-Prosperity Party cooperation far more natural, far more durable, and far more strategically coherent than any arrangement between TPLF and Fano could ever be. Consider the logic from TPLF’s perspective. To work with Fano is to work with a movement that demands the restoration of Welkait and Raya, the territories TPLF illegally annexed and whose return would represent a historic defeat for Tigrayan political ambitions. To work with Fano is to work with a movement whose primary military energy is directed at asserting Amhara political sovereignty, the very outcome TPLF has spent thirty years trying to prevent. There is no version of a genuine Fano-TPLF alliance that does not require TPLF to betray its own foundational interests.
To work with the Prosperity Party, by contrast, costs TPLF nothing of comparable substance. The Prosperity Party has no interest in restoring Welkait and Raya to Amhara. It has every interest in keeping the Amhara resistance movement militarily engaged, politically isolated, and internationally delegitimized. A TPLF-Prosperity Party understanding, whether formal or tacit, serves both parties’ primary strategic interest: the containment of Amhara power. This is not a hypothetical alignment. The ceasefire architecture of the Pretoria Agreement and the political accommodations that followed it already reflect elements of exactly this convergence. The two movements that waged devastating war against each other found it possible to reach accommodation. The Amhara, who were not party to that agreement, found themselves politically abandoned by its terms.
From the Prosperity Party’s side, the calculation is equally transparent. The Oromo political establishment within the Prosperity Party understands that a TPLF that is reintegrated into federal political life, even partially, serves as a useful counterweight to Amhara political demands. A Tigrayan political bloc in Addis Ababa that endorses the constitutional framework, that does not demand Welkait’s return, and that can be presented internationally as evidence of Ethiopian reconciliation, is an asset to the Prosperity Party’s legitimacy. The price TPLF pays for that reintegration is acquiescence to an order in which Amhara interests remain subordinated. It is a price TPLF has already demonstrated it is willing to pay.
This is the political reality that any Fano commander contemplating collaboration with TPLF must confront. TPLF is not choosing between Fano and the Prosperity Party from a position of neutrality, weighing which partnership better serves Ethiopia’s interests or even Tigray’s interests. TPLF is choosing between a partnership with Fano that would require it to support Amhara sovereignty claims it has always opposed, and a partnership with the Prosperity Party that requires it to do nothing more than accept a political arrangement already largely in place. The choice, from TPLF’s strategic perspective, is not difficult. The Amhara must not be naive enough to believe they are the preferred option.
Furthermore, any movement that enters into tactical cooperation with TPLF should understand that it is not merely allying with TPLF in isolation. It is inserting itself into a broader political ecosystem in which TPLF and the Oromo Prosperity Party, whatever their surface conflicts, share a common interest in Amhara subordination. A Fano that embraces TPLF does not thereby gain a counterweight to the Prosperity Party. It gains an actor who can serve as a bridge between Fano and the very government Fano is resisting, on terms determined entirely by the two parties whose foundational ideology regards the Amhara as the problem to be managed.
A Criminal Organization, Not a Political Partner: The Case for Accountability
From the perspective of the Amhara people, the TPLF is not a political party with whom one disagrees. It is not a regional movement with competing but legitimate interests. It is not a former adversary with whom reconciliation is a moral possibility in the absence of justice. From the perspective of the Amhara people, the TPLF is a criminal organization, and it must be named as such without qualification, without diplomatic softening, and without the false equivalence that treats perpetrators and survivors as symmetrical parties in a political dispute.
The evidentiary basis for this characterization is not polemical. It is documentary. The crimes committed by TPLF against the Amhara people meet, by the definitions established in international criminal law, the threshold for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and, on the question of the systematic targeting of Amhara civilians on the basis of their ethnicity, a credible case for genocide that demands formal international investigation. The mass rape of Amhara women and girls, documented by Amnesty International and the UN, was systematic and organized. The deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, hospitals and schools, was systematic and organized. The massacres of non-combatant Amhara civilians across occupied territories were systematic and organized. Systematic, organized ethnic targeting of civilians is not the fog of war. It is a crime.
The TPLF’s leadership, including those who authorized, commanded, and failed to prevent these acts, bears individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute’s command responsibility doctrine. The argument that TPLF is a political actor that must be engaged as such is an argument that places political expediency above the legal and moral obligations owed to the Amhara victims of its crimes. It is an argument that the Amhara people are not entitled to the same standard of justice that the international community demands when similar crimes are committed in other theaters. That double standard must be rejected, loudly and repeatedly, by every voice that claims to represent Amhara interests.
The demand for criminal accountability is not incompatible with political realism. It is the foundation of any durable political order. Across the world, from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the international community has recognized that peace built on impunity is not peace. It is a deferred resumption of violence. Every transitional justice framework that has allowed perpetrators of mass atrocities to avoid accountability has produced environments in which those perpetrators, or their successors, eventually repeated their crimes. The Amhara people cannot afford to participate in building that kind of deferred catastrophe.
What the Amhara people are owed, and what any legitimate political representative of the Amhara must demand as a precondition for any political engagement, is a formal, independent, and internationally recognized criminal accountability process for the crimes committed against Amhara civilians. This means individual prosecutions for identifiable commanders. It means institutional accountability for the TPLF as an organization. It means a formal truth process that places the documented record of anti-Amhara violence into the permanent historical and legal record, so that the narrative cannot be revised, softened, or erased by future political arrangements. It means reparations for the communities destroyed. And it means the unconditional return of the Amhara territories of Welkait and Raya as a matter of law, not negotiation.
Those within Fano or the broader Amhara political leadership who speak of collaborating with TPLF are, whether they intend it or not, asking the Amhara people to abandon these demands. They are asking rape survivors to sit at the same political table as the commanders of the forces that raped them. They are asking the families of massacre victims to treat the organization that authorized those massacres as a legitimate partner. They are asking the displaced communities of Welkait to accept a political framework in which the theft of their land becomes a negotiating chip rather than a crime to be remedied. This is not politics. It is the victimization of the already victimized, conducted by people who invoke the Amhara cause while betraying its most fundamental obligations.
No statute of limitations exists in the court of historical and moral judgment. The TPLF’s crimes against the Amhara people are recorded, documented, and witnessed. The survivors are alive. The evidence is preserved. The international legal architecture for accountability exists. What is required is the political will to pursue it, and that political will must begin with the unambiguous insistence, from every corner of Amhara political life, that the TPLF will answer for what it has done. Not in a political negotiation. Not in a power-sharing arrangement. In a court of law.
Answering the Honest Critic: Conditions Under Which Limited Engagement Might Be Considered
A serious challenge deserves a serious answer rather than dismissal. A skilled interlocutor who points out that this analysis has so far emphasized only the harms inflicted by TPLF, while the Prosperity Party government led by Abiy Ahmed has itself conducted a sustained campaign of repression against both the Amhara and the Tigrayan people, is making a point that must be confronted directly rather than evaded. Since 2023 the federal government has waged open war against Fano inside the Amhara Regional State under a prolonged state of emergency, has conducted air and drone strikes on towns and villages, has carried out mass arbitrary detentions of Amhara youth, professionals, and civic figures, and has imposed communications blackouts that have concealed the scale of civilian harm from outside scrutiny. In Tigray, implementation of the Pretoria Agreement has stalled, large numbers of displaced Tigrayans remain unable to return to Western Tigray and other contested areas, and the interim regional administration has been repeatedly undermined by federal interference. These patterns are well documented by human rights organizations and independent journalists, and they describe a single strategic logic: a central government that benefits from keeping both the Amhara and Tigrayan peripheries weak, divided, and exhausted, whether by war with the state or by unresolved conflict with each other, because a fragmented periphery cannot challenge a consolidating center.
Recognizing this shared structural adversary is not, however, the same as concluding that TPLF has become a trustworthy partner for the Amhara struggle. The reasoning embedded in the objection contains a logical gap. The fact that Amhara and Tigray both suffer under the same federal government does not mean their political organizations must therefore find common cause with each other. Shared victimhood at the hands of Abiy Ahmed’s government does not erase or discount the thirty years of anti-Amhara policy that preceded his rise to power, nor does it erase the specific atrocities committed by TPLF and TDF forces during the very war in which Amhara and Tigrayan forces were combatants on opposing sides. A common enemy does not retroactively absolve a separate perpetrator of its own distinct crimes. The two facts, that Abiy Ahmed’s government is harming the Amhara and that TPLF previously harmed the Amhara, are both true at once, and a sound Amhara strategy must hold both truths simultaneously rather than allowing one to cancel out the other.
It is necessary, then, to distinguish precisely between two categories of relationship that the term collaboration has so far obscured. The first category is political alliance: shared platforms, joint declarations, power sharing arrangements, mutual political endorsement, or any framework that requires the Amhara movement to soften, qualify, or set aside its demand for TPLF accountability and the return of Welkait and Raya. This category remains unacceptable under any circumstance and nothing that follows should be read as weakening that position. The second category is conditional, narrow, and reversible coordination on specific, limited, and verifiable terms. This second category is not by definition impossible, but it is acceptable only if it is built on conditions that protect, rather than compromise, the fundamentals already established.
Before any conversation about even narrow coordination could responsibly begin, TPLF would need to demonstrate good faith through verifiable deeds rather than promises. A credible sequence would include the following, in this order:
• A public and written renunciation of the colonial settler narrative used to justify decades of anti Amhara policy, issued as official TPLF doctrine rather than as a private assurance to negotiators.
• Public acknowledgment of the specific atrocities documented in this analysis, including the mass rape and killing of Amhara civilians, together with active cooperation rather than obstruction with an independent international investigation conducted by the United Nations or a comparable hybrid mechanism.
• A binding, written, internationally witnessed commitment, verified by the African Union or another credible neutral body, to support the legal and administrative return of Welkait and Raya to Amhara administration as a matter of law, not as a bargaining chip to be traded for political concessions elsewhere.
• The naming, disowning, or surrender for prosecution of commanders responsible for documented atrocities, as a unilateral gesture of accountability rather than a negotiated exchange.
• Unilateral, low cost, independently verifiable confidence building actions, such as facilitating the return of displaced persons and ending any continued assertion of claims over Welkait and Raya, undertaken before any reciprocal gesture is requested of the Amhara side.
Even if these preconditions were substantially met, any resulting coordination should remain narrowly scoped. It should be limited to specific, time bound, and clearly defined arrangements, such as a mutual non aggression understanding to avoid mutually destructive conflict while both face a common federal threat, or coordination on humanitarian corridors and the safe return of displaced civilians. It should carry a sunset clause subject to renewal only upon continued verified compliance. It should be mediated and monitored by credible neutral institutions such as the African Union or IGAD rather than negotiated through secret bilateral channels between elites. It should be transparent to the Amhara public and subject to genuine consultation with Fano’s constituent communities and the broader Amhara political spectrum, not announced as a fait accompli. And it must never extend to a joint political platform, a shared governance arrangement, or any mutual statement that blurs the historical and legal record established above. The record of TPLF’s crimes against the Amhara people must remain intact and undiminished regardless of any tactical necessity of the moment.
There is also a wiser strategic alternative to a narrow bilateral arrangement with TPLF specifically. Rather than placing the Amhara movement in a position where its only available partnership against the Prosperity Party center is with the organization most responsible for thirty years of anti Amhara persecution, Amhara political leadership should invest in building a broader multilateral opposition coalition. This would include genuine Oromo opposition movements that are themselves victims of Prosperity Party authoritarianism and must be carefully distinguished from the ruling party itself, other ethnic based federalist movements with legitimate grievances against the current center, and credible civic and diaspora institutions. A diversified coalition reduces Amhara dependence on any single relationship, including one with TPLF, and removes from TPLF the leverage that would come from being the Amhara movement’s only available partner against Addis Ababa.
None of this changes the central conclusion. Abiy Ahmed’s government currently controls the instruments of state violence being used against Amhara civilians today, and resisting and ultimately replacing that government must remain the immediate strategic priority of the Amhara struggle. But the Amhara people are not required to choose between confronting the Prosperity Party and abandoning their demand for TPLF accountability. Both objectives can be pursued at once, provided they are pursued in the correct order and anchored to verifiable conditions rather than to goodwill, sentiment, or short term tactical convenience. Facing two enemies at once is a harder strategic position than facing one. It is not, however, a reason to treat one of those two enemies as a friend.
Hold the Line
To those within Fano leadership who are entertaining this path, this analysis addresses you directly: history will not be kind to the choices you are contemplating. The bones in Welkait will not forgive a settlement that fails to restore what was taken. The women of Kobo and Lalibela and Woldiya, who survived what was done to them precisely because they believed someone would eventually demand accountability, will not forgive an arrangement that treats their attackers as partners. And the Amhara people, who have endured too much and seen too much to be deceived by the language of tactical necessity, will not forgive a leadership that chose political convenience over the demands of justice.
The enemy of one’s enemy is not a friend when that enemy has Amhara blood on both hands, an unreformed ideology in its political documents, and a strategic interest in Amhara weakness written across its entire institutional history. TPLF is not a potential partner. It is the original architect of the wound the Amhara people are still bleeding from. To invite it into the tent of the resistance is not pragmatism. It is the wound inviting the blade.
Hold the line. The struggle is legitimate. Its legitimacy must be protected.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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