Key Points
- Eritrean engagement with Ethiopia will depend on the latter withdrawing its troops from territory awarded to the former, which Ethiopia is likely to follow through on during 2018.
- Ethiopian withdrawal would likely embolden Eritrean anti-government demonstrations, increasing the probability of a military mutiny against President Isaias Afwerki.
- Ethiopia’s likely troop withdrawals would significantly decrease interstate war risks and militant violence threats in northern Ethiopia by Eritrea-backed groups.
Event
On 5 June, the Executive Committee of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) released a statement saying Ethiopia would fully accept and implement the December 2000 Algiers Agreement that ended the 1998–2000 border war with Eritrea, as well as the decisions of the 2002 boundary commission ruling.
Rusted out, Soviet-era tanks and trunks sit abandoned in Asmara’s ‘tank graveyard’ in Eritrea on 20 July 2013. (Jenny Vaughan/AFP/Getty Images)
In April 2017, then Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn indicated that a new draft policy towards Eritrea was being formulated, which he claimed would “emphasize creating sustainable peace”. However, further details of this policy did not emerge before he resigned in February 2018. Desalegn’s successor, Abiy Ahmed, furthered this approach towards Eritrea by calling for bilateral reconciliation in his 2 April inaugural speech, and retaining Foreign Minister Workneh Gebeyehu in his subsequent cabinet reshuffle. Eritrea’s information minister Yemane Gebremeskel responded to Ahmed’s inaugural speech by calling on Ethiopia to withdraw from the “occupied territories”, citing Badme in particular, which has been Eritrea’s longstanding precondition for any talks.
Eventual normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia would also serve the Ethiopian government’s agenda of increased regional economic integration and diversifying its land and air trade routes by facilitating access to Eritrea’s Assab and Massawa ports. Ethiopia already owns a 19% stake in Somaliland’s Berbera port, and the government initiated discussions in April and May aimed at obtaining shareholdings in the Port of Djibouti and Port Sudan.
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